Piracy: a symptom of Somalia's deeper problems

However, US policymakers should resist letting recent events lead them to adopt policies - such as supporting a new UN peacekeeping operation to enforce the authority of the TFG - which would face enormous challenges and be unlikely to succeed.

A new UN peacekeeping operation in Somalia would be unlikely to succeed for several reasons. Foremost, there is no legitimate sovereign able to assert its authority for the operation to support. Although the TFG is internationally recognised as the government of Somalia, it is a paper government.

The recent TFG elections were conducted in Djibouti because it was unsafe to conduct them in Somalia. Indeed, while the elections were occurring in January 2009, the al Shabaab militia seized control of Baidoa, the TFG capital. What little territory the TFG retains control over is secured only through the presence of an AU peacekeeping presence. The Somalis in the south understandably question the legitimacy of a government comprised largely of people who have fled Somalia and rightly doubt its ability to protect them.

As a result, a new UN peacekeeping operation would likely find itself charged with nation-building on a massive scale without a legitimate domestic partner. The mission would initially (maybe perpetually) involve the imposition of authority through force, assert external governance for lack of a credible domestic option, and further strain UN peacekeeping capabilities on top of current commitments. This is exactly the type of operation that history indicates the UN should avoid. Instead, the US should be seeking a new approach to Somalia capitalising on existing realities.

Recognise the failure of trying to impose a centralised state authority.

Somalia is a fractured state with little, if any, national allegiance from its various powerful factions. The current strategy of the international community - seeking to establish a state-centric model for dealing with instability by providing capital, both political and financial, to a succession of central authorities - has repeatedly failed. The TFG is the 14th interim government since 1991. Experience indicates that this is not a viable strategy for addressing the lawlessness in Somalia, at least in the short-term.

The US and the international community need to acknowledge that there is no national authority broadly recognised and respected by Somalis and that trying to artificially impose one is a fool's errand in the short term. Instead, the US needs to move toward a grassroots model of establishing, building, and improving local governance based on existing legitimate authorities - including civil society, traditional clan authorities, and local government leaders who have shown themselves to be legitimate and capable of governing responsibly, provided that they do not support or have links to piracy, terrorism, or radical Islam.

Use nascent governments and authorities to expand and improve governance in Somalia.

To encourage local Somali authorities to improve their governance structures and mature politically, the US and other nations should reward these authorities with the same benefits other governments receive from the international community. Such benefits would include financial assistance and de facto recognition (perhaps moving to full recognition in the case of Somaliland that has an admittedly brief history of independence) of these smaller governments and use them as positive examples. For instance:

• Somaliland has operated as a self-governing entity and de facto sovereign since the early 1990s. While Somaliland is far from perfect, it should be offered recognition by the international community pending demonstrable actions of improved governance and order. If Somaliland remains stable, it could serve as an example for the other parts of Somalia and a valuable partner to the US; and
• While Puntland is largely autonomous like Somaliland, it is less developed politically. It is also close to being a criminal state due to its links and support of piracy. To address the situation in Puntland, the international community should establish benchmarks for progress towards recognition. Clamping down on piracy and co-operating with international anti-piracy efforts would be a key, early condition. As Puntland meets these and other governance benchmarks, the US should offer assistance and de facto recognition.

A similar approach should be used for other Somali regions, albeit on a more localised scale.

Critically, nothing prevents the disparate Somali authorities from knitting themselves together into some United Arab Emirates-like confederation with individually sovereign states. Such an entity could collaborate on certain matters while respecting the individual character (and eccentricities) of the clan-families dominant in each region.