Forming government in Iraq

A political breakthrough in Iraq has finally been reached but after eight months of tiresome political jostling, in what shape is the new government?

It was an arduous, protracted and tiresome journey at the best of times, but Iraqi politicians finally brokered a deal to form a new government. The announcement came as a result of days of intricate negotiations both in Baghdad and Erbil and were an elusive power-sharing formula that satisfied all sides was finally reached.

As has became widely expected in recent weeks, Nouri al-Maliki retains his position as Prime Minister, with the Kurds retaining the presidency. Iyad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya would assume the Speaker of Parliament position, along with the heading of the newly established National Council for Strategic Policy.

Although the basis for the new government is crucial, distribution of key ministries and the makeup of the new cabinet are still to be confirmed. Either way, the likes of al-Iraqiya and the Sadrist will exact a price for their support of al-Maliki with key roles in the new cabinet.

With the new journey that weary and dejected politicians must now assume, the crucial milestone of agreeing on the basis of a new government may soon be eroded by the many political cracks that Iraq will need to bind. The maintaining of such a delicate balance may prove more difficult than the onset of any agreement itself.

Facts speak louder than words. Any country that sets the world record for the longest period of time without a government after an election speaks volumes about its socio-political handicaps.

Eight months and twenty parliamentary session minutes later, the MPs have plenty of work to get started on. For every day the MPs bickered and the government-forming stalemate ensued, the very people that these politicians were elected to serve suffered. Much progress remains to be made in Iraq and as far as the government is concerned the real work has yet to begin.

The problem in Iraq, a disparate country fuelled by historical mistrust, is the thirst for power. No side is easily willing to relinquish power to another. And finding a power-sharing solution that will satisfy each side is much easier said than done as the facts clearly prove.

Amidst the current political frenzy, it is often forgotten that protracted negotiations and political stalemates are hardly new phenomena in Iraq. Often at critical junctures in the past, fervent pressure from the US ensured political progress and compromise amongst the main factions. As much as the US has encouraged and attempted to help muster an inclusive government, its lack of influence this time round is clear, as Kurds, Shiites and Kurds stuck to their guns.

As kingmakers, the Kurds had clear demands for their inclusion in any coalition and if all their preconditions have been met, then this serves to solidify the Kurdish strategic standing both in Iraq and the Middle East. In recent weeks, the Kurdish leadership has played a key role in facilitating negotiations and acting as the political raft in a gulf of political tension. This illustrates the vital role that the Kurds play, both in terms of commanding a share of seats that affords them the role of kingmakers but also as the key balancing piece in the jigsaw between the Sunnis and Shiites.

In theory, the biggest breakthrough for the Kurds was the commitment of other parties to the constitution. Whilst Baghdad often looks to find solutions to political rifts, the constitution which already provides a roadmap for resolving a number of key issues such as disputed territories, hydrocarbon law and federalism is sidelined.

Simply put, as long as Baghdad abides by the constitution and acts on its promise in practical terms, then the vast majority of the Kurdish wish list is already covered.

Although, a number of breakthroughs had been prematurely announced in recent weeks, it became increasingly clear that Nouri al-Maliki had won his challenge to retain the premiership. His pan Shiite alliance looked formidable on paper and the strategic enticement of the Kurdish coalition was all that was needed for him to cross the line. With the Kurds holding a tight grip on the demand for the presidency, it left al-Iraqiya with the Speaker of Parliament position.

The heart of the problem ultimately lies with the appeasement of the al-Iraqiya group and the idea of establishing an all inclusive government. Allawi held the view to the last moment of negotiations that as the victor at the polls, his group should play the lead role in forming government. In light of this stance, convincing him firstly to accept a role under al-Maliki and secondly as a “second” party was not going to be easy.

Ultimately, the application of democracy to Iraq is often like applying square pegs to circular holes. Regardless of the elections results and the number of seats that parties are afforded, no side is happy to take proportional power in line with the seats won.

Although on paper, al-Iraqiya came out on top at the polls, it was a misleading reading. State of Law only came second as the major Shiites groupings initially failed to form a coalition. Once the Shiites groups announced a new alliance to create a Shiite super-party, this sent ominous danger signals to the Sunnis. However, the timing of Moqtada al-Sadr’s backing of al-Maliki was the real hammer blow to Allawi. Thus Allawi’s insistence on a government which reflects the results of the elections is not so accurate, once the real votes in parliament are tallied up.

Whilst foreign powers have tried to push Iraqis along and have lamented the time taken to form government, ironically they have been at the core of the problems. Turkey, Iran, America and Sunni neighbours have each had their own ideals on a future vision of Iraq and the basis for power-sharing. For neighbouring Sunni countries and the Washington administration, a new Sadrist backed al-Maliki premiership tipped the scales firmly in Tehran’s favour, and they worked tirelessly to redress this balance.

It may well have been pressure from Tehran above all other external parties that led to the current deal between the main parties.

The real question for a parliament which will be based on power-sharing and national unity is where do politicians with an over flowing “in tray” of tasks go from here? Any compromise or power-sharing formed on delicate foundations or through gritted teeth will be prone to future splits and ultimately collapse. For example, one of Allawi’s conditions was that no political decision could be made without his agreement.

As a price for his inclusion, Allawi wanted roles with real power but this is in many ways in contradiction to the constitution. Any position that can rival the role of prime minister in executive powers spells trouble. However, the backdoor manoeuvring that has taken place to appease Sunnis comes from an evident desire to avoid a return of the dark days of insurgency. By the same token, although Allawi remained steadfast in his quest for power, other elements within his ranks could clearly see the reality of a new al-Maliki leadership and wanted to avoid the bare-cupboard nature of political exclusion that they witnessed before. As a result they showed increased willingness to work with al-Maliki.

Either way, it appears that Allawi and al-Iraqiya commanded a high price for their endorsement. The presidency of the National Council for Strategic Policy was designed to keep Allawi in the frame as a key Iraqi leader. However, Allawi was far from happy with consultative or ceremonial roles and demanded real power in this role. It is still unclear how much authority this council will really have.

How al-Maliki will fare in an environment were his wings are essentially clipped will make interesting reading, especially as al-Maliki has often been criticized in the past for monopolising power and having too much of a direct influence on the security forces.

One thing is clear. The new government of 2011 will certainly be weaker and not stronger than the government of 2006, and in reality this new national partnership may pose more questions than answers.