The media and Iraq

A report by The Financial Times on the study argues that it "highlights the opportunity for Iraq to be one of the world’s biggest oil suppliers, and its attractions for international oil companies - if the conflict in the country can be resolved." (“Iraq May Hold Twice As Much Oil”, Ed Crooks The Financial Times April 18, 2007)

De-classified war planning documents drawn up by Central Command (PDF 92KB) demonstrate that a key objective of US military operations in the first phase of the conflict was "seizure" of Iraq's oil fields. By contrast the seizure and dismantlement of Iraqi "weapons of mass destruction", the no longer discussed initial rationale for war, was a low priority for strategic planners.

One of the key architects of the Iraq war, Paul Wolfowitz, has stated, “the most important difference between North Korea and Iraq is that economically, we just had no choice in Iraq. The country swims on a sea of oil.” Wolfowitz has attempted to clarify this remark, stating that military action was needed in the Iraq case because Saddam’s oil meant he could resist US economic pressure. In reality, this clarification is unsatisfactory.

First, it flatly contradicts a previous interview with Vanity Fair where Wolfowitz reveals that “weapons of mass destruction” was but a pretext for the war chosen for internal bureaucratic reasons in which case the denial is instantly rendered invalid. Second, as Wolfowitz well knows Iraq was subject to comprehensive economic sanctions that decimated its oil infrastructure.

Cementing US global primacy through military power, not spreading democracy, is the key underlying doctrine of the neo-conservatives. The “new” doctrine of preventive war, announced prior to the Iraq war, was to be enshrined in Baghdad. The Bush administration sought to use Iraq to demonstrate that it meant what it said in its 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States that officially re-affirmed the tenets of a controversial 1992 draft Defence Planning Guidance written by Cheney and Wolfowitz.

It must be added that the contempt for democracy does not just apply to Iraq. The Bush Administration had sought to use Iraq in order to ram through unpopular reform measures at home in order to further cement the power and privilege of a highly concentrated elite. So did the Howard Government. For Canberra, Iraq was to be a wedge behind which they could corral a frightened population. Use of the threat of terrorism and turban headed hordes in order to wage a neo-liberal jihad against the population has been one of the central, if not the central, features of the Howard years.

We may say that the US invaded Iraq in order to deter democracy in Iraq, to deter democracy globally by shifting the burden of statecraft in international relations further toward the employment of military power where the US maintains a comparative advantage (the world is economically tri-polar and militarily uni-polar with the rise of China threatening to make it multi-polar and bi-polar respectively hence less amenable to control from Washington) and to deter democracy at home.

One can see the link in the issue of troop withdrawal. As noted, bumper majorities in Arab Iraq desire the occupation of Iraq to end. The mid term congressional elections demonstrate that so does the population of the United States. When Nancy Pelosi calls for the occupation of Iraq to be wound down she is acting on the mandate given to her by the voters. This demonstrates that so far as Iraq is concerned the preferences of the people of Iraq and the United States are not reflected in actual policy, but our scribes are still able to use the term democracy with a straight face all the same.

Of course, the analysis presented above could well be wrong, but Iraq demonstrates that our Government’s contempt for democracy both abroad and at home would not be a thesis displayed prominently either now or post media "reform" in the opinion pages of our major broadsheets no matter how compelling the empirical evidence.

Whenever we observe that a series of opinions are widely held, even by critics of government action, but are at odds with empirical reality we know we are entering the realm of ideology. What Iraq demonstrates is that there is a hidden underlying dominant ideology that sets the framework for permissible analysis in International Relations. Why that is so is a matter for the “sociology of knowledge”, understood as an empirical undertaking.

This is of concern because, as noted, intellectual commentary in Australia is dominated by the agenda setting broadsheets. The intellectual community is meant to provide perspective on government policy. This is an essential task for informed debate is critical to the fashioning of rational policy outcomes in a democracy. However, this cannot happen so long as critics of government action are allowed to go thus far and no further.

Indeed, most commentary in the big media places a premium on pithy language and emotionally potent over simplifications. Combined with a dominant ideology this means that in our opinion pages there is a premium placed on irrationality.

There can be little doubt that timid analysis has played its part in the mess we find ourselves in Iraq today. In fact, a US colonel has slammed America’s generals as being incompetent partly out of such analytical timidity.

So long as even the critics of the Iraq war maintain their opposition on strictly pragmatic criteria, without questioning our right to intervene if we judge it to be feasible, it follows by simple logic that other interventions of a similar type will follow in future. The media, which has played an important role in this war, is helping to set up the framework for the next one.