Rudd's Australia and the Asian jigsaw

The regional architecture of the Asia Pacific is undergoing considerable transformation. Along with a decisive shift in global power and influence, the region is also facing several new challenges. India’s steady rise as an economic powerhouse has made it an important player in the region. China continues to pursue the vision of a China-centric unipolar Asia.

While the contradiction is perceptible, both India and China are slowly learning the art of living together. As this strategic reality gradually unfolds in the Asian theatre, Australia, ensconced as another major power in the region, is also laying out an indigenous regional vision. The vision aims to establish the Asia-Pacific Community (APC) by 2020 to suit the region’s changing geo-political reality in the 21st century. The APC is envisaged as a regional institution spanning the “entire Asia-Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and other states of the region”.

The APC framework encompasses many elements, among which, one of the most significant is the inclusion of India as a key variable. The perspective clearly indicates an upward shift in the trajectory of Indo-Australia relations notwithstanding irritants to a closer engagement between the two democracies in recent times.

The “China” factor, which has always loomed large on the Australian psyche, has been the biggest impediment to the partnership. Following the Rudd Government’s decision to engage China unconditionally - despite the Tibet issue and the Olympic torch relay - the Oz-India relations had come under some stress. However, Australia appears keen to re-energise the engagement between Canberra and New Delhi.

India’s role in the global arena makes it difficult for Australia to ignore its presence altogether. Hence, the recent friendly rhetoric to “revisit” sale of uranium to India, after ruling out such a possibility earlier, till New Delhi signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The refusal was a tacit reminder to India that it was yet to gain access to the privileged nuclear club of the Cold War years.

The Asian jigsaw puzzle

The present international system is witnessing the rise of several large powers. The Asian region probably reflects this better than any other part of the world. The rise of Asia is being driven by the emergence of several centres of power. This is an influential geopolitical trend shaping contemporary international relations. While Asia is vital to Australia, its power trajectory with both India and China has many critical components that will shape its larger engagement with Asia in the years to come.

Australia’s engagement with Asia has been extensive and has been gathering pace for several decades now. Historically, “China has always loomed in the Australian consciousness” and the changing dynamics are pushing Australia even closer to China so much so that it seems ready to alter the old Australian perception of China as a “bellicose”.

Australia is committed to deeper engagement with China, given the latter’s ravenous resource and material imports (minerals, base metals, chemical products, textile materials, plant products and machinery and other electronic products) which has been instrumental in sustaining Australia’s economic boom. It cannot afford to disturb China. By calling China a “responsible global stakeholder” and submitting to be a zhengyou, (i.e. a partner who sees beyond immediate benefits the broader and firm basis for continuing, profound and sincere friendship), Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd is all set to rewrite the new rules of engagement with China.

Beijing, on the other hand, is closely following the region for spotting any new development that challenges its ascent. One such example is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue - Quad - that was taking shape in late 2006 as an axis of democracies. The Dialogue resulted in a disturbed China sending demarche and seeking explanations from all the members of the initiative.

The Quad: triumph for China

The Quad included four leading democracies: the United States, Australia, India and Japan. The initiative crumbled in early 2008, much to Beijing’s relief. This was a triumph of the Chinese demonstration of its presence in the region. China was apprehensive that this initial loose arrangement between the democracies contained enough ammunition for blowing up into an alliance to “contain” a rising China. However, the failure of the Quad to take-off signals that Chinese blessing is a necessary condition for any arrangement to fructify in the region.

In February 2008, Australia, in a bid to repair misunderstandings with its long-time partner China assured it that Canberra had “corrected the feng shui of a disturbing piece of the region’s diplomatic architecture”. The Chinese also became wiser courtesy of the Quad. It realised that its rise in the region is unlikely to remain unchallenged. It will remain a threat and continue to unsettle countries - both big and small - in the region, thus disconcerting its efforts to rise to a “great” power status.

The rise of China in the region has another significant dimension. Smaller powers in the region are weary of an all-powerful China and prefer India as a stable counterbalance. Australia needs to realise that its engagement with China may not go down well with these countries who are watching China’s rise with trepidation.

Australia’s neglect of these “other” entities in the region may not be the correct strategy and calls for some serious rethink. In addition, “great” power involvement in the region, like that of the United States, is impacting the regional dynamics significantly. However, in crafting the new rules of engagement towards China, Prime Minister Rudd has to a large extent not only “offended or ignored most Asian countries and failed to present a coherent policy towards Asia, other than for China” but has overlooked India as well.

Nevertheless, India-Australia relations appear to be improving in spite of the roadblocks. The Australian Foreign Minister Stephen Smith’s assertion that India is a “very significant power” and a neighbour in the region suggests that closer ties are sought after as Australia recognises the criticality of the relationship. However, crucial missteps and lack of political will continue to be impediments to a long-lasting positive relationship between the two key players in Asia, and more specifically in the Asia-Pacific region.

India-Australia: inching closer?

For decades, the relationship between India and Australia has been confined to two “C”s: Cricket and Commonwealth. It is interesting to note that the 1997 Foreign Affairs White Paper of the Howard government did not rank India as one of the states that “most substantially engage Australia”. But the two countries seem to have come a long way over the next decade despite occasional fall-outs.

Despite China, Oz-India relations have great potential and the two countries realise the new reality of a close partnership in the backdrop of an evolving global international system. With the Indian Diaspora in Australia being as large as 260,000 and bilateral trade touching a record A$7.25 billion during the year 2004-05, the stage is set for Australia and India to embark on closer ties on the basis of strategic considerations and economic ambitions.

The Labour Government, after assuming office in November 2007, made its intention clear of making the relationship a priority. However, ground realities do at times convey conflicting signals. Nevertheless, Smith’s recent claim that “now we need to make sure we … take our relationship with India to a new level and to put our relationship with India amongst the first order of our international partnerships” speaks volumes about the future of the Indo-Australia engagement and underlines Australia’s inclination to move closer to India.

There is no doubt that for engagements to grow deeper much more than intentions are necessary. The sale of uranium to India is a case in point. The Rudd Government, posing as a non-proliferation hawk, did not think twice before scrapping the landmark deal negotiated by the former conservative Prime Minister John Howard to sell uranium to India for its nuclear energy program. Sales of uranium to China and Russia, however, continued without any disruptions.

While harping on strengthening ties with India in the coming years, it seems that Australia is yet to comprehend the new geo-political realities and continues to be influenced by Cold War considerations.

Sale of uranium to India appears to be contingent upon implementation of the civilian nuclear deal being worked on by India and Australia’s long-term ally, the United States. Linking the sale of uranium to India’s nuclear deal with the US is, of course, Australia’s sovereign decision. But Australia must realise that even President Bush had accepted that India was a “responsible state with advanced nuclear technology”. India is a nuclear weapon power in its own right and needs to be treated as one. The Bush administration was making all efforts to accord India a special status in the international nuclear order. Australia, oblivious of these developments, seems unable to sever itself from Cold War politics and judge issues in the contemporary context.

Australia’s grand Asia diplomacy might suffer unless it treats its relationship with India as a top priority. Canberra needs to take stock of India’s strong presence in Asia and also needs to recognise that India is well on its way to achieving “great power status”.

Although the prospects of the Rudd Government getting its act together on its India diplomacy appears bright given the current trends, the overall bilateral relations are still “hesitating” on the brink of a close partnership despite the two countries sharing common interests, commitments, values and ideals.