Roasting the Governor-General: a recipe for an Australian Republic

This is not to say the President cannot dissolve Parliament for an election as soon as it happens. Indeed, the legislature can also dissolve itself for an election with the right majority. But, if all this fails the clause dissolves both Houses of Parliament.

Also, make election dates set so Parliament shall automatically dissolve, say, three months beforehand. This ensures no repeat of scenario two: someone refusing to dissolve Parliament for political purposes or an unelected individual being Head of Government.

7. My model would disallow the veto powers of the President. As soon as a bill passes both Houses it becomes law. Indeed, one man should not be able to override between 50 to 66 six per cent of the legislature, rather, the President could simply have the power to freeze a bill except perhaps a budget bill. Furthermore, the bill may be frozen for no more than one year and no more than once in his or her entire Presidency. Nor could the President then freeze a bill 28 days after the bill passed Parliament. The bill may be further amended and debated and passed by Parliament. This again redresses the deficiencies associated with scenario one and the American model. Here regulation still exists but without overriding the will of the people.

8. Statisticians can debate which method of voting truly ensures accurate representation. After all the Maltese, who also use the same single preferential system as ours, had an Opposition party who had won more than half the votes but had less than half the seats in the 1981 election.

9. Australia needs a bill of wrongs, not rights. We need a prohibition on not only what the legislature and executive can do but what the judiciary can or cannot do.  Republicanism is not a one-way ticket to judicial activism. Indeed, the primary purpose of a Constitution is not policy, rather it is about limiting the intrusion of policy on individual freedoms (negative liberty) and how we come to deliberate on policy. Furthermore, the Canadian Constitution teaches us that an implied right to privacy should not equal abortion. It should be a decision left for the legislature to decide the logistics, not the courts.

Of course, how we deliberate on policy will influence what the policy is but a constitution should not set policy in stone (positive liberty). I therefore believe that it is wrong for the state to prohibit free speech and the press, which are essential to fruitful deliberation.

10. The Irish Constitution allows the President to refer a bill to the Supreme Court to determine its constitutionality. This should be an option here. Some might argue this would lead to a politicised High Court. This assumes it already isn’t. Moreover, caps on the amount of appointments each President would make would minimise this issue. In the instance where a judge who is appointed by the previous government dies after the cap is reached, the cap would still be in place. If the President exceeds the cap, he or she may only appoint another judge if a situations occurs where there are less than five judges.

11. The eleventh issue relates to war. To deploy troops overseas for the purposes of an invasion the President should seek either the support of a two-third majority of one house of Parliament or a majority in both. It is only then the President can become Commander and Chief unless a foreign country declares war, or a direct attack occurs on home soil. Currently the Governor-General as Commander-in-Chief acts on the advice of the Prime Minister. A stronger check and balance is needed when lives are put at risk.

12. Finally, allow decentralisation to be an option in the Constitution. The Parliament may hand over powers to the States, particularly the power to set tax rates. Therefore, in an ideal world, the States would set the numerical value while Canberra would set the literal regulations and qualitative side of things. However, federalism in its current form is code for a blame game between the States. Instead I support clear accountability on health and education and as such believe they should fall under the role of the Federal government.

Yes, Parliament may decentralise policies to the States and enact legislation for certain communities if need be, but if portfolios are decentralised they must be decentralised entirely, so no overlaps in policy occur.

This model would prompt clearer accountability between State and Federal governments, hopefully avoiding the blame game.

Monarchists would argue the present systems accountability derives from an impartial umpire: the Governor-General. Wrong. The Governor-General has the potential to be a tyrannical individual where he is not above politics but in it. After all, most former Governor-Generals are politicians and it is a matter of time before a Governor-General will abuse his or her power. This cannot happen if his or her powers are codified or held accountable by the people. Indeed, it is the people who are the true umpires. It was the people not the Governor-General who had the power to replace Whitlam in the end. It was the people who vetoed WorkChoices. It is Question time and a free press that allows effective critiquing of the law. And it is the High Court that strikes down unconstitutional laws.

It is for these reasons I support a directly elected President especially when powers are reserved to the Parliament and to the people. The sunset of the constitutional monarchy can itself be the sunrise for Australian democracy and constitutional efficiency.