Where now for the West's strategy in Afghanistan?

No real meaningful attempt has been made to reconstruct Afghanistan and to improve the lives of ordinary people, despite all the pomp and circumstance. For much of the population the situation has reverted back to conditions prevailing prior to the emergence of the Taliban, a structural condition greatly aiding Taliban activity.

For the West the underlying problem is due to the political weakness of the central administration, which exists because of the neglect for nation building shown after the fall of the Taliban and the support given to Northern Alliance warlords. It is this weakness, plus an almost reflexive reliance on the armed forces to solve global problems, that leads to an over reliance on military firepower which in turn fans the insurgency.

Expanding the war into Pakistan threatens to turn the Afghan war into a broader insurgency based on the Pashtun population both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, the Pakistani military has stated it will oppose any US incursions into the border regions. Indeed, what appeared to be a recent probe of Pakistani resolve led to a brief fire-fight between these two nuclear armed states.

A current strategy of bombing into Pakistan from drones and aircraft, with the occasional foray by ground troops across the border, is particularly dangerous. This will probably lead to mission creep and inflame Pakistani opinion, thereby undermining the Government and possibly pushing Pakistan over the edge towards collapse.

Raids across the border will eventually lead to a need to take and hold ground, effectively annexing parts of Pakistan by an already over-stretched US Army. Even this would not necessarily be successful, assuming the Pakistani Army could be overcome. Israel sought the same objective in its "security zone" in South Lebanon, without success.

In other words, the best way forwards is to either repeat a tribal based strategy, which it appears cannot be replicated in Afghanistan, or engage with the Taliban in talks. It could be possible to split the Taliban between moderates and hardliners by offering moderates a seat in government. In fact, de-classified Defense Intelligence Agency documents (PDF 565KB) reveal this was a post 9-11 strategy contemplated by Washington (see especially page 10 of this document on moderation and cutting the Taliban/al-Qaida nexus). Indeed, it has been revealed that talks are currently under way with the Taliban. The success of these talks will depend upon the Taliban's price and our willingness to pay it.

The Taliban will likely demand the withdrawal of Western forces. At a minimum this may prove necessary in the Pashtun provinces. In turn, we would demand that the Taliban cut off al-Qaida, possibly leading to the capture of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Quite simply, it's a case of "deal or no deal".

It is interesting to reflect that one of the reasons why al-Qaida has suffered defeats in Iraq is precisely because of the brutality it has unleashed upon the population. To defeat al-Qaida is to drain the swamp in which it operates and cutting it off from the Taliban. Military force only makes that swamp bigger and makes the link with the Taliban tighter.

If Australia is truly providing Washington with advice, as Labor claims can be done, then hopefully the Australian military is counselling for a political solution, a re-configured international presence and some serious nation building.

The war is opposed by the population of Afghanistan and is now pretty much opposed by the population of the West. It is interesting to reflect that, in the war being waged between states and Islamic groups, the actual preferences of the globe's population matters not a jot for all sides to the conflict.