The US education system is based on local school districts which are financially supported by property owners who pay tax that directly goes to the school district. Anyone who pays the tax can be elected to the school board (a district-wide Board of Education) who in turn hires and fires the district superintendent: therefore school boards can be run by people who have little to do with education but a lot to do with how “their money” is spent. The Superintendent’s role is politicised to a greater extent than that of comparable Education Department Chief Executives here and many pursue conservative anti-spending policies in the belief that this will serve their chances at reappointment.
New York has a somewhat different model again. In 2002 Mayor Michael Bloomberg eliminated the Board of Education and brought schools under the city’s direct political control. By way of a Special Waiver, Bloomberg appointed Klein Chancellor of Education and placed him at the head of a new Department of Education that subsequently morphed into the Panel for Educational Policy.
As Chancellor, one of Klein’s first regressive acts was to change the city policy that allowed students to be promoted to the next grade even if they flunk standardised math and reading exams. The city had previously used test scores, classroom work and attendance records to develop a slightly more holistic evaluation of students before deciding to hold them back or not. Klein narrowed it down to test scores, announcing that the new policy would apply initially to third-graders half way through their 2003-04 school year. This is the man whom Gillard praises for the “transparency” of his system. Parents, however, claimed not to have been consulted: “Our position is ‘no’ on retention. It’s punitive and unfair,” said Robin Brown, head of the United Parents Association of New York City. “There’s been no consultation with parents, teachers, principals or experts” (New York Post, February 11, 2004).
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The system that emerged under Bloomberg’s and Klein’s care was one in which those third-graders who scored in the lowest of four tiers of a single standardised test could be held back. With estimates that this could mean as many as 15,000 students, Klein built in an appeals system under which teachers were required to build and review an extensive portfolio of student work.
A 48-page manual for teachers on how to implement the new policy was distributed, imposing “impossible deadlines at an extremely busy time” according to unions representing teachers and principals (New York Times, May 14, 2004).
Randi Weingarten president of the teachers’ union said “What they have done here in every step of implementing the tough retention policy has been to teacher-proof it and to overwhelm teachers with paperwork and bureaucracy. It’s really intended to eliminate any ounce of professionalism and discretion that a teacher would apply in assessing his or her children.”
Several months later, after ramming through the test, Klein was forced to reveal that 20 per cent of some 5,000 third-graders who had been held back under the old policy had failed the new standardised test and would have to sit through third grade a third time (New York Daily News, June 18, 2004). The mother of one boy who had already been held back twice criticised the policy for turning her son into a bully: “He’s in a class with a bunch of little kids he can pick on. He’s a bully.”
The situation compounded the following year when fourth graders were held to the new promotions and testing regime: 23,163 fourth graders or 30.1 per cent, received letters mid-term warning that they could be held back if their performance did not improve (New York Times, March 19, 2005).
It’s easy to see how, with this mindset, you could be led to believe that the problem of “poorly” performing Grade 3 and 4s might be tied to performance in kindergarten and Grades 1 and 2. And lo and behold! On the same day that Rudd was addressing the National Press Club, the New York Times (August 27, 2008) was reporting that New York’s elementary school principals were “being urged to join a yearlong pilot program with five testing options for kindergarten through second grade”.
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Assigning pass or fail grades to students and promoting them or holding them back as a result is one thing. Assigning pass or fail grades to whole schools and rewarding them or closing them accordingly, is quite another.
In 2006, Klein and Bloomberg appointed death penalty litigation expert James S. Liebman (New York Times, November 16, 2007) to oversee the introduction of a schools grading system. Based on student improvement data and like schools demographic information, schools are awarded a grade between A to D, or F. The grades are published by Klein and distributed at parent-teacher meetings. Referring to the 50 schools that copped an F in the first round, Liebman drew on his professional expertise to remark “It’s not a death sentence for the school, and it’s certainly not a death sentence for the kids who attend it”.
While the real estate agencies loved the new school grades, (New York Times, November 7, 2007) parents were not at all convinced. Many were “perplexed by the way the grades were calculated. Other dismissed them as meaningless … ‘I find the methodology to be confusing, problematic and flawed,’ said (parent) Emily Horowitz”.