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China’s take on Obama and Obama’s take on China

By Dominic Meagher - posted Wednesday, 28 January 2009


The US-China relationship is among the most important bilateral relationships in the world. Yet during the American Presidential election, China appeared something of a no-go zone.

In the US there are broadly two camps on China: those who would seek to contain, and those who seek to engage.

President-elect Obama is lauded for his instincts towards international engagement, co-operation, listening respectfully to others, and pragmatism. These are instincts that will serve him well dealing with China. But his comments on trade during his campaign for the Presidency, his penchant for blaming US manufacturing job losses on China and his promise to establish an “enforcement office” at USTR (Office of the United States Trade Representative) to pressure China to revalue the RMB, point in a different direction and herald a trickier time for Sino-American relations.

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Real Clear Politics has described considerable concern in Asia that the protectionist side of Obama will dominate his dealings with Asia, and notably China. Is the concern in Asia justified?

Perhaps not when you compare Obama with President Bush, when newly elected.

Current Secretary of the Treasury, Hank Paulson, claims that President Bush chose the path of engagement. This is far from true. It is true that US engagement with China, economically and strategically, has grown enormously under the Bush Administration. But a review of media reports from 2000-2001 show that, in fact, at the outset Bush rather chose to antagonise, not to engage, China.

Here’s a reminder of how the US-China relationship looked at the time:

As a candidate, Bush was criticised for being “stuck in a cold war time warp” and relying on “isolationist, right-wing advisers for guidance” (30/4/2000). He talked strongly of defending Taiwan militarily, and selling arms to Taiwan (a long term policy, but not one traditionally trumpeted loudly). His enthusiasm for the misguided Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) plan was perceived in Beijing as a policy of containment. Bush abandoned the Clinton era rhetoric describing China as a “strategic partner”, in favour of the more antagonising “strategic competitor”.

Three weeks before Bush took office, he was described as “on a collision course with China” (04/1/2001), Yan Xuetong, at that time executive director of the Institute of International Studies at CASS (China’s premier government think tank) said, “in the next four years, I would not rule out a possible military confrontation” (04/1/2001). The whole of the Asia Pacific was frightened about a nuclear arms race between the US and China (25/1/2001).

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Bush escalated the issue of arms to Taiwan by hinting that Taiwan would be included in the anti-missile defence umbrella (06/3/2001).

Then, on April 1, 2001 was the “spy plane incident”*. The Chinese detained the US crew on Hainan Island for 12 days. As soon as the US personnel were back in Hawaii, Bush began blaming the crisis entirely on China, dropping the diplomatic rhetoric he grudgingly adopted under duress during the stand-off (13/4/2001).

Following the spy plane incident, Bush stepped up encirclement rhetoric. On April 25 Bush said “he would do ‘whatever it takes’ to defend Taiwan from any China attacks” (26/4/2001). Shortly after, he ratcheted up the rhetoric, engaging Russia on TMD plans (01/5/2001). China promptly responded that such actions “could lead to a possible arms race” (02/5/2001). To celebrate the Bush administration’s first 100 days, the People’s Daily described Bush as “arrogant”, “emotional”, “egotistic” and “capricious” and recommended Bush “learn from his predecessor, Bill Clinton” (03/5/2001).

Instead, with the approach of his first meeting with President Jiang Zemin (the APEC leaders summit was held in Shanghai in October 2001; an unavoidable encounter), Bush began to preach religious tolerance to China (04/5/2001). In a move deliberately calculated to antagonise China, he met with the Dalai Lama in Washington (just five months before the scheduled meeting with Jiang) (23/5/2001).

On June 2, John Lewis wrote in the New York Times, “partly as an unintended consequence, but mostly by design, the administration’s actions have appeared to cast Beijing as America’s enemy. The expanded arms sales to Taiwan, rhetoric that enlarges the commitment to defend the island, the thinly disguised decision to make Chinese missiles a target of revised missile defence plans, the proposed shift in defence strategy from Europe to the Pacific and the call for new long-range weapons to counter China’s military power have come in stunning procession.” (02/6/2001)

Colin Powell’s visit to Beijing late July offered a moment to breathe in Bush’s rush towards hostility (29/7/2001) but the game-changer, of course, was the terrible events of September 11. President Jiang immediately condemned the attacks and offered to share intelligence with the US and help combat terrorism (26/9/2001).

The attacks gave Bush an enemy far more proximate than China. The open-ended War on Terror had been launched and China was transformed from putative enemy into active ally. Containment and strategic competition were transformed into active engagement on this and a range of other fronts: a strategy that has been remarkably successful during the last seven years.

It will be important for Obama to avoid the early mistakes of Bush in handling the US-China relationship. There is no guarantee that such circumstances as eventually constrained the Bush Administration’s inclination towards hostility with China will similarly constrain the undercurrent of economic hostility in America that an Obama administration must manage in dealings with China. The risks are especially high in a time of global economic crisis.

China has already expressed hope “that the policy of free trade will continue to be adhered to”, and has defended its exchange rate policy, but the hostility generated by President Bush is notably absent. Xinhua’s account of the conversation between Obama and President Hu on Saturday is encouraging:

Obama said that settlement of the global financial crisis requires close co-operation by governments of all countries, expressing the hope that the United States and China will strengthen co-operation at the world economic summit planned for November 15 in Washington.

More than most things in foreign policy, Obama needs a China Policy before he takes office: one that emphasises the centrality of Sino-American co-operation on responding to climate change and coping with the financial crisis, as well as commitment to an open economy. Early signs point to Obama bearing the mantle of responsibility well. If that continues, we can expect to see more of the pragmatic, tough but fair Obama.


Update: Thomas Barnett offers a different spin on Bush’s legacy of engagement with China (The Interpreter).

In the grand sweep of history, this is arguably George W. Bush’s greatest legacy: the encouragement of China to become a legitimate stakeholder in global security.

This sort of effort at grooming a great power for a greater role in international affairs is a careful balancing act, and the Bush team sounded most of the right notes, from reassuring nervous allies in Asia, to avoiding the temptation of trade retaliation while simultaneously pressuring Beijing for more economic liberalisation, to drawing China into the dynamics of great power negotiation over compelling regional issues like the nuclear programs in both North Korea and Iran.

Clearly I think this gives more credit than credit due.


*Correction:

It was earlier stated in this post that “on April 1, 2001 a US spy plane crashed in Chinese waters”. This is not true. A loyal reader provides a correction: A US Navy EP-3, flying in international airspace, was clipped by a Chinese fighter jet. The damaged US plane flew to the island of Hainan, where it landed at a military airfield. As per regulations, the crew methodically destroyed the equipment on the inside of the aircraft, then exited.

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First published in East Asia Forum on October 27, 2008. This article has been judged as one of the Best Blogs 2008 run in collaboration with Club Troppo.



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About the Author

Dominic Meagher is a PhD candidate in Economics at the Australian National University and is Project Manager of the China Economy and Business Program of the Crawford School of Economics and Government. Research areas are the Chinese economy, East Asian energy and environment.

Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

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