A trifecta for the Middle East

Much like the rest of the world at the moment, all eyes in the Middle East are on the US elections. The change Obama is offering is seen as the turning point in the ongoing regional conflict that many have been waiting for, especially in Israel and Palestine.

Obama represents the opportunity for change and progress in the quagmire that is the Middle East, and many are ready to gamble. Progress in the Middle East, however, needs more than just a favourable outcome in the US election. There are two other horses that need to come in, two other elections in the next eight months that need to go the right way to set up a political environment amenable to real progress.

The first is in early February next year in Israel and then in June in Iran. For a real chance at peace in the Middle East, the full trifecta is needed and as most of you punters already know, although a trifecta is generally a long shot it is a real jackpot when it actually pays, and this one is no different.

The US election is obviously integral to ensuring the world is no longer plagued by the limited, narrow minded White House strategies of the last eight years. An Obama White House is likely to engage the Middle East through dialogue and not necessarily resort to petty sabre rattling, which only further isolates countries such as Iran, in turn fostering extremism and anti-US sentiment.

The recent US re-engagement with Lebanon requires a deft touch and an appreciation for subtlety and balance that is more likely to come from a former senior lecturer of constitutional law than an ageing, self-proclaimed “maverick” who is proud that he can do something wacky, like pick a hockey mum for a running mate.

Ongoing support can stabilise Lebanon and provide enough clout and legitimacy to its Government’s official military establishment to balance the power of Hezbollah’s militia, which, for several years now, have been the most powerful military in the country.

Moving towards this balance will not only settle Lebanon, but also the Israeli-Lebanese border, because if Hezbollah cannot bring Israel to the table on negotiations, a settled government that can will cement its legitimacy among its constituents. But Lebanon is, and always has been a delicate balance of competing interests. Engagement and support needs to be strategic and well thought out, not ham-fisted and idealistic.

Creating the appearance of a reduction in the presence of US troops in Iraq will give its government the breathing room and legitimacy to engage and interact with its neighbours as an independent state. The US can use Iraq as a pretense for engagement in the region; Iraq can serve not only as a powerful bridge to the diplomatic engagement of Iran but also as an even more powerful bridge between Iran and Israel.

To justify engagement with the US, Iran needs a mediator, a façade through which to channel dialogue to distract from the fact that it is engaging with the Great Satan. Given Iraq’s newly formed Shiite government, it is extremely well placed to serve this function.

Further, Iraq can engage more closely with Syria to facilitate negotiations with Israel, and although the US cannot be seen as taking sides, especially when it comes to Israel, stabilising the region in this manner can facilitate a process whereby countries temper each other against extremism through strengthened relations and trade not only between each other, but consequently with the rest of the world as well. The Bush administration’s legacy will not be easy to shirk, but to facilitate progress, what is needed, especially when dealing with Israel, is a change in course and not an ill disciplined meandering around the same one.

The result of the Israeli election in February can either set up the greatest chance for peace in a generation or result in little to no chance of any agreement between Israel and Palestine in the foreseeable future.

The issue with recent Israeli governments has been the factionalised nature of Israeli politics, which has meant that the conservative parties have been able to hinder the government’s ability to negotiate and progress the peace process.

This is highlighted by the recent collapse of negotiations held by the current leader of the Kadima party, Tzipi Livni, who was trying to bring together a coalition to form government. One of the main reasons for the collapse was demands made by the religious Shas party that Livni felt were unacceptable, and without their support she was forced to call elections for February next year. These elections, however, bring the conservative Likud party back into play as they have just as much, if not more, support among the population and are more likely to accept the demands of ultra-conservative parties such as Shas to form a coalition.

If Likud should form a government however, Binyamin Netanyahu (former Prime Minister and current leader of Likud) will likely rollback all of the ground that has been made in recent years.

The conservatives in Israel are not looking for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Many see the spread of Israeli settlements within the previously agreed borders of Palestine as a strategy to achieve a Greater Israel, and it is working. The West Bank no longer really exists, and with the annexation of land by the separation barrier and the spread and increase of Israeli settlements on Palestinian land, a two-state solution is becoming less and less viable because it would require either group to part with even more land.

This situation has developed under several years of a “progressive” Kadima government, imagine what the conservatives would do if they were in power, given that they do not see the need for negotiation.

The fate of Jerusalem is also key. Livni and Kadima are open to negotiating on Jerusalem, whereas for Likud there is absolutely no question that a united Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is the only option. This doesn’t even begin to address what is happening in Gaza or the possibility of right of return or compensation. Needless to say, any stabilisation of the Middle East in the near future relies on a Livni-led Kadima Government in Israel, which also may reduce pressure on Shimon Peres to follow through on his promise to give Marwan Barghouti a Presidential Pardon, possibly giving Palestine its own Nelson Mandela and offering the opportunity to re-unite them under a single government.

Iranian politics are notoriously complex and given the network of approval needed for qualification and candidacy, it is extremely difficult to predict. To simplify, there are two main groups of candidates, the conservatives, of which current President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is one and the Reformists, a group who identify around Former-President Mohammad Khatami. The only candidate who has declared his candidacy at this stage is Mehdi Karroubi, a Reformist and apparently Khatami’s candidate of choice as he announced earlier this year that if Karroubi is running, then he would not.

The time lag between the Israeli election and the Iranian election are integral, and increase the chances of a Reformist government being allowed to run and to get elected. The Iranian people, much like Americans or Australians, tend to vote according to their own immediate needs. At the moment, with the fear of attack from Israel and the ongoing grandstanding over the nuclear issue on both sides, the Iranian people feel their primary needs are stability and safety.

In the same way that Americans turn to the Republican party in times of war, the Iranian people turn towards the hardliners, and the conservatives, and this is what Ahmadinejad is counting on. He needs the nuclear issue to be alive to turn it into an election issue to keep other issues out of the spotlight.

The current global financial crisis hasn’t helped Ahmadinejad very much as it highlights his main weakness. Ahmadinejad’s economic policies have been criticised widely, including by his own supporters, and have lead to several high-ranking officials resigning, and ongoing tensions with the Central Bank.

The reformists on the other hand boast of Khatami’s record, especially with inflation. The volatility in the price of oil has made things even more difficult as the problem fluctuated from high inflation to relatively low oil income. Not only does the economy outweigh the threat of attack for Iranians as an issue, but the US will also be busy dealing with their own economy distracting them from the incendiary rhetoric that keeps security going as an issue in Iran. Further, an Obama White House will most likely tone down the rhetoric, and additionally is much less likely to support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, further reducing the safety concerns among Iranian citizens.

All this will combine to put pressure on Ahmadinejad, and the Guardian Council, who can veto all candidates and exercised this by barring almost half of the candidates in the parliamentary elections earlier this year. While at the moment it appears that they are unlikely to allow a reformist candidate to stand, without the nuclear issue brewing, Iran’s main focus will be the economy, and not allowing at least some reformists to stand could inspire a backlash, the likes of which Iran has not seen in almost 30 years.

With the short odds of an Obama White House that is looking to open dialogue combined with the even money bet of a moderate leadership in Israel working towards peace the odds of a reformist government in Iran increases greatly: and perhaps the Dialogue Amongst Civilisations proposed by Khatami all those years ago will have a chance to grow.

Trifectas are very rarely a safe bet, and this one is no exception, but the future of the Middle East may be riding on it, and we can only hope the right horses come in.