Oh, the Cold War how I miss it so: Russia and America's missile wars

Russia's test of a "new" Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), the RS-24, and a new cruise missile, the R-500 or Iskander-K has been reported variously as Russia re-igniting a new cold war. The Western media, while reporting breathlessly on Russian missile tests, has displayed a curious lack of interest in Washington's missile and strategic programs.

One of the main talking points about Russia's RS-24 test has been the testing of the missile's capability to deliver multiple nuclear warheads.

The RS-24 test did indeed involve the employment of multiple re-entry vehicles, known as Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles that enable the missile to deliver multiple nuclear weapons against different targets, albeit within a limited footprint (there is an upper boundary on how big this footprint can be but planners can vary its size by altering the geometry of targeting). Currently, Russia is slowly replacing its old fleet of missiles, the SS-19 and the SS-18 with the Topol-M.

Under the old Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) arms control process all Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) on long range missiles were to be eliminated.

The new Topol-M has been deployed with one, 550Kt warhead (the bomb that destroyed Hiroshima had a yield of 12.5-15Kt). It was the now defunct START II treaty that carried the provisions to eliminate MIRVs but START II is no longer in force, for reasons to be explored below.

However, the earlier START I treaty remains in force and this limits the number of warheads to be deployed on a missile of a given type. Given that the Topol-M was deployed with one warhead to put in more would require modification so that it can be presented as being of a new type. And that is essentially what the RS-24 is. It is a semantic artifice. It is basically a Topol-M that has been modified so that according to arms control counting rules it is deemed "new".

Initial reports suggested that the RS-24 could carry 10 nuclear warheads, like the old Cold War heavy missiles, but this claim is false. The Topol-M does not have a "throw weight" sufficient to deliver 10 warheads unless Russia's nuclear physicists at Sarov have invented a new ingenious way of lowering the weight of high-yield nuclear warheads. And we know this cannot be, given the absence of any nuclear testing.

The Iskander missile tested (the R-500) is a new cruise missile of short range. It would not be able to hit the proposed US radar base in the Czech Republic if launched from Kaliningrad but could hit the proposed anti missile interceptors for Poland. These interceptors would be housed in hardened missile silos. If the hardness of these silos is comparable to the hardness of Washington's other missile systems then strategic planners in Moscow would be tempted to target them with nuclear warheads.

How do we explain these tests? The idea behind MIRVing the Topol-M is to both defeat a Ballistic Missile Defence system and to maintain a cost effective strategic deterrent in the absence of the treaty that previously banned BMD - the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT).

The fact that both tests occurred on the same day was clearly a gesture with BMD in mind and follows exactly five years after Washington withdrew from the ABMT.

Of course, BMD in Europe is presented as a measure to deal with the ballistic missile threat from Iran. An Iranian ICBM targeted at the United States would over fly Europe but Iran does not have the capability to deliver a nuclear warhead against the US and such a capability is not even on the horizon.

Recently US officials have claimed that Iran could acquire a North Korean ICBM, but Pyongyang does not have an ICBM to deliver. Indeed the North Korean Taepodong 2, which thus far has proven to be a dud, would not give Iran the ability to hit the United States. Also, for states with relatively crude missile programs the greater the range of the missile the less the payload that the missile can deliver.

A debutant nuclear weapon state would find it extremely difficult to design a nuclear weapon of the required weight for an ICBM.

When faced with such facts Washington tries to shift the goal posts and claims that BMD in Eastern Europe is meant to protect Europe from Iran but America's NATO allies were hardly consulted on the matter and have expressed grave reservations about the whole idea. Indeed, it is acknowledged that the NATO states closest to the putative threat would not be covered by interceptors based in Poland.

Moreover, even if Iran had nuclear weapons and even if Iran had an ICBM capability there is no reason to suppose that Iran would not be deterred from using them given the overwhelming nuclear capability of the United States.

