Being neighbourly in the post-Mubarak Mid East

Recent events in the Middle East have increased Israel’s paranoia that it would once again be surrounded by a sea of hostile neighbours bent on its demise.

Since the crisis in Egypt began, the Israeli media has been abuzz with reports of politicians and analysts predicting that an Islamist take over was imminent.

To Israel’s East, King Abdullah II’s recent engagement with Jordan’s Islamists provided them with a greater say in the running of the country. Hezbollah in the North has gained political supremacy in Lebanon due in part to the Israel-Lebanon War in 2006.

Further East, Iran’s nuclear program and strike capability add to the list of Israel’s real or imagined threats.

Finally, repeated attempts to dislodge HAMAS from the Gaza Strip have proven unsuccessful, and negotiations with the Palestinians have reached an impasse.

To the political establishment, such developments vindicate its existing view that Israel is perpetually vulnerable, and its survival is dependent upon a zero-sum approach towards the Palestinians as well as its Arab neighbours.

The zero-sum approach basically means that when dealing with the Palestinians or her Arab neighbours, Israel must always emerge in a far superior position than her interlocutor. This approach applies not only to peace agreements but also to military responses to rocket attacks and cross-border skirmishes.

The win-at-all-cost mentality, particularly when it involves retaliatory strikes, has directly and indirectly caused much suffering to Palestinians and other Arab civilians. This has invariably created popular discontent with Israel throughout the Arab and indeed the Muslim world, fuelled Islamist rage and tarnished Israel’s image internationally.

Moreover, it makes it extremely difficult for Arab regimes that already have peace treaties with Israel like Egypt and Jordan to legitimise existing agreements or for those Arab states that wish to seek normalisation with Israel.

Perhaps there are strategic advantages of maintaining an agreeable tension with her Arab neighbours. But even so, the validity of the zero-sum approach must surely be called into question in light that it has been counter-productive to Israel’s purported efforts to co-exist in peace with her Arab neighbours.

One of the major tenets of Israel’s national security doctrine has been to maintain a military superiority to her Arab neighbours as a deterrent. To that end, Israel possesses a well-trained and professional armed forces, enforces conscription, manufactures and acquires advanced weapons technology including its highly ambiguous nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in an effort to prevent potential aggressors from gaining the technological advantage, Israel has required neighbouring Arab states to police common borders to prevent weapons smuggling and/or infiltration into Israel, obtained commitments from international allies not to supply high tech weaponry to her neighbours and restricted the kinds of technology that can be imported into the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

With the possession of such military capabilities comes the invariable temptation and indeed ability to use it. When the Israel-Hezbollah war erupted in Lebanon in 2006, Israel’s military responded by attacking Lebanese civilian institutions as well as Hezbollah targets instead of focusing its attacks to the latter.

Artillery shelling and aerial bombardments destroyed roads, bridges and buildings including Beirut international airport. Israel’s use of white phosphorous bombs was also highly controversial. The war claimed the lives of approximately 40 Israeli civilians and 1100 Lebanese civilians, not to mention the thousands that were injured as well.

The attacks on civilian targets, while sound to Israeli military strategists, were perceived by many in the Arab world and around the globe as excessive, unfair and akin to collective punishment.

As former UK Foreign Office Minister Kim Howells criticised: “The destruction of the infrastructure, the death of so many children and so many people. These have not been surgical strikes. And it’s very difficult, I think, to understand the kind of military tactics that have been used. You know, if they’re chasing Hezbollah, then go for Hezbollah. You don’t go for the entire Lebanese nation.”

Likewise in Gaza, Israel’s response to rocket attacks carried out by Palestinian militants has been to strike hard and fast. Israel has launched air strikes, carried out a military invasion (Operation Cast Lead in 2008-09) and enforced a blockade of the Strip.

Israel’s right to protect its citizens from rocket or any types of attacks from elements that wish to do it harm is undisputed. However, it’s excessive use of force, attacks on civilian targets and controversial military tactics do raise serious problems.

First, the proportion of civilian casualties is extreme, which has generated condemnation not only from the Arab world but also from Israel’s international allies.

Second, the humanitarian crisis that has developed in Gaza as a result of Israel’s continued blockade of the Strip has focussed international scrutiny on Israel and even provoked activist action. The mobilisation of the “Gaza Freedom Flotilla” to deliver essential supplies to Gaza in defiance of Israel’s naval blockade is a case in point.

Third, the hardships inflicted on the Palestinians in Gaza not only galvanises Arab and Muslim opinion against Israel but also creates domestic problems for neighbouring Arab states. For example, Egypt’s borders were breached in 2008 by Palestinians desperate to buy food and essential supplies.

The seeming disregard for the lives of Arab civilians and more importantly, its handling of the Palestinian conflict are the main reasons why normalisation between Israel and the rest of the Arab world have not been forthcoming.

