Preemption: war with Iran next?

"Some worry that it is somehow undiplomatic or impolite to speak the language of right and wrong. I disagree. (Applause.) Different circumstances require different methods, but not different moralities. (Applause.) Moral truth is the same in every culture, in every time, and in every place. Targeting innocent civilians for murder is always and everywhere wrong. (Applause.)

"Brutality against women is always and everywhere wrong. (Applause.) There can be no neutrality between justice and cruelty, between the innocent and the guilty. We are in a conflict between good and evil, and America will call evil by its name. (Applause.) By confronting evil and lawless regimes, we do not create a problem, we reveal a problem. And we will lead the world in opposing it." (Applause.)George W. Bush Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1, 2002.

Only six months after the “axis of evil” speech, and showing no reservations about his moral take on world events, President Bush called on the graduates of the West Point Military Academy to "face a threat with no precedent".

September 11 had exposed this threat as "a few hundred thousand dollars in the hands of a few dozen evil and deluded men", he maintained, and the old Cold War doctrines of deterrence and containment were inadequate against it.

"We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. (Applause.) In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act. (Applause.)"

And with that, we have the doctrine of preemption. It must be stressed that this new doctrine is not intended to replace the old ones, but rather to complement them. It widens America's range of strategies, to the point where it permits unilateral action against a threat that is not truly imminent.

At the same time, we cannot escape the fact the Bush administration was quite happy to put that new complement into practice quickly. Not even ten months after his speech at West Point, the president launched the war against Iraq, on the basis of a rationale that would appear to have chameleon-like qualities.

It has done much to discredit the possible merits of preemption per se. Growing crowds worldwide see it as a lame excuse for America to still its imperial hunger. And now Iran is the next one up. Or so they say.

Debating the illusions and realities of American empire with Bradley A.Thayer, scholar Christopher Layne holds that "the same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq now are agitating for war with Iran" (American Empire - a debate).

To him it is "hardly coincidental that the administration's policy toward Tehran bears a striking similarity to its policy during the run-up to the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, not only on the nuclear weapons issue but - ominously - with respect to regime change and democratization".

He is joined by other, even more vocal observers such as investigative journalist Seymour Hersh and former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter (see for example here) who claim that America is on the verge of invading Iran.

It is true that the Bush administration has always kept all available options open, including a military one. It has repeated its position in public on several occasions.

Vice-president Cheney summed it up quite succinctly:

"We have said repeatedly that we think they should not have a nuclear bomb. And we also made it abundantly clear we want to solve the problem diplomatically. But the president has always emphasised no options have been taken off the table."

This was September 2006. It may have been that Cheney was merely in a polite mood. But White House Press Secretary Snow said the same thing in May, and even Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, arguably one of the "architects of illusion" that Layne was talking about, stated:

"Finally there have been some questions raised about Iran and speculation about US policy. Let me be clear. The department's policy is the president's policy. President Bush and America's allies are on a diplomatic track. The president addressed this matter yesterday very forcefully, and I would have nothing to add."

He was merely repeating a point that years before, in 2002 already, had been made by then Secretary of State Colin Powell when he said that there were no plans to begin a conflict with Iran. As late as December 2006, Rumsfeld's successor Robert M. Gates being heard before the Senate Armed Services Committee reaffirmed again:

"Senator Byrd, I think that military action against Iran would be an absolute last resort; that any problems that we have with Iran, our first option should be diplomacy and working with our allies to try and deal with the problems that Iran is posing to us. I think that we have seen in Iraq that once war is unleashed, it becomes unpredictable. And I think that the consequences of a conflict - a military conflict with Iran could be quite dramatic. And therefore, I would counsel against military action, except as a last resort and if we felt that our vital interests were threatened."

The United States are maintaining a steady course with regard to Iran so it seems. Diplomacy first, army last. If there is naval buildup in the Gulf, it should be read as classic deterrence in the framework of a regular text-book containment policy. Kenneth Katzman, in a report for Congress entitled Iran: US Concerns and Policy Responses, summarises:

"The Bush Administration has continued the thrust of Clinton Administration efforts to try to limit Iran's strategic capabilities through international diplomacy and sanctions, although some Bush Administration officials have sought to place regime change at the center of the US Iran policy. During 2006, the pressing US interest in curbing Iran's nuclear program has led to a de-emphasis of regime change in favor of international diplomacy and a revival of the option of direct engagement with Iran. As of early 2007, however, the Administration approach has shifted somewhat toward strategic and military containment."

With temperatures in the region increasing "somewhat", Congress has moved to introduce legislation that will require the president to obtain congressional authorisation for use of force against force.

Alongside this, another proposal would prohibit the use of any US funds for strikes against Iran.

At the same time, in September 2006, Congress voted into law the so-called Iran Freedom Support Act that is designed to uphold various sanctions against the country, its material backers and investors, while promoting democracy through the assistance of opposition groups and individuals both domestic and foreign.

Furthermore, the State Department has appropriated funds - with full congressional support - to finance educational grants to Iranian organisations, pay for broadcasting, support the development of political parties, promote civil society, and so on.

On top of that, state has widely expanded its network of Iran-diplomats, both in Washington where it erected a dedicated Office of Iranian Affairs, and worldwide, adding Farsi-speaking staff to its branches in London, Dubai, Baku, Istanbul and Askhabad.

So while regime change may not be entirely off the table, so far it looks unlikely that it will be brought about by military means. And while the army may figure prominently in various contingency plans, preferences in the White House and Congress alike still seem to go towards a mix of diplomacy, containment, and propaganda.

Despite statements to the contrary, despite congressional checks on the presidential authority to launch a limited strike, let alone an all-out war, there are those who maintain that some sort of Osirak scenario will be played out soon.

Iran's obnoxious attitude towards Israel and the Holocaust is contributing rather handsomly to galvanize the hardliners in Israel and the Israeli lobby in the States. Such an attack would be a tragic mistