Remembering and learning from the past: World War I and Iraq

In Iraq, the situation had ceased being a conventional war and had become an insurgency by late 2004. By then the majority of attacks from the numerous Islamic insurgent groups was largely aimed at the invading Americans. Given the length of the border, (approx 3,000km), the hostility of neighbours (Iran and Syria) and the number (25 million) of the religiously diverse population, a US army of about 150,000 is probably several multiples below what has historically been required to be effective. Experts used to consider a ratio of 10:1, counter-insurgency troops to insurgents, to be the minimum necessary for success. A Washington source in March 2007 estimated the number of Sunni insurgents at 70,000. Shia might be as many or more.

General David Petraeus, the latest US commander in Iraq recently appointed by President Bush, was the principal author of a new and widely acclaimed US Army counter-insurgency manual (Field Manual 3-24). After 242 pages, he concludes with Appendix G, “Learning Counterinsurgency”, (COIN in the army vernacular). It includes six principles; principles 2, 3 and 4 are as follows:

• isolate the insurgents from their cause and their base;
• secure the population under the rule of law;
• generate intelligence from the population.

Lord Kitchener and Lieutenant General Briggs could have told him all that. Remember the past.