Even her peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt have not produced the envisaged positive results.

For instance, despite the economic benefits of the Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs) between Egypt, Jordan and Israel (which enable goods produced by either Egypt and Israel or Jordan and Israel duty-free access to US markets), neither Arab state could show enthusiastic support for the plan or further its development in light of strong domestic support for the Palestinians.

As Jordanian Ambassador to Israel Ali Al-Ayed argued: “Normalisation cannot blossom in a political vacuum. It is directly affected by the general regional situation and the barometer of the Palestinian conflict”.

It has been 63 years since the creation of Israel, and she is realistically not in danger of being “wiped off the map”. While there are certainly radical elements advocating her demise, her position as a legitimate nation-state is widely recognised. The two questions this raises are: (a) Is the Arab world still determined to destroy Israel? (b) Is Israel’s only option to gain acceptance in the Middle East through the barrel of a gun?

The Saudi Initiative that was endorsed by the Arab League in 2002 and re-affirmed in 2007 provides the answer to the first question. The Arab states are prepared to recognise Israel and grant her a full normalisation of ties provided:

1. Israel withdraws completely from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967 as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon.
2. Israel achieves a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194.
3. Israel accepts the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since the 4th of June 1967 in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

That this initiative was proposed by Saudi Arabia, which is considered by many to be the centre of radical Wahabi Islamism (which rejects Israel’s right to exist), is extremely noteworthy.

It underscores the Arab world’s acceptance of Israel’s right to exist. Now assuming Israel accepts this offer, it would be unrealistic to think that she would be immediately embraced by the Arab world. Decades of conflict and mistrust mean that Arab-Israeli relationships will have to be thawed out gradually through meaningful confidence-building measures such as mutually-beneficial trade agreements.

The advantages for ending the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and obtaining Arab state support are numerous. Among the most important are: (a) that the Iranian and Islamist threat would be severely diminished as the religious and ideological justification of eliminating Israel would cease to exist; (b) moderate regimes in the Middle East will be strengthened and emboldened to push for greater cooperation with Israel.

Undoubtedly, spoilers on both sides would strive to torpedo any Arab-Israeli rapprochement at every step of the way; however, once it becomes clear that the commitment of both leaders and the people to cooperating, and indeed coexisting with the other is steadfast, such spoilers would invariably be marginalised.

Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt and now Algeria, show that Arabs are rejecting the old and outmoded ways of thinking, and are poised for change. In such a climate it is opportune for Israel to reassess her strategy vis-a-vis the Palestinians and her Arab neighbours.

The major stumbling block seems to be Israel’s existing national security doctrine. It posits that if a true and lasting peace with the Palestinians and the Arab world were to occur, it would be increasingly difficult for Israel to justify its foreign aid from the US, acquisition of weapons and armaments and even conscription. This would, as many strategists believe, severely weaken the state of Israel.

Therefore, Israel must always maintain some form of tension with its neighbours either in the form of a low-level conflict or a cold peace with its neighbours. It is for this reason that Israeli actions can sometimes be provocative, such as the continued building and/or expansion of settlements in East Jerusalem despite pledging to halt such projects. Such actions incense the Palestinians and the rest of the Arab World, and signal Israel’s unneighbourly intentions.

The current Netanyahu government is a firm believer in this doctrine. It does not fear that Islamists would assume political control of neighbouring Arab states, but rather that the status quo will change, and Israel will be forced to change the way she deals with the Palestinians and the Arab states.

The ‘Pali-leaks’ documents have severely discredited the Palestinian Authority and scuttled the existing Palestinian negotiation team. Saeb Erekat, the chief negotiator has resigned and the cabinet in the West Bank has been dissolved in preparation for elections in September 2011. Moreover, HAMAS’ role in negotiations is still unclear. At present, this uncertain state of affairs has resulted in a stalemate in negotiations between the Palestinians and the Israelis, which bodes well for those resistant to change in Israel.

International pressure to compel a change in Israeli mindset has already begun with several Latin American countries recognising a Palestinian state, which does not yet exist. The EU has recently urged Israel to take the lead in overcoming the negotiation stalemate with fresh and innovative proposals. The EU could well move unilaterally if it finds progress on this front severely wanting. Thus, it is clear that the international community expects Israel to take meaningful steps to resolve the longstanding conflict with the Palestinians and with her Arab neighbours.

To those who ask why it is always Israel that must make concessions, the answer is simple: Israel is no longer the underdog but the big dog in the yard, and as a major world power, is expected to act accordingly. As the “only democracy in the Middle East”, Israel should spearhead the campaign for a just and lasting peace in the region.

The Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab conflicts have lasted long enough. There are no prizes if these conflicts reach a centenary.