Brand Rudd's fantasy Defence White Paper

Furthermore, it speaks volumes that Indonesia hardly got a mention in the White Paper. The build up would not give Canberra the ability to independently hurt China, but it may leave us with the ability to independently deliver significant military firepower in our immediate region.

We are of the view that the downfall of Suharto, which was not really welcomed in Canberra, and the subsequent East Timor crisis has played a more important role in Australian strategic planning than commonly realised. The current order in Indonesia, though welcomed, remains fragile.

Whether the announced build up would actually provide deterrence is another matter. In the 1990s the Clinton Administration, what was called "cruise control" diplomacy, was fond of lobbing cruise missiles to little political effect.

The Defence White Paper would have the Australian Defence Force do everything bar create an outpost on the Moon. This aspect of the Paper the government labels as "concurrency". For instance, the government would have the ADF inter alia; deploy a brigade "group" in one area of our "primary operational environment;” a battalion "group" in another; projecting power through strategic strike beyond this area; maintaining sea and air control within that area; provide tailored contributions, including at battalion "group" level, in support of US global operations and "lead" military coalitions in our immediate neighbourhood.

Under concurrency the government would have the ADF do all this and more at the same time if deemed necessary. Such fantastically ambitious operational planning is a recipe for disaster. No plan survives contact with the enemy. What happens if on one front things do not go according to plan? Concurrency could lead to an overstretched force being defeated at one point along a ludicrously inflated battle space.

We should note further that concurrency, it is said, requires Australia to have an adaptive and flexible force structure. However, how flexible is a force structure that appears geared towards heavy weaponry? Actually, as should be clear from the above, most of the combat burden under concurrency would fall upon the Army. A land force structure built around heavy tanks and 155mm artillery, including self-propelled artillery, is hardly "adaptable and "flexible".

Many have focused on the fact that the funding strategy that is meant to underpin the planned military build up has been poorly developed.

The government is relying on forecasts of economic growth above the trend average during recovery to bring the budget back into surplus. It is argued that there exists ample spare capacity in the economy that will fuel such growth on the up-turn. However, given the financial breakdown, it is quite possible that credit growth will remain weak in which case past experience of rapid and sustained GDP growth post a recession might not be replicated.

If the government's budget strategy flounders because of overly optimistic growth projections then policy commitments that rely on large public expenditures, such as the defence strategy would be at risk.

The government has argued that it will be able to make savings in the defence budget to offset the spending commitments on equipment; however, seasoned observers, such as Hugh White, have pointed out that the defence department has a poor track record in making cost savings.

Moreover, defence acquisition programs have a tendency to go well over budget. Can a streamlined department keep acquisition costs under control?

It could well be possible that growth projections will not be realised, the necessary level of savings in the defence budget will not eventuate and that procurement costs will be greater than supposed. Should such events come to pass the "Force 2030" will be all but blown out of the water. The Chinese Navy might not really be necessary to do this after all.

The government's strategy is based on false premises, it overplays the China card, obscures the real intent underpinning policy, asks far too much of our armed forces and is based on a risky financial strategy.

No wonder it was released on a Saturday, buried by the climate policy back flip on the Monday and became but a distant memory after the budget was handed down.

Perhaps "Force 2030" will just end up being another brand.