A united Iraq - an impossible dream

From the actual battles taking place mainly in the Sunni areas of Iraq, to the verbal battles in the US and worldwide press, the catalogue of misunderstandings concerning what is wrong in Iraq and who is responsibile continues with little clarity emerging.

When discussing Iraq the first question we must ask is whether there is such thing in reality as “Iraq” or is it a fantasy. The US occupation cannot be understood without knowing the history to Iraq’s creation and who engineered this failed project.

After World War I the British and French colony divided the Middle East between themselves on the basis of their strategic interests. The British Empire established Iraq by amalgamating three territories or Vilayat. These were Basra with a majority of Shiite, Baghdad with a majority of Sunnis, and Mosul with a majority of Kurds.

This constructed national identity imposed on ordinary Iraqis - if we assume Iraqis as such exist - failed to inculcate a spirit of nationalism among the majority of the population. Since 1921 the respective Iraqi regimes (both Monarchy and republican), were ruled by Sunnis. The Kurds and Shiite were largely ignored. The few official positions occupied by Shiites and Kurds were merely cosmetic and lacked any real power.

Despite the criticisms levelled at Paul Bremer, his decisions to dissolve the Iraqi army and ban the Ba’ath political Party were both right. His biggest mistake, however, was to allow high ranking Ba’ath members, who were responsible for killing hundreds of thousands of civilians, to go free.

Prior to the toppling of the former Iraqi regime, Saddam ordered thousands of criminals to be released from prisons. Consequently many of the insurgents fighting against the wishes of the majority of Iraqi people and the Coalition forces are comprised of criminals or members of Saddam’s regime. In addition al-Qaida has grasped the opportunity to infiltrate the Sunnis.

While the toppling of Saddam’s regime may be regarded as courageous, to perpetuate the mistakes made by the British 80 years ago, will prove disastrous. Iraq has never possessed a national identity and no super power can bring one into being. Iraq is not a nation. It is a fake and under normal circumstances would disintegrate.

Thirty-five years of cruelty and coercion from the culture of Ba’athism has left a dreadful legacy. The Ba’ath regime may be gone, but its culture of murder and rituals of elimination are still present in Iraq, at least among those Sunnis factions who benefited from Saddam and previous Sunnis regimes.

Nir Rosen could not be more mistaken when he wrote in the Washington Post on May 15, 2007, “Iraqis were not primarily Sunnis or Shiites: they were Iraqis first”. Iraqis! He is certainly not speaking for those who have suffered, and continue to suffer in Iraq.

Rosen claims that “most Ba’ath Party members were Shiites” and yes, in terms of numbers, this is correct: but this glosses over the truth of the situation, which is that the 60 per cent of the population who are Shiite had little choice. They either became members of the Ba’ath Party or they were deemed to be opposed to the National government and would have to face the consequences.

Most importantly, the total number of Shiite members of parliament wielded less real power than one ordinary ranking Sunni of the same party. All highly ranked professionals in both the military and the Ba’ath party were Sunni Arabs. There was not one Shiite or Kurd in the air force during Saddam Hussein’s regime.

Even though a “third of the famous deck of cards of Iraqi leaders”, wanted by America were Shiite, this was merely a veneer - a public face to show that the US was not operating solely against high ranking Sunnis.

Rosen’s statement that “in fact, the army was the most nationalist institution in the country ...” is a deception. Bremer was correct when he said the Shiites hated the Iraqi army. Nor was it only Shiites who hated it. So did the majority of the Kurdish people and some Arab Sunnis. The former Iraqi army was controlled by Sunnis and Ba’athites, despite the many Shiite officers of lower rank.

If the Americans want to stabilise Iraq, it is essential to give the Iraqi people the opportunity, if they so wish, to create their own unified nation. This is, however, an unlikely event. A united Iraq does not take into account that Shiite and Sunnis have been killing each other for 1,300 years. Their mutual antagonism has not arisen since the US occupation. Reconciliation between these two factions would be a long and arduous process, and it is certainly not a viable proposition at this stage.

How can further deaths among American troops be avoided? How can the cost of a united Iraq be prevented from escalating into billions of dollars? The solution is to have Shiite and Sunnis settled in different areas and ruling themselves. Federalism at this stage is the best solution. If Baghdad is a problem there are plenty of alternatives, including dividing the city into two major parts, which, in fact, is what is occurring anyway.

Rosen’s statement that “there is no evidence that Hussein killed hundreds of thousands of Iraqis” is flawed. Mr Rosen has obviously never heard of the genocide campaign (Anfal) against civilian Kurds which cost of about 200,000 lives, mostly women and children. Their remains have been discovered in mass graves in the deserts of Iraq. Has he also counted the Shiite casualties during the period of tyranny? Mr Rosen has failed to pay attention to the reality of the lives of the majority of Shiites and Kurds.

There are two rational alternatives; one is democratic and morally humanitarian. It is to divide Iraq into three parts, each ruling itself independently with some assistance from the international community. This alternative may eventually move towards full independence. The Kurds are the most likely to adopt this alternative: they claimed independence after including Kirkuk city in the Kurdistan region. The city had suffered from Arabisation under Saddam’s regime.. This situation may be repeated in the south of Iraq which also desires independence.

The second alternative is the return of the Ba’athists to power through a military coup d'état: this would suppress all the Iraqi people again. This alternative is naturally unacceptable to the Iraqi majority. However, it would be acceptable to Ba’athists, terrorist groups and possibly even Mr Rosen, because they share an aim of stabilising Iraq at any human cost.

Reconciliation for Ba’athists means a return to power and implies a military coup to take control of all areas of Iraq and create a national identity and a nationalist army.

The real story and the real progress on the ground are there for the world community to see. Iraq must divide into three parts, as did former Yugoslavia. Iraq as a united country is an impossible dream. Unofficial referendums, particularly among Kurds, tell us that Iraq will divide sooner or later, and the myth of “Iraq” will fade into the past.