The UN's selective intervention

Article 27(3), which refers to the “veto”, is also an important reason why the UN cannot intervene in certain situations. For example, the Security Council cannot even consider the annexation of Tibet and the disgraceful abuse of human rights there, because China happens to have the veto.

There is also an indirect effect of the veto. For example, the Security Council does not deal with Israel’s foray into Lebanon because Israel is considered to be an ally of a member of that Council.

These are some of the reasons why the UN is unable to intervene in many of the situations where people rightly expect it to do so.

However, the growing tide of refugees who are displaced by civil war or by persecution, and who are putting enormous political and economic strain, not only on the host countries, but whose mere presence is causing the spread of unease and of intolerance worldwide, is an indictment of the current interpretation of the Charter, which only allows the UN to offer humanitarian aid.

What can be done?

It is important to realise, that the flexibility of the Charter not only allowed its interpretation to evolve in a certain way, but also that, because of the Cold War, certain aspects of the Charter were given more emphasis, and were made more use of than others.

Take for example Article 51, which states: “… The Charter shall not impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence …”

Because of the Cold War, this Article has assumed enormous importance. The formation of various military alliances were justified on the basis of this Article. Members of these military alliances had the right to make, or to acquire, arms for their own or for their collective self-defence. Other nations, not belonging to a particular alliance, and who happened to have strategic importance, were also encouraged to arm themselves for “self-defence”. At the height of the Cold War, the super-powers vied with each other for influence, usually by supplying armaments for “self-defence”. Iraq and Somalia are just two such examples.

Article 51 does seem to have been interpreted too freely by the Permanent Members of the Security Council. The member states of the General Assembly can, and should take the initiative to correct the rather cavalier interpretation of this Article. They could seek clarification in the International Court of Justice, (ICJ) not only as to how much armaments are required for self-defence by a given member state, but more importantly, they could ask the ICJ to request the Permanent Members co-ordinate the supply of those armaments.

Members of the General Assembly can do this, by insisting that more emphasis is placed on the implementation on Article 26, which states: “… in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources …”

They could also point out that, although Article 24 gives primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace to the Security Council, it does not preclude the General Assembly from exercising a secondary or residual responsibility.

There are other aspects of the Charter where the General Assembly could insist on greater emphasis.