Iran: theocracy versus democracy

Now that the most violent episode of the series of post-election events seems to have calmed down in Iran, it is time to dig one layer deeper into an analytical survey of events regarding this non-Arabic Middle Eastern country. The very core of these recent occurrences may be traced to a century of conflict between theocratic and democratic ambitions. From the very beginning of democracy-seeking attempts through the Constitutional Revolution of 1906-1911, the political desires of the religious body have continued to pose a significant challenge to these efforts.

There is little need to mention that democratic efforts have seen no notable achievement, but politico/religious ambitions have also never been able to deliver a solely theocratic regime in Iran.

The recent disturbing events that have plagued the latest presidential election are not just about the next four years of presidential incumbency. They are part of the aforementioned long lasting conflict between democratic and theocratic ambitions in Iran’s political history.

In fact, a clearly fraudulent election result and its aftermath have transformed Teheran into a battlefield, whereupon the theocratic components of the Iranian political system have undertaken to eliminate - or in precise words - to nullify all democratic components. Iran enjoys neither a democratic political system nor a theocratic one. In the simplest of terms, it may be said that Islamic Republic of Iran manifests paradoxical democratic and theocratic features.

The regime that emerged from the 1979 revolution has always suffered from the tensions between the two antithetical components, theocratic and democratic, that make up the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The 1997 presidential election was a milestone in this troubled relationship. The Supreme Leader and Guardian Council as the leading theocratic bodies backed the conservative candidate, Nategh-eNoori, but the reformist candidate Mohammad Khatami gained more than 20 million votes, and it seemed an overwhelming majority of Iranians were urging the theocratic powers to bear with a reformist state for the next eight years.

But this apparent success deceived the reformists, who thought that a high turnout in the most recent presidential election would leave the theocratic component with no choice but to accept a reformist government - at least for the next four years. In contrast, the theocratic bodies came up with a plan to fight back after the high turnout in the election.

In other words, while the 1997 experience misled the reformists and left them shocked by the fraudulent election result, it forced the theocratic component to have a plan on the table in advance. Two preceding instances showed the theocratic component did not bear with democratic inclinations: in the seventh and eighth parliamentary elections (2003 and 2007), almost all of the reformist candidates were rejected by the Guardian Council, which has the authority to approve the expediency of candidates who run in any form of election. The Iranian people were disappointed with the reformists’ constant failure to fulfil their wishes; thus, the turnout rate was not very high and did not cause any serious trouble for the government.

These two parliamentary elections could be seen as the starting point for the theocratic trend to nullify the democratic process of the political system - a trend that reached its high point in last month’s presidential election. Eighty-five per cent of the eligible population turned out to vote in the June election. Many inactive voters took part in the election to say “no” to Ahmadinejad. Thus it is very difficult to justify the results announced by the government.

Possibly less than surprising was the fact that neither the government nor the theocratic bodies made any concerted effort to at least make it look like a clean and fair election. The Supreme Leader, surprisingly, endorsed the results in a broadcast announcement made just a few hours after voting closed. This was indeed very strange, given that he is not in a legal position to endorse the election. Endorsement is the Guardian Council's territory: it takes about ten days to endorse every election.

Even more interesting was the fact that the voting papers shown on TV and on the government official news agency IRNA were not folded: they were written in single handwriting with a single pen. There are also many problems with the official statistics that have been announced. According to these statistics, there was more than a 100 per cent turnout in 170 cities.

I read all these as representing a message to the reformists and especially to the people at large. The Iranian government wants it understood - specifically by those who voted against the theocratic bodies - that there is no point in taking part in any future election. Therefore, the plan is not just about this recent presidential election. The plan is to continue to thwart all and every democratic component of the political system in Iran.

Although the theocratic component has the capability to stifle any democratic elements in the short and even mid-term future, it is not clear that the situation can go on like this ad infinitum.

Two reasons may provide an explanation for this claim. Given that 68.3 per cent of Iran’s population is under 34 years of age (Statistical Center of Iran 2007) the country's youth, who have been the main force of both the 1997 and 2009 elections, are not going to stand aside. Post-election events and a high turnout in the streets happened despite almost all communication channels being closed down by the government a day before the election. Using the minimum possible Internet access, people, specifically youths, organised their moves through Facebook, Twitter and the Iranian website, Balatarin. These youths are armed with both the knowledge and the technologies of modern life.

In addition, the women’s role should not be overlooked. Since 1998, the number of female university students has outnumbered the number of male students. In 2007, 65 per cent of university students were female (Radiafarda 2008). It is the women who will suffer most from a theocratic government and its anti-women edicts. Thus, it is not surprising that women played a key role in the post-election events. The infamous murder of a young girl named Neda Aghasultan came to be the symbol of resistance.

Although the government may slow the people’s agitation for a time, the people will certainly not cease their protest against living under the intolerable rules of a theocratic government.

The other challenge to Iran’s long-term, hitherto triumphant, theocratic government is posed by internal conflict at the elite level. The Shiite clergy, who rule the country, are loosely organised. There is no centralised hierarchal system like in Catholicism, wherein a Pope leads a levelled clergy. The tradition of debate and questioning is an essential part of Houze (religious schools). Thus, based on the aforementioned religious structure and tradition, disagreement and a specific sort of pluralism are embedded in the relationships of Shiite Ayatollahs (Gheissari & Vali 2004). These features are reflected in the Islamic Republic of Iran as a political regime as well. Even the Supreme Leader’s authority, as the one who has higher authority over the country’s other institutions, is more political than religious.

There are many high-ranking clerics, both within and outside the political institutions, who while they may not subscribe to secular democracy, evince a democratic interpretation of an Islamic Republic. They are against a solely theocratic regime. Therefore, the theocracy-democracy battle is not only a battle between seculars and religious figures. The theocratic component has to fight an internal battle which does not auger well. High ranking religious figures such as Grand Aystullah Montazeri and Sanei, as well as political figures including head of the Assembly of Elite Hashemi Rafsanjani belong to the opposing camp.

Rafsanjani’s latest speech at the (July 17) Friday prayers gathering, in which he avoided endorsing the election as a “clean” one, specifically opened a new battle ground for the theocratic body. He insisted on the importance of the people’s endorsement of the legitimacy of the regime, which clearly shows where he stands in the theocracy-democracy battle. Rafsanjani is currently Head of the Assembly of Experts, a group of 86 Shi'ite Muslim clerics commissioned to oversee the Supreme Leader. Thus, it is not surprising that there have been severe reactions to Rafsanjani’s speech.

These reactions included that they were adamant about the utmost importance of Tanfiz - an official ceremony in which the Supreme Leader endorses the winning candidate’s presidency - as the main source of government legitimacy. Ayatollah Yazdi (2009), a key member of the Guardian Council, maintained that the people’s vote without the Supreme Leader’s endorsement is worthless. Moreover, in July 26, 2005 MPs signed an open letter to the Supreme Leader pronouncing that all institutions and positions in Islamic Republic would be legitimised only through the Supreme Leader’s endorsement.

It is hard to foresee any significant change, either through current demonstrations or efforts by opponent elites such as Rafsanjani, in the short-term perspective. However, the fact that the theocratic component has to fight both a vitally alive society and strong religious and political leaders leaves one with many doubts about the success of any plan to develop a solely theocratic government in Iran in the long-term.