How (not) to maintain and manage power

Nobusuke Kishi, who had been charged as a war criminal and imprisoned for three years in Japan after the defeat and occupation of that country in 1945, moved quickly after his release. By August 1955 he had reached agreement in a meeting with the American Secretary of State, Foster Dulles, to help the United States fight communism. Weiner details the background:

Kishi told the Americans that his strategy was to wreck the ruling Liberal Party, rename it, rebuild it and run it. The new Liberal Democratic Party under his command would be neither liberal nor democratic, but a right-wing club of feudal leaders rising from the ashes of imperial Japan. He would first work behind the scenes while more senior statesmen preceded him as Prime Minister, and then take charge. He pledged to change the foreign policies of Japan to fit American desires. The United States could keep its military bases in Japan and store nuclear weapons there, a matter of some sensitivity in Japan. All he asked for in return was secret political support from America.

At first glance, this appears to be a much more substantial achievement than the messy removal of Mossadeq in Iran. There can be no doubt that both sides have honoured their commitments and that both parties publicly continue to honour one-another as leading members of what is still the world’s most powerful political alliance. Yet its long-run consequences have hardly benefited America.

In reality, the American-Japanese alliance highlights the fundamental failings not only of America’s Central Intelligence Agency but also of the whole American leadership class since 1945. To his credit and America’s shame, Kishi’s “right-wing club of feudal leaders rising from the ashes of imperial Japan” have been unbelievably successful in regaining much of what Japan lost in World War II. They have also, and this has been less beneficial to Japan, developed a model that has enabled successive Asian states to follow Japan and relocate American industry, skills, technology and productivity to Asia.

Today’s hollowed out, bankrupt American economy, living on the illusion of its superior innovation but increasingly dependent on tottering industries like pharmaceuticals, finance and defence technology, is the end result of the deal with Kishi.

Japan’s “feudal leaders” were able to utilise ancient Chinese strategic thinking that enables the weak to conquer the strong through service and the cultivation of dependency and self-indulgence. America’s Central Intelligence Agency, which recruited Kishi, has been no more successful than the rest of America in figuring out what has gone wrong.

Such reflections can only lead one back to the central question posed by Weiner’s book, by Kishi’s success and by the achievements of Vladimir Putin. How does a democracy built somewhat innocently on lofty ideals and aspirations, like America, come to terms with both the subtlety and harshness of political power - whether internal or external?

The CIA’s most successful recruit, Robert Gates, is now in a position that carries great responsibility in addressing that question.