Challenges ahead for the next government of East Timor

Projections aside, the final result on June 30 will depend strongly on the impact of the “Xanana factor”. While Gusmao is likely to build upon Ramos-Horta’s first round share of 22 per cent, many from the east see the former president as having taken sides in the east- west tensions of last year.

Much will depend on whether the charismatic former resistance leader still has the symbolic capital to unify a divided nation, or whether his image as a consensus maker is now tarnished. If the latter, Fretilin’s vote may rise slightly in the eastern districts, with CNRT capturing a larger share in the west at the expense of other opposition parties.

Such a polar result would be unwelcome, and it is to be hoped that any party with a leading role in the next government polls well across all districts. The size and distribution of the CNRT vote may tell us how entrenched regional loyalties have become.

Interestingly, a new government may be in position to “pick winners” in the internal conflict within Fretilin, by appointing ministers from the Mudança or “reform” faction. They would be wise to avoid marginalising Fretilin altogether, which will remain a key political force, and by far the most experienced in policy development.

For all its faults, real and perceived, Fretilin skilfully bankrolled the nation’s future development in very tough oil and gas negotiations with Australia. CNRT draws its name from the broad front that led the country to the independence referendum in 1999, and it should continue its former inclusive policy while allowing for democratic change.

Whatever its ultimate composition, the incoming government faces a number of serious challenges.

The first is political stability. In the long term, any new coalition government may prove fragile. The opposition parties have anti-Fretilin sentiment in common, and also Catholic Church endorsement, and broadly concur on the need to encourage greater levels of foreign investment, spend more of Timor’s oil and gas revenues, and to decentralise government administration.

But once in government, these broad brush strokes may prove insufficient to bind the anti-Fretilin parties to a coherent and stable policy agenda. Policy debate in East Timor remains underdeveloped, with political mobilisation heavily centred on leaders’ personalities and regional loyalties. Without an agreed and transparent coalition agenda, politics could easily descend into a bidding war among governing parties, to satisfy local patronage networks.

Another key challenge will be satisfying the demands of Timorese youth for a greater say in politics. Aside from PD, the opposition parties are still led by the older generation, and it is unlikely that this election will see the transition of power to the demographically dominant youth. Along with high youth unemployment, the “disconnect” between the political elite and younger Timorese is a background factor in ongoing political unrest and gang violence.

While the next government is likely to upgrade the status of Indonesian as a language of public administration, on some controversial intergenerational issues (such as the use of Portuguese language in primary education) the anti-Fretilin parties, broadly representing different generations, may yet find little ground in common.

Foreign relations are another policy battleground. Where Fretilin has consciously fostered multi-polar relationships with the EU, China and the Portuguese-speaking countries to offset the influence of its two powerful neighbours, the opposition parties - rhetorically at least - are signalling higher priority ties with Indonesia and Australia.

While there is much common sense to this position, it also comes with potential costs for a small nation. Much of the heat generated by the recent “Force 2020” report is related to this wider debate over strategic alignment - and the meaning of independence - rather than the specifics of the military expansion plan itself.