Revisiting the 'Axis of Evil' - Part II

However, after 18 months, the Bush administration decided to move first in exchange for a North Korean limited declaration that omitted reference to the alleged uranium-enrichment program or alleged proliferation of nuclear technology to Syria. It’s up to Bush’s successor to finish the job of denuclearising North Korea.

The Bush administration failed to contain North Korea’s covert nuclear developments in its first term, ironically choosing policies that facilitated its capacity to expand a small nuclear arsenal. Although the second administration has gained commitments in principle from the North to achieve full denuclearisation, implementation to date has resulted in a situation in which North Korea’s capacity to expand its nuclear arsenal is “frozen” - or under the Bush agreement, “disabled”. North Korea’s denuclearisation remains an aspiration - not an accomplishment.

Thus, a new US administration will inherit essentially the same problem that the Bush administration inherited, although North Korea now has an expanded stash of fissile material at its disposal. Although North Korea’s capacity to make more materials is contained and the next administration will not face immediate crisis, it’s urgent that the next administration make clear that a nuclear-capable North Korea will not stand as part of a new status quo in Northeast Asia.

The successive and bipartisan policy failures of the past two decades illustrate that any conclusive deal with North Korea will likely be accompanied by buyer’s remorse. The best strategy for achieving North Korea’s denuclearisation, as politically unpalatable as it may be in Washington, will be to affirm that the foundational principles embodied in the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement still stand as an attainable objective and promote concrete efforts toward full implementation of those goals.

This means both insisting that North Korea fully implement its denuclearisation obligations by strengthening coordination among regional partners to compel North Korea’s denuclearisation through both word and actions while actively pursuing a diplomatic relationship with a denuclearised and normalised North Korea. Such an approach should recognise that the existence of a relationship is the prerequisite for pursuing progress on even harder issues and should require that North Korea’s viability depends on its ability to conduct “normal” economic and political relations on a give-and-take basis rather than relying for survival on handouts from its Northeast Asian neighbours.