Western liberalism and the challenges of the emerging global order

Third, questions abound over the extent to which movements animated by fanaticism and extremism, some clothed in coherent ideologies and others not, will shape the new order.

International politics has long been an arena of often intense ideological competition, but in recent years the rise of new fundamentalisms, whether they revolve around tribalism in parts of Africa, theology in the Middle East, politics in the Balkans, or zealotry somewhere else have not only wrought misery, they have destabilised countries as well as international affairs more widely.

The times ahead seem hardly more promising. Perhaps fanaticism can be contained - its destructiveness of prosperity and security limited to the local. But leaving aside the questionable moral aspect of any such strategy, dealing with extremism, militancy and fanaticism in all of its ugly manifestations will be a serious test for the political resourcefulness of the international community.

Fourth, the character of the emerging order will be shaped by the international community’s success in confronting the challenges of environmental sustainability.

Environmental decline has caused the collapse of small communities in the past and others are now at risk, but the scale of the environmental challenge is now global, affecting states and cultures, habitats and ecosystems.

Climate change may be the most visible sign of environmental stress, but the strains on the Earth’s land, air and water resources are widespread and in some places leading to acute insecurities. Many of these environmental challenges will have to be confronted in the decades ahead.

Whether modern science and technology offer the knowledge needed to manage this deteriorating situation is an open question, but this seems less in doubt than the need, still far from hand, for the international community to summon the political energy, will and leadership to develop solutions.

Finally, the character of the new order will be defined partly by the norms and values that predominate within it. Concepts of peace, justice, order, security, prosperity and legality all possess a challenging complexity within the context of international relations, yet all ages tend to be defined by the extent to which values such as these gain legitimacy among members of the international community.

If Western liberalism, for example, has not been the most peaceful of global orders, it has nevertheless been notable for its increased rule-making and expanding institutionalism. This trend could continue if, as some commentators have suggested, we are entering an era of significant normative development in international relations.

Perhaps our age is one that will pay greater attention to more sophisticated ideas of right, obligation and society in international affairs than has been the case in the more recent past. If so, the results will be surely slow to mature. Still, if the new order were to evolve in this way it could well involve some significant changes in the normative foundations of international relations.

The way these key issues play out over the coming decades will determine the future of the Western liberal order. Some of the trends in the international system - the rise of new great powers, for example - will pose acute strategic challenges for great power management and presage an era of considerable instability. The trends overall do not necessarily foreshadow a period of confrontation, or indeed the wider use of military force to resolve disputes. But in periods of insecurity where interests clash and power is shifting among key actors, this cannot be ruled out.

There is reason to hope however, that the rules and institutions which constitute such an important part of the current order will permit many of the coming instabilities to be managed in other ways.