Obama and Iran: the Clinton dilemma

Policymakers in Tehran saw the deterrent value of having nuclear capability in 2003 when the US invaded Iraq, which had no nuclear capability, yet negotiated with North Korea who did have such a capability. This reinvigorated Iran’s desire to continue its development of nuclear technology as a measure against an Iraq-style invasion.

Despite attempts by Iran in 2003 and again in 2006 to instigate diplomatic negotiations with Washington on issues including their nuclear program, the Iraq war, and Tehran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, Washington continued to follow a policy of isolation refusing to speak with Iranian leaders.

A Joint Experts' Statement authored by a group of prominent Iran experts, released in November 2008, warns Obama’s new administration that a continuation of the Bush strategy will be counter-productive. Instead, they call for “direct, unconditional and comprehensive negotiations” with Iranian leaders.

“US efforts to manage Iran through isolation, threats and sanctions have been tried intermittently for more than two decades,” the report said. “In that time they have not solved any major problem in US - Iran relations, and have made most of them worse.”

Both Arab and Iranian leaders are optimistic that Obama will move away from the toxic policies of the Bush administration’s that have destabilised the Middle East. Obama must capitalise on this reservoir of goodwill felt towards him. No long-term solution to Middle Eastern regional security can be found without the constructive engagement of Iran.

If Obama is to succeed in convincing Tehran to halt its nuclear program he must offer a bold new approach based on engagement. To do this, he must not allow his new Secretary of State’s hawkish stance on Iran to derail his foreign policy vision.

Obama risks a unique opportunity to improve relations between Washington and Tehran, if he proves unable to manage Clinton.