Why the markets can't fix themselves - part 2

This is part 2 of George Soros's article. Part one is here.

Market fundamentalism is a false and dangerous ideology. It is false on at least two counts. First, it profoundly misapprehends the way financial markets operate. It assumes that markets tend toward equilibrium and that equilibrium assures the optimum allocation of resources. Academic economists have proceeded far beyond general equilibrium - multiple equilibriums are all the rage now - but market fundamentalists continue to believe they have solid science behind them, not just economics but also Charles Darwin's theory of survival of the fittest. Second, by equating private interests with the public interest, market fundamentalism endows the pursuit of self-interest with a moral quality.

But if financial markets do not tend toward equilibrium, as the theory of reflexivity maintains, private interests cannot be equated with the public interest. Left to their own devices, financial markets are liable to go to socially disruptive extremes.

The fallacy of endowing the market mechanism with a moral quality goes deeper still. What distinguishes markets is exactly that they are amoral--that is to say, moral considerations do not find expression in market prices. That is because efficient markets by definition have so many participants that no single one can affect the market price. Even if some participants are held back by moral scruples, others will take their place at only marginally different prices. For instance, moralists cannot prevent alcohol and tobacco companies from raising capital on more or less the same terms as not-so-sinful enterprises. As a consequence, anonymous market participants need not be overly concerned with the social consequences of their actions because those consequences are so marginal. The amorality of financial markets is one of the factors that contribute to their efficiency: It allows participants to be single-minded about maximizing their returns without regard to the social consequences. (Of course the concept of efficient markets is only an abstraction. In reality many large participants are not anonymous and their decisions may sway others.) It is exactly because markets are amoral that we cannot leave the allocation of resources entirely to them. Society cannot hold together without some consideration of the common interest. If private interests cannot be equated with the public interest, the public interest must be given expression in some other way than through the market.

Here we must draw a distinction between rulemaking and playing by the rules. As market participants, we may pursue our self-interest as long as we play by the rules. But as rulemakers we must be guided by the common interest--and in a democracy we are all rulemakers. By claiming that the public interest is best served by allowing people to pursue their self-interest, market fundamentalists have erased the distinction. Those who subscribe to this convenient ideology have no compunction about bending the rules to their own advantage. The result is not perfect competition but crony capitalism, where the rich and powerful feel morally justified in enjoying their privileged position.

The dangers of market fundamentalism are particularly evident in the international arena. The development of our international financial institutions has not kept pace with the growth of global financial markets. As a result we have seen several major international financial crises since 1980. Their impact on our economy has been relatively modest because whenever a crisis threatened our prosperity the Federal Reserve intervened aggressively--as with the Long Term Capital Management crisis in 1998. But many other countries--Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Russia--have been devastated, some more than once. Instead of recognizing that financial markets are inherently unstable and bigger markets require stronger public institutions to maintain stability, market fundamentalists have reached the opposite conclusion: They blame the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for the instability. They claim that the IMF rescue packages have created a "moral hazard" by encouraging markets to extend more credit than they would have otherwise. Yielding to market-fundamentalist pressure, the IMF has reversed its policy from bailouts to "bail-ins"--in which the private sector must make concessions as well. Since investment banks are not motivated by charity, they want to be paid for their part of the bail-in burden--which means higher interests, which further undermines a developing country's economic growth.

The change in IMF policy in the aftermath of the emerging-market crisis of 1997 to 1999 has increased the cost of capital going to debtor countries. As a result, recent years have seen a reverse flow of capital from the periphery to the center as demonstrated by America's ever-increasing current account deficit, which now exceeds $400 billion or 4 percent of GDP. This has the makings of another bubble that must eventually burst, although the timing cannot be predicted. The recent weakening of the dollar is an ominous sign, especially as the main alternatives--the euro and the yen--are not particularly attractive. The financial crisis in Brazil is even more threatening. From the market-fundamentalist perspective, Brazil has done everything right; yet its bonds today yield more than 20 percent in dollar terms, and no country can live with such high interest rates. After the Bush administration reversed its previous opposition, the IMF recently put together a large, $30 billion bailout package, but the markets were not impressed. Having been told about moral hazard and private-sector burden-sharing, they are determined to avoid it. After a brief rally, yields settled back at more than 20 percent. By imposing such high interest rates, financial markets are engaging in a self-fulfilling prophecy that is making Brazil insolvent. If Brazil fails, the international financial system as currently constituted has failed. Global financial markets have created an uneven playing field that cannot be sustained in its present form.

