A trifecta for the Middle East

This is highlighted by the recent collapse of negotiations held by the current leader of the Kadima party, Tzipi Livni, who was trying to bring together a coalition to form government. One of the main reasons for the collapse was demands made by the religious Shas party that Livni felt were unacceptable, and without their support she was forced to call elections for February next year. These elections, however, bring the conservative Likud party back into play as they have just as much, if not more, support among the population and are more likely to accept the demands of ultra-conservative parties such as Shas to form a coalition.

If Likud should form a government however, Binyamin Netanyahu (former Prime Minister and current leader of Likud) will likely rollback all of the ground that has been made in recent years.

The conservatives in Israel are not looking for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Many see the spread of Israeli settlements within the previously agreed borders of Palestine as a strategy to achieve a Greater Israel, and it is working. The West Bank no longer really exists, and with the annexation of land by the separation barrier and the spread and increase of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, a two-state solution is becoming less and less viable because it would require either group to part with even more land.

This situation has developed under several years of a “progressive” Kadima government, imagine what the conservatives would do if they were in power, given that they do not see the need for negotiation.

The fate of Jerusalem is also key. Livni and Kadima are open to negotiating on Jerusalem, whereas for Likud there is absolutely no question that a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is the only option. This doesn’t even begin to address what is happening in Gaza or the possibility of right of return or compensation. Needless to say, any stabilisation of the Middle East in the near future relies on a Livni-led Kadima Government in Israel, which also may reduce pressure on Shimon Peres to follow through on his promise to give Marwan Barghouti a Presidential Pardon, possibly giving Palestine its own Nelson Mandela and offering the opportunity to re-unite them under a single government.

Iranian politics are notoriously complex and given the network of approval needed for qualification and candidacy, it is extremely difficult to predict. To simplify, there are two main groups of candidates, the conservatives, of which current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is one and the Reformists, a group who identify around Former-President Mohammad Khatami. The only candidate who has declared his candidacy at this stage is Mehdi Karroubi, a Reformist and apparently Khatami’s candidate of choice as he announced earlier this year that if Karroubi is running, then he would not.

The time lag between the Israeli election and the Iranian election are integral, and increase the chances of a Reformist government being allowed to run and to get elected. The Iranian people, much like Americans or Australians, tend to vote according to their own immediate needs. At the moment, with the fear of attack from Israel and the ongoing grandstanding over the nuclear issue on both sides, the Iranian people feel their primary needs are stability and safety.

In the same way that Americans turn to the Republican party in times of war, the Iranian people turn towards the hardliners, and the conservatives, and this is what Ahmadinejad is counting on. He needs the nuclear issue to be alive to turn it into an election issue to keep other issues out of the spotlight.

The current global financial crisis hasn’t helped Ahmadinejad very much as it highlights his main weakness. Ahmadinejad’s economic policies have been criticised widely, including by his own supporters, and have lead to several high-ranking officials resigning, and ongoing tensions with the Central Bank.

The reformists on the other hand boast of Khatami’s record, especially with inflation. The volatility in the price of oil has made things even more difficult as the problem fluctuated from high inflation to relatively low oil income. Not only does the economy outweigh the threat of attack for Iranians as an issue, but the US will also be busy dealing with their own economy distracting them from the incendiary rhetoric that keeps security going as an issue in Iran. Further, an Obama White House will most likely tone down the rhetoric, and additionally is much less likely to support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, further reducing the safety concerns among Iranian citizens.

All this will combine to put pressure on Ahmadinejad, and the Guardian Council, who can veto all candidates and exercised this by barring almost half of the candidates in the parliamentary elections earlier this year. While at the moment it appears that they are unlikely to allow a reformist candidate to stand, without the nuclear issue brewing, Iran’s main focus will be the economy, and not allowing at least some reformists to stand could inspire a backlash, the likes of which Iran has not seen in almost 30 years.

With the short odds of an Obama White House that is looking to open dialogue combined with the even money bet of a moderate leadership in Israel working towards peace the odds of a reformist government in Iran increases greatly: and perhaps the Dialogue Amongst Civilisations proposed by Khatami all those years ago will have a chance to grow.

Trifectas are very rarely a safe bet, and this one is no exception, but the future of the Middle East may be riding on it, and we can only hope the right horses come in.