Such facts raise eyebrows in Moscow, much as BMD in Asia raises eyebrows in Beijing. But why should planners in Moscow be so concerned with BMD?

There are two main factors. First, missile defence would give the US greater "freedom of action" to employ conventional military firepower. This is an important consideration because since the end of the cold war NATO has been expanding, contrary to an agreement reached with Gorbachev, toward Russia's borders. More importantly, NATO has been expanding its mission, both in terms of shifting the focus from defence to offence, and by a willingness to engage in military operations outside of Europe.

Second, in the calculus of rational strategic planners the main function of potential adversary missile defence is to augment the offensive power of nuclear strikes. If the US were to conduct a first strike against Russia then at some point diminishing returns would set in and Russia would still be left with nuclear weapons able to strike the United States in retaliation. If Ballistic Missile Defence could be made to work then this second strike capability, rather than being dealt with in a first strike given diminishing returns, would be defeated by missile interceptors.

In this way the US could possibly attain a theoretical first strike capability. What matters here is not the number of interceptors initially deployed but the fact that limited deployments act as a Trojan Horse for further future deployments.

When Condoleezza Rice states that it is ludicrous to believe that BMD could blunt Russia's deterrent based on thousands of warheads she ignores this calculus based on a second strike.

The two factors mentioned above are linked. Russia does not fear, and has no grounds to fear, that the US would actually launch a first strike even if Washington had the means to do so, although we are talking Team Bush here. The fear is that a theoretical first strike capability would give Washington the confidence to further expand its military potential towards Russia and throw its weight around in the former Soviet Union in ways favourable to US corporations and disfavourable to Russian corporations.

The global economic system has rightfully been described as a system of state-corporate mercantilism and this system is intimately linked with military power, even nuclear power.

At the recent G8 summit Putin put Bush on the back foot by proposing that the US radar slated for Europe could go to an existing Russian radar site in Azerbaijan. This proposal has been dismissed because it is “too close” to Iran - the putative threat. Both Putin and Bush are attempting to demonstrate to the Europeans that the other party is intransigent. Both sides are not offering proposals for joint co-operation that are meant to be taken seriously. For Putin the goal is to drive a wedge between Europe and the US. For Bush it is to sooth deep anger and anxiety in Europe.

In fact, it is interesting to reflect on what the US is doing with its long range missiles. The US is engaging in the "modernisation" of its fleet of Minuteman III missiles that began during the Clinton administration. The US is fitting the Minuteman III with the W87 warhead that previously armed the MX, a hard target killer that was designed for a first strike.

It is forging along a path of creating a portion of this fleet into an elite force known as Minuteman Elite. Minuteman Elite would improve the accuracy of Minuteman III missiles by using GPS satellites for navigation, further cementing the link between strategic nuclear weapons and space assets that would be problematical if we are to march head long toward the weaponisation of space, which we are.

So, the US is augmenting Minuteman III by improving the lethal power of nuclear weapons that the fleet is to deliver and by improving its accuracy. In other words, the US is working on its ICBMs, in conjunction with other aspects of its strategic triad such as modifying the fuse on the W76 warhead, in order to increase their ability to deliver a nuclear first strike. Russia is working on its ICBMs in order to increase their ability to retaliate and therefore deter.

That's a big difference and nowhere discussed in the blanket coverage accompanying Russia's latest tests.

In fact just a few months ago the US conducted a Minuteman III closed silo test from Vandenberg Air Force Base that employed GPS for navigation.

One can easily do a controlled experiment. How much coverage in the media did that get compared with the Russian tests?

To a great degree missile defence is a make work scheme for the US aerospace industry, which stands to make great profits by the usual mechanism of tax payer subsidy. Second, because strategic systems are a matter of survival strategic planners in Moscow must operate on the assumption that the system can work, even though the whole thing probably won’t work (PDF 97.3KB) because of counter-measures.

It would be crazy to start a new arms race in Europe, and Asia for that matter, for these reasons. But we live in a crazy world as is all too evident.