Tough times ahead for Australia's Defence Force

I do not think that the current wave of religiously-inspired terrorist fanaticism is likely to end any time soon; this too is a threat we have to consider very seriously. I won’t dwell on it here, but it cannot be discounted. The need for integrated intelligence collection and quality analysis, critical factors for counter-terrorism, is a principal contemporary imperative for maintenance of close ties with the US.

Nor is there any reason to think that demand for the highly proficient Australian military as peacekeepers, stabilisers and disaster-relief logistic support providers is likely to fall away. Requests for assistance from our region will always be hard to refuse; indeed, as John Howard discovered after he knocked back a 2000 request from the Solomons, it’s not always wise to refuse.

We will also face the challenge of calls for contributions to “coalition” operations from our American ally. The alliance with the US is necessary, but it does not come free. Nevertheless, we are not obliged to heed every call: US allies have on occasion declined, yet remained in alliance with Washington (of course, it would not do to decline all such requests). The Iraqi fiasco warns us to be careful: hopefully this time (unlike after Indochina) the lesson will be learned.

We are not, however, faced with any direct military threat. No one wants to invade us, or grab a slice of Australian territory. It would take anyone a long time to develop the military capacity to make either threat credible. Instead we face maritime poachers and, on occasion, people smugglers, and the need to maintain effective surveillance of maybe a tenth of the Earth’s surface.

What does this combination of factors suggest as a sensible prescription for the future structure of our security forces?

Our low population base, coupled with a vast area of responsibility, leave us little choice but to use technology as a so-called “force multiplier” because we lack the population to field a mass force. Our forces are always going to have a substantial high-tech component. Moreover, “coalition” demands from the US require that we be capable of interoperability with the Americans.

In present and likely future conditions, more extensive surveillance and patrolling of our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ - out to 200 nautical miles from the coast) and of the broader maritime approaches will probably be required. Not only for the monitoring, management and protection of important maritime resources, but for security, should climate change phenomena trigger significant regional population movements.

Taking these considerations aboard, it seems our forces, in conjunction with law enforcement and intelligence communities as required, need to be capable of:

• counter-terrorism;
• regional peace support and stabilisation missions;
• maritime patrol and surveillance; and
• coalition operations.

Additionally, there will be requirements generated by climate change and other factors which cannot presently be specified.

Our existing forces have these capabilities, but their mix, however appropriate in an earlier era, is now unsuitable. There is too much emphasis on forces structured for traditional concepts of middle and great power conventional warfare, and not enough for patrol and surveillance, intelligence and regional support. In particular we tend to over-invest in capabilities for coalition war.

We must have such capabilities, but we need to be realistic. We cannot influence the outcome of large-scale conflicts involving the United States. No coalition war that we have joined would have gone differently if we had not. Our contributions are necessarily symbolic and declaratory, showing our willingness to support an ally.