Howard and Kyoto: was he wrong for the right reasons?

What of the argument that John Howard was, as Rudd claimed, “asleep at the wheel” on climate change?

This charge seems a little distorted. Howard was not convinced by the science on climate change, but he was not asleep at the wheel. Indeed, he clearly felt that he needed to be seen to be doing something: hence the numerous programs devised by the government to encourage reductions in carbon-emissions. It is true that for the most part, these programs took the form of incentives, rather than regulation of the major polluters, but this is consistent with Howard’s perception that Australia should not push too hard on climate change.

Finally, there is the possibility that Howard might not have ratified Kyoto because he thought that, even if climate change was real, Kyoto was (a) not going to achieve very much to counter it and (b) Australia’s involvement would be particularly costly and (in itself) not very effective.

On both points, Howard had an arguable case. The absence of the United States fatally undermined Kyoto. Let us hope the Americans reverse this soon. But the other problem, what to do about developing economies, is more intractable. Moral arguments are all very well. But unless ways can be found to limit emissions growth from the two massive developing economies of China and India, the efforts of the rest of the world will have been largely in vain.

The other point - the likely costs to Australia - is now exercising the mind of the Rudd Government and its advisers. If cuts are to be made, carbon will have to be priced, and with that price will come increases in the costs of electricity and of fuel. The corporations in the energy sector are not so much evil, as fearful of being caught in the middle, once the public starts to understand the implications of emissions-trading.

With no nuclear industry, or even the prospect of one, and a pattern of energy-generation and settlement that is hugely carbon-intensive, cuts of the magnitude canvassed in the Garnaut discussion papers will bite hard.

But these are issues for the future. Why, as a shrewd politician, did Howard not ratify anyway? There would have been plenty of feel-good factor, and as his government constantly pointed out (to the electorate’s continuing bewilderment), Australian emissions (once cuts in land-clearing were counted) were roughly tracking the 8 per cent increase on 1990 levels that would have been permitted. The carbon-polluters could have rested easy.

My own view is that the government’s stance reflected Howard’s particular (and perhaps peculiar) view of fairness. Australia had contributed relatively little to the overall problem, and our doing anything about it would not make a lot of difference either. He certainly did not see the issue as a moral one, in the Al Gore sense.

But the political price was considerable. As a result of his intransigence, Howard lost control of the agenda on climate change - and towards the end, he was back-pedalling rapidly, commissioning a proto-report on emissions-trading, and trying repeatedly to engineer new groupings of countries that would address the issue.

What, then, are the messages from this saga? For those who want to see real action on this problem, I would suggest there are two.

First, the Howard story highlights the immense power of the office of the Prime Minister in our political system. Howard used this power to frustrate action in relation to climate change. Kevin Rudd’s task will be to find ways of using it to the full if his government is to take the country with it.

Second, the developing world will have to make a contribution to any credible international agreement on greenhouse-gas reductions once Kyoto expires in 2012. The Garnaut discussion paper’s clear message that Australian efforts make sense only in a comprehensive framework of international commitments reinforces this point.