The horrors of World War II have prompted many people to try to find systematic explanations for the causes of violent conflict. There was a general feeling of optimism that war was not inevitable; that it was caused by certain conditions, even if those conditions were not yet clearly defined at that time.
The importance of this feeling was clearly demonstrated when the architects of the United Nations created the Economic and Social Council as one of the principal organs of that organisation. As one of the delegates at the San Francisco Conference said in 1945: “One of the most prolific causes of war is social and economic unrest.” (In contrast to this new feeling of determination, it should be noted that in the Covenant of the League of Nations, only one article related to economic and social questions.)
In 1946 the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) was created to “build lasting peace founded upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of humankind”.
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Clearly, there were two main areas identified as possible causes of conflict: one relating to certain economic structures; the other being something to do with cultural co-operation (or rather the lack of it). They were confident when identifying these two major sources of conflict, even though they did not have a detailed map that would help them to pinpoint, or to explain, each specific area. The detailed mapping, so to speak, was left to academics, spurred on by the enthusiasm of the great number of people engaged in peace activities.
The best, and probably the most prominent, example of this is the research carried out at the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford. This department was established in 1973 following an initiative by the Society of Friends (Quakers).
Before we attempt our brief search for the causes of violent conflicts, we ought to dispel two popular perceptions relating to it. One of these perceptions is the fatalistic view of humanity which, basically, maintains that humans (and men in particular) are aggressive and violent by nature, and hence, we have wars and always will.
The objection to this view is that it ignores an even more basic drive than the propensity for aggression, namely, curiosity, or the urge to discover. It is only when this basic urge is thwarted that aggression may follow. It is incorrect to claim that aggression is the first or predominant instinct of humans.
The second popular perception is that conflicts are caused by “religions”, or deep-seated historical enmities, and nothing can be done about it.
A superficial glance at the many violent conflicts would confirm this impression. However, if we look more carefully, “religion” or “historical enmity” only causes violent conflicts in areas where social institutions - such as the judiciary, the police or the army - have been built in such a way that it favours one particular religious or social group only.
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To illustrate that religion per se is not a cause of violent conflict, one can look at Hungary, where Protestants and Catholics are approximately in the ratio of 4:6. In that country there are no institutions that effect peoples’ social or economic activities, which are exclusively Protestant or Catholic. There are no segregated schools. Hence “religion” is not an issue of contention. A similar situation exists in every other Western European country.
So, can the causes of violent conflicts be identified? Are there discernible patterns to them, or are they far too complex to define reasonably clearly?
As mentioned earlier, there has been a lot of research carried out at various universities into the causes of violent conflicts. One of the most influential researches was elucidated by Edward Azar, who proposed ten “commonly observable features in situations of protracted conflicts. Terrell Nurthrup highlighted the psychological dimensions of conflicts, especially the importance of identity in a conflict situation. There are numerous other researchers who are providing valuable insight.
The events leading to violent conflicts may be varied and complex, and may evolve over a long period of time. However the conditions, which allow our all too human misperceptions to develop into hatred and hostility, can be summed up succinctly:
Conflict develops where there is an absence or the denial of the ability to access, to analyse, to synthesise, and to disseminate information freely. (An indication of this is where there is a lack of academic, judicial or media independence.)
The absence or the denial of social progress, either for individuals, or for groups, or for society as a whole, can also lead to violence. (Social progress can be perceived as attaining material wealth or professional status, above all, unbiased access to education.)
Apartheid era South Africa was a classic example that was ripe for violent conflict. Education, the police, even the seats on public transport were restricted to the majority living there.
Let us examine another, less well known, recent conflict - the sad events that befell the Balkans - and see if one can discern these conditions prior to the eruption of violence.
The origins of the conflict in the Balkans were probably set in motion in 1919, soon after the formation of the state of Yugoslavia. The land reforms introduced in that year benefited mainly the Serbs. The gendarmerie, a Serbian military force, employed 12,000 men to carry out civilian police duties. The Serbs, in effect, appropriated all the levers of power and administration to themselves.
Unfortunately, the Serbian bureaucracy was corrupt, inefficient and riddled with political clientism. Not only were the Muslims and the Kosovars largely excluded from exercising any power, they also had to take second place in the job market. Many of the better-paid jobs in the large important state enterprises, such as electric power plants, employed Serbs only, or at least, all the managerial positions were allocated to Serbs.
Hence, the Bosnian Muslims and the Kosovars were clearly denied, or were greatly hindered in their goal to achieve social progress, let alone parity and fairness vis à vis the Serbs.
As to the denial of access to information, this was largely the result of the communist regime’s penchant for centralised control. The newspapers, the radio and television networks were rigidly controlled by the state, dutifully churning out propaganda that suited the regime. One did not seek information. It was given, and what was given, was considered enough.
Equally, the judiciary were the servants of the state. No question of them having the independence to interpret the law themselves. The state did not tolerate any interference from academic circles either. They all had to toe the line and, needless to say, as they were all good Serbians, they did just that.
Unfortunately, one of the side effects of this centralised control of information is, that the number of people who depend on a free flow of information is relatively small. What is euphemistically called “the chattering classes” was not sufficiently influential in Serbia to make an impression on the policies of their government.
This, relatively brief exposition, illustrates that the two salient conditions in which violent conflicts occur was present in the former Yugoslavia. These conditions can also be observed in all the other trouble spots, like Kashmir for example.
At this stage one may ask, “If we know the causes of violent conflicts, why isn’t something being done about trying to eradicate those conditions which lead to violence?”
Although much of the research is relatively recent the good news is that these ideas are being put into practice already. It is a little known fact that about 5,000 mediators facilitated the transition between the Apartheid regime and majority rule in South Africa. The task of the mediators, who were engaged by the UN (and all of whom had some expertise of law) was to ease the integration of traditional community justice with the national system of law. Was the exercise of benefit? All one can say is that it is most likely to have contributed to a peaceful transition. The South Africans may have a lot of problems but, at least, they did not suffer the fate of the Balkans.
We should also remember that, like all research carried out in universities, it takes time before the effect of that research percolates down to the public domain. It is like the radiated warmth that gradually thaws the frozen recesses of a room. Those who are involved in the various peace movements will no doubt help to further that process. It is not a question of “whether” the ideas about the causes of violent conflict will be widely accepted and acted upon, but “when”.