Enmeshed: Australia and South-East Asia’s fisheries

To give some idea of the three underlying problems - overcapacity, inadequate regional organisations and data gaps - we describe how they manifest in South-East Asia.

Uncontrolled fishing in an era of limited resources arose with the great expansion of South-East Asian fishing - and aquaculture - in recent decades. The first expansion phase from 1950 to the end of the 1970s was the age of fishing industrialisation and the race for fish unconstrained by national borders. The second expansion phase was from the 1980s to the present as the open frontiers were closed by sea territory claims under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea and by overfishing that closed off many fishing options and ended the rise in production from wild fisheries. However, paradoxically, the number of fishers and boats is still increasing in South-East Asia. Fish prices are increasing and most countries still have open access to fishing or are weak on controlling numbers. This is a growth paradigm that does not match the reality of the resources and degrading marine environments.

Australia is affected directly by Indonesian overcapacity. The marine resources of Indonesia, the fourth largest fish producer in the world, are close to fully exploited, and a significant number of fisheries, even in remote eastern Indonesia, are already over-exploited. Yes, the intensity of fishing is still increasing and all resources will be fully exploited or over-exploited within a decade. Indonesian fishers and legal, semi-legal and illegal foreign fishers in Indonesian waters are hungry for more fish and this hunger can result in internal illegal fishing, and illegal fishing in Australia, in other countries and in international waters.

The similar story is heard in the other major South-East Asian fishing countries but the boundaries of marine fisheries sustainability were reached earlier. In Thailand’s most important fishing ground, the Gulf of Thailand, the density of fish declined by 86 per cent from 1961 to 1991. The fish are now smaller, of different types and less valuable. Sixty per cent of the Gulf of Thailand trawl catch is sold as “trash fish” to fishmeal manufacturers. And Thailand is the number one source of Australia’s fish imports. However, a lot of what we import from Thailand, such as tuna in cans, comes from fish caught elsewhere and processed in the highly developed Thai fish processing sector.

Vietnam is a new fishing power and a growing source of Australian imports. Most of Australia’s Vietnam imports come from aquaculture, such as prawns and catfish fillets - often grown on feeds made partly of trash fish. Between 1981 and 1999, Vietnam tripled its fishing capacity but only doubled its marine fish catch - a sure sign of declining resources. In areas such as the Gulf of Tonkin which Vietnam shares with China, the decline has been even more severe because vessels from both countries pressure the fish resources.

In the Philippines, most marine fisheries were overexploited by the 1980s, with catch rates now as low as 10 per cent of rates when fishing grounds were lightly fished.

In short, South-East Asian countries continue to fish their depleted but still valuable fish resources hard, and continue to allow their fleet fishing capacity to expand, almost as though resources were unlimited. The countries recognise the coastal fisheries problems but tend not to address them directly. The typical policy reaction is to develop offshore, distant water fishing and aquaculture, and leave the difficult coastal fishing problems unresolved.

Can Australia help countries develop the means to address the overcapacity problems, other than to catch the spillover when it crosses the sea border?

The second underlying fisheries problem is that regional fisheries regulation is served by a plethora of management organisations that are making only slow headway on critical issues, especially illegal fishing and shared stock management. Illegal fishing is outwitting the efforts of many national and regional fisheries management bodies. Most countries prefer to handle the hard issues bilaterally, if at all. In addition, other non-South-East Asian economies are also interested in the fisheries of South-East Asia, especially Japan, China and Taiwan, and European and Latin American countries.

The third underlying problem is a lack of basic data, such as data on shared stocks, the social and cultural characteristics and the dynamics of fishing communities - like the Bajo of Indonesia who traditionally fished the MoU Box, the impact of illegal fishing and the extent of environmental degradation of mangroves and seagrasses.

And who can project what global warming and ocean acidification will do? These data gaps are delaying and complicating effective regional action. For example, if we don’t understand which fish stocks are shared across national boundaries, we don’t know whether we have to manage them jointly or separately.

Only a few scientific studies - most funded by the Australian Center for International Agricultural Research - have been conducted to study shared stocks and improving tuna data collection. These studies are time consuming, but essential, and they also help build scientific bridges between countries.

Australia and South-East Asia’s enmeshed fishing interests will lead to international fishing tensions unless regional overcapacity is reduced, the exploitation limits of fish stocks are recognised, regional organisations become effective in eliminating illegal fishing and reaching sustainable catch levels, and basic data gaps are filled.

Australia already performs well in regional fisheries engagements but a more comprehensive approach to the fisheries connections could elevate the contribution. The challenge: is Australia prepared to further help the region and help itself by a more comprehensive regional fisheries engagement?