Pakistan's nukes - how secure?

Since 1998 Pakistan has not tested any nuclear weapons. So it doesn't have CAT-F PALs, one might reasonably surmise. We might well ask; if Pakistan has CAT-F PALs then why doesn't Pakistan store fully assembled warheads? We cannot conclude that Pakistan has PALs that are not by-passable.

Should it indeed prove the case that Pakistan does not possess CAT-F type PALs we might be able to conjure a possible theft scenario. This is not really discussed in analysis but I will explore it in my book.

As stated above Pakistan is reputed to separate the AF&F system, the physics package and the delivery components of its nuclear weapons. Although Pakistan likely has a PAL system that locks the AF&F system from unauthorised users this system is not integrated with the fissile core.

Naturally the fissile cores of Pakistan's nuclear weapons are, one would feel, highly secure. It's hard to imagine a tactical level assault by militants over-running the Pakistani military facility or facilities that store these fissile cores. How could a would-be thief get their hands on these fissile cores and what could they do with them if they did so?

The best way would be by launching a separate high consequence terrorist attack against India, such as an attack on India's parliament or a very sacred Hindu site. The objective would be to provoke a crisis between India and Pakistan that would see both countries mobilise their armed forces and place them on a high alert footing.

Because of a perceived imbalance in overall strategic firepower Pakistan does not maintain a no-first use nuclear doctrine. For Pakistan to maintain a credible deterrent in the face of a military showdown the temptation would surely be high for the Army to assemble its nuclear weapons and then place them on their delivery vehicles ready to be used first if ordered to do so.

We are not too sure of where Pakistan stores its strategic nuclear capabilities nor how they have planned to physically assemble their nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis with India.

Imagine there are three facilities in existence, A, B and C. Let us suppose that the AF&F system is housed at A, the fissile cores at B and the delivery vehicles at C. A number of possibilities for the transport of material from A, B and C are possible.

One could be for A and B to be transported separately to C for assembly at C. If so, the fissile cores would be at their most vulnerable to being stolen not when they are stored at B but when they are transported to C (or perhaps first to A). A tactical level attack employing heavy machine gun fire and anti-tank weapons might be able to overcome the Pakistan Army's nuclear convoy defence as the cores are being transported.

Transport by helicopter could deal with this, but still would be vulnerable for instance through use of shoulder fired missiles. The CIA sent over plenty of those for Jihadi use during the 1980s. Helicopter transport probably is easier for India to detect and attack. India has recently announced that it will move all of its MIG-29 fighters to the border with Pakistan. Indian air power might deter the air transport of the fissile cores.

Hopefully what occurs is that the AF&F system is transported and assembled with the physics package at B and then jointly transported to C with the PAL system in place during transport. One would think so, but we cannot be sure how the Pakistani system works given the India factor.

If militants capture the actual fissile cores they would not be able to detonate them. This would require them to develop their own system to implode the weapons grade uranium, which is highly unlikely given the great difficulties involved. At best they would need to mine the uranium metal from the physics package for their own pre-developed gun-assembled firing device.