Indonesia, myths and elections

President Soeharto dominated the parliament by "simplifying" the party system, blocking new parties from ever competing in elections, screening out any critical candidate MPs and then actually "recalling" any that did prove problemmatic later. Finally there was the orchestration of electoral politics in such a way that his preferred party could never lose or even face serious competition – at least nationally.

In both cases, the key to success was to exclude the voting public from playing any role in determining the presidents' political fate by creating a closed loop between the president and the pliant parliaments they could dominate. Indeed the only way to break this loop was through catastrophic meltdownsof the social, economic and political fabric of society. This occurred in 1965-66 and then in 1997-98.

It was only then that docile members of parliament turned the tablesand removedthem. (Unlike President Suakarno who was dismissed, President Soeharto resigned before he could be dismissed by the parliament). Looking back it was an absurdly high threshold of national pain to endure merely to say "time is up".

Given all this constitutional history of presidential dominance, it is little wonder that Indonesians believed they operated under a presidential system.

What most failed to notice, however, was that once citizens regained sovereign voice the inherent instability of this radical parliamentary system became very apparent. In the three years between 1998 and 2001, the Indonesian parliament appointed and dismissed 4 presidents.

Indonesia's parliamentary genes

Among the most popular demandsduring Reformasi was that the power of the president had to be pulled back. The newly emboldened parliament was very happy to oblige cutting from the president and giving to itself. The one critical power the parliament did lose, but only to an extent, was the right to appoint the president. This is now shared with the voting public. The right to dismiss the president is now shared with the Constitutional Court, thus elevating the removal of the president from a political motion of no confidence to a genuine legal impeachment process.

Indonesia's new found Latin American presidentalism, however, sits atop the country's 60 years of parliamentary political traditions and culture. Even on the issue of presidential election, the Parliament retains a pre-emptive veto over who can be a candidate. It does this through rules demanding potential candidates have to demonstrate a certain level of support of the parliament. In any normal presidential system this is none of the parliament's business.

Even the arguments in favour of this unorthodox system are classic parliamentary. "The president needs to demonstrate s/hehassupport from the parliament". Thisis what Prime Ministers have to show, not elected presidents. Indonesia's parliamentary DNA runs much deeper than the myth of presidentialism would ever dare to admit.

Overall the parliament has gained much. In many regards it always had certain powers, butsimply never daredto use them. This included the right to initiatelegislation. Among its new powers includes the fact thatits legislation can no longer be vetoed by the President. The parliament now plays a key role in determining senior appointments to the public sector. It has also re-asserted rights to interpellation and indeed to undertake far reaching and probing investigations into government activities through subpoena.

The President has lost much, but has at least gained the right not to be dismissed on partisan political grounds alone.

Put another way, however, MPs are now liberated from a key accountability task under any parliamentary system. This is the duty to support the government when their party is in government and to act as loyal opposition when not in government. With governments no longer able to be dismissed through political votes of no confidence, MPs and so called government parties are free to rat on the government with impunity. They know the government can not fall by their actions. But they are free to extort new concessions or advance their partisan interests if, for example, the government deems it necessary to pass difficult or unpopular measures.

In essence the new political system provides for a president who has to assume all accountability, through vigorous oversight by the parliament,but who enjoyslimited authority. On the other hand, the president faces MPs in a parliament who enjoy substantial authority but little actual constitutional accountability. The president enjoys all the glory as a head of state but little of the power of a head of government. All up a pretty nasty combination. What sort of a masochist, therefore, would like to be President of Indonesia?