Give Iran the bomb? Reading Iran's apologists

But the crucial question remains: if the country is not what it is, will it be what it is not? And who will tell? Where are the benchmarks? Rather more tempting than mere negative dialectics, is Barnett's pragmatic take on things. In his view, the United States should engage Iran as its regional security partner, and extend responsibility if it wants the country to act responsibly.

Iran is not interested in overthrowing the West and does not harbour a millenarian fantasy of regional, much less global, revolution. It is guided by what he calls the calculated cynicism that nukes are for having, not using. Barnett, with others, proposes a so-called grand bargain, whereby Iran gets the bomb, diplomatic recognition, the lifting of sanctions, the opening of trade and removal from the axis of evil, in return for supporting a two-state solution in Palestine, stability in Iraq, cessation of support for terrorist groups, joint pressure on Syria; last but not least, Iran should establish diplomatic relations with Israel, and formally acknowledge the country's right to exist.

The pragmatism inherent in Barnett's reading is tempting. Here, acceptance of Iran's nuclear ambitions is not based on intangibles such as goodwill, or voluntary suspension of disbelief, or finger-pointing, you-had-it-coming vengeance, but on the rather clearheaded realisation that some clocks can not be turned back. It is better to work with what's coming, than to hold on to what is slipping, the message seems to be.

Only Barnett, too, takes as his point of departure, the conviction that Iran is not to be trusted. Iran will get the bomb, despite its consistent claim that its intentions are entirely energy-related. So, if the country can not be trusted to start with, how will a grand bargain fare?

Besides, the idea of a grand bargain as such presupposes a unified decision-making process by Iran's ruling elite, that we know to be non-existent. Iran's establishment is marked by infighting and power struggles in the seat of an elaborate system of checks-and-balances.

Rafsanjani's regained prominence thanks to his recent appointment as chairman of the powerful Assembly of Experts is indicative of the delicate mechanics of power in Iran. Rafsanjani's opposition to Ahmadinejad is well known. It may spark strong competition between an absolutist and a pragmatic wing of the establishment that might very well kindle the fire of millenarianism inherent in Shia Islam. There's no telling what domestic role the field of foreign affairs might then have to play ...

All of this makes for a regime that is marked first and foremost by a high degree of unpredictability. Unpredictable is not synonymous to irrational. Yet, a responsible leader better think twice before acquiescing and giving the bomb away.