Can we save 'problem gamblers' from the consequences of their actions?

On Mill’s view, it would only be justified to prevent someone from gambling, for example by banning her, if her actions were causing harm to others, not for her “own good”, as perceived by others. In any case, she should not gamble if she believes her actions are causing harm to others. But if others are not being harmed, it is permissible for someone to gamble.

Dickerson’s emphasis on “at-risk” gamblers fits the harm principle better than the “problem gambler” approach. First, it’s doubtful that merely preventing someone from being subject to specific marketing practices constitutes a restriction on her liberty. Second, where techniques are used on at-risk gamblers in order to keep their patronage, and the development of gambling-related problems is likely to result, the harm principle might well be violated. Grounds appear to exist for restricting the use of certain marketing techniques, in particular those based on computer software which tracks the playing patterns of individual gamblers.

We enter the muddy waters of paternalism once we consider justifying violations of the harm principle. Paternalism involves restricting a person’s liberty for her own good — that is, to prevent her from being harmed or enabling her to receive a benefit. There is an obvious conflict between paternalistic justification and the harm principle. If a person’s gambling is perceived to be damaging her life, then there seems to be a clear-cut reason to encourage her not to gamble, or at least to seek help. If she persists, does concern for her well-being justify preventing her from gambling? Again, there seems to be reason to prevent her from damaging herself. But what if she wants to continue gambling, and her actions are not harming or in future likely to harm others? Dickerson partially avoids the conflict by arguing that strategies should be applied which prevent a gambler arriving at the point where her autonomy is actually diminished. The aim is in part to enable gamblers to retain their autonomy, not just to avoid other problems associated with gambling.

Application of the harm principle would force a gap between different policies. A pathological gambler would be dealt with differently from someone autonomously choosing to gamble, even though both were suffering harm as a result of gambling. Someone whose gambling was causing harm to others would be dealt with differently from someone who was only harming herself. These complications are exacerbated by the difficulty of defining “problem gambling”, and the related difficulty of establishing what counts as harms and benefits and their extent.

Furthermore, does gambling damage or benefit our society and culture? There is a range of social costs associated with increased legal gambling, along with claimed financial benefits to the community. It has an impact on spending in other sectors of the economy, on crime, and on welfare provision. In Victoria it has been associated with a change in the aims and role of government, and the funding of public amenities, including hospitals and schools. It is also associated with a reorientation of public culture. The Crown Casino occupies a major site in Melbourne, and gaming machine locations loudly announce their presence in the suburbs. Ultimately, these factors do not tell us the appropriate moral response to gambling. The question remains open even if increased legal gambling on the scale that has occurred in Victoria has great economic benefits. Is the maximisation of economic benefits the primary responsibility of a government? Is it alright to allow increased gambling and then attempt to deal with the predictable associated harm? Attending to the consequences of gambling is obviously important. The formulation of the principle of autonomy which is most concerned with consequences of actions, the harm principle, has a role to play in determining policy. However, I think that more needs to be said, and a wider approach taken.

Public policy concerns particular practices and institutions, and those are not just sets of outcomes, but have characteristics which can be understood, and which suggest the relevant moral principles which should be applied in formulating policy. To argue that public policy should be based solely on outcomes is either to have a crude and inadequate grasp of those principles, or to deny that they express values which are relevant to the aims of public policy.