There is an urgent need to reform the system by strengthening the IMF's function as lender of last resort to countries that cannot get private-sector credit and by encouraging developing countries to pursue more domestic-led growth, which will lessen their dependence on U.S.-led growth. This will require far-reaching institutional changes, but there is no sign that the Bush administration and others in economic authority recognize the need--partly because they remain beholden to market-fundamentalist thinking.

In the international arena, as in the domestic, market fundamentalism assumes that the collective pursuit of private interest produces economic stability. But as today's turmoil shows, the lack of ethical principles and social concerns--whether among governments or accountants--creates enormous instability. Values are shaped by exactly the same reflexive process as market prices. As I explained earlier, there is a two-way connection between values and economic fundamentals (the economic performance of companies and governments) on the one hand and market prices on the other. There is the "normal" connection studied in economic theory by which the supply and demand curves determine prices; there is also an inverse, reflexive connection by which market developments have repercussions on the participants' values and the so-called fundamentals. The more susceptible the participants' values are to market developments, the more unstable the system becomes. Firmly held ethical, professional, and social principles serve as an anchor, keeping financial markets stable. Conditions then approximate those stipulated by economic theory: The values are more or less independent of markets, and the outcome is a more or less stable equilibrium. But when people pursue financial success without regard for other considerations, they become willing participants in initially self-reinforcing but eventually self-defeating processes.

This is exactly what has happened in the recent boom/bust cycle. Warren Buffett and a few others refused to be swayed by the irrational exuberance of the '90s and continued to base their decisions on the fundamentals of economic performance. But the vast majority of investors were swept away by a self-reinforcing tide, and many people who had never previously invested in stocks got sucked in. The removal of restrictions stimulated entrepreneurial and inventive talents; shareholders' interests took precedence over other considerations. The exuberance was not entirely irrational. Only when the fundamentals could not keep up with the expectations did the process become unsustainable. That is when ethical and professional principles failed to keep the process within bounds.

The argument about stability is relevant not only to financial markets but to society at large. As we have seen, financial markets are amoral, whereas society cannot remain stable without some shared values. Although amorality renders financial markets efficient, it also renders them inhuman. Some sense of humanity must be introduced through the political process--even if it means sacrificing some efficiency, as measured in GDP. That is the fundamental insight that American politics has been missing. Market fundamentalists have managed to convince themselves and others that the proper objective of policy is to protect markets from regulation in the interests of efficiency and economic growth. They point to the failure of socialism in all its forms. But this argument is based on faulty logic. It does not follow from the fact that regulations are imperfect that unregulated markets are perfect. The fact is, all human constructs, including markets, are imperfect in one way or another; perfection is beyond our reach. That is where fundamentalist beliefs, including market fundamentalism, are always wrong: They lay claim to ultimate truth.

To be sure, in developing a new regulatory framework we must remember that regulations are liable to be even more imperfect than markets. They need a feedback mechanism that allows mistakes to be corrected. That is what makes regulated markets superior to central planning. In the absence of feedback either from markets or from free speech and free elections, there is no limit to how far governments can go wrong. But democracy can keep the excesses of government within bounds, just as government can contain the excesses of the financial markets.

In the last two decades or so--and particularly since the '90s--we have given financial markets too much free rein. We have allowed corporations to maximize profits to the detriment of considerations like equality of opportunity, environmental protection, and maintenance of the social safety net. Professional standards have broken down, and conflicts of interest have proliferated. Correcting these deficiencies will require stronger government intervention. Interestingly, the measure that is likely to be most effective in clearing the air is the recent directive issued by the SEC requiring the chief executive and financial officers of the 947 largest companies to certify their accounts dating back to the beginning of the previous fiscal year. The officers could be held criminally liable if the accounts do not give a fair representation of the company's financial condition--even if they are in conformity with the GAAP . The directive is sufficiently vague so that the officers are likely to err on the side of caution and reveal all questionable practices. It reasserts the supremacy of broad principles over particular rules. In doing so it harks back to the glory days of the SEC pre-dating Mike Milken when principles like insider trading and stock manipulation were not yet codified by court decisions.

Legislation is only part of the answer. Changes in the law must be accompanied by a fundamental change of attitude. In the last analysis, professional standards can be maintained only by the professions themselves, and conflicts of interest can be avoided only if people recognize a common interest other than self-interest. Without such a change of heart, new regulation and new legislation will only encourage more evasion.

It is unrealistic to expect that all market participants will suddenly undergo such an ethical conversion. But public opinion and public discourse--as we saw in the '90s--can have a dramatic impact on individual behavior. Americans must relearn the difference between a collection of individuals each pursuing his or her self-interest and a society of people guided by the public interest. How well Americans relearn that difference may well determine whether this country and the world return to economic stability and prosperity in the months and years to come.