India’s fast breeder nuclear reactors and Australian uranium: an absence of safeguards?

India currently has two fast breeder reactors, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). The FBTR actually uses fuel in the form of a plutonium-uranium carbide mixture with a ratio of 70 per cent plutonium and 30 per cent uranium. It initially used a core composed of weapons grade plutonium. The Prototype reactor is the follow on reactor to the FBTR and shall use a mixed fuel of plutonium-uranium oxide. It is envisaged that the FBTR will be up and running by 2010.

To produce the plutonium for fast breeder reactors India will re-process spent reactor fuel from the operation of thermal reactors. The United States has agreed, again another concession to India, to give Delhi advanced consent for the re-processing of spent reactor fuel to separate plutonium.

Alexander Downer has stated that Australia will sign a safeguards agreement with India to allow for the export of uranium and that it will incorporate all the safeguards features typical of hitherto agreements. It has been standard policy, although not from the beginning of uranium exports, to provide advanced consent for chemical re-processing of spent reactor fuel arising from the use of Australian designated nuclear material.

It is clear that under India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle strategy that Delhi seeks to use separated plutonium in its fast breeder reactor program. Recall from the above discussion that plutonium used in fast breeder reactors is highly concentrated plutonium-239 that is weapons grade plutonium. It is possible then that Australian uranium could very well be used in short burn-up campaigns in designated civil reactors to produce spent reactor fuel high in the concentration of plutonium 239.

Indeed India in the first stage of its nuclear fuel cycle relies heavily upon heavy water moderated reactors that are efficient producers of plutonium-239. Australian safeguards policy requires the consent of Australia before any country can enrich uranium to concentrations of uranium-235 greater than 20 per cent (20-90 per cent is weapons useable and greater than 90 per cent is weapons grade) but does not actually make any such stipulation with regard to plutonium. This is because Australian safeguards policy assumes, so it would seem, nuclear fuel cycles associated with light water reactors predominantly but with India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle this is not the case.

But actually India need not produce plutonium high in plutonium-239 in civil reactors in its fast breeder reactors. This is because it is possible to use reactor grade plutonium, high in the isotope of plutonium-240, to produce plutonium-239. This is known as using a reactor as a “laundry” to breed plutonium-239.

The Indian case may well pose some interesting dilemmas for the Australian Safeguards Office. For instance the office has acknowledged in a research paper that the blanket of fast breeder reactors will be a source of plutonium-239, as is clear, and that in fact the blankets of fast breeders will contain plutonium at the super-grade level, that is, 97 per cent plutonium-239.

The key point for us is that, as noted, the US in the 123 accord has agreed that these two fast breeder reactors will not be safeguarded. Because of this a reasonable thesis to draw is that these fast breeders will play a role in India’s nuclear weapons program. Given the enormous leverage of the United States it hardly seems likely that Australia will wrest this concession from India. Delhi will not let such a concession to its negotiating stance with Washington slip behind the back door via a safeguards agreement with Australia.

That being the case it thereby follows that the Australian government, given advanced consent to spent fuel re-processing and the absence of safeguards on India’s fast breeder reactor program, will not be in a position to claim that it can safeguard Australian nuclear material from ending up in India’s nuclear weapons program.

In its negotiations with India the government must state quite categorically that no Australian designated nuclear material may end up at these two fast breeder reactors. In the absence of such provision safeguards is a moot point.

It is disturbing, then, that it seems that under some aspects of the 123 accord the export of uranium to India almost follows as a consequence. For instance in one article the US agrees to provide India assurance of supply in the case of exogenous supply side shocks by convening friendly countries to re-supply India.

Australia would fit into this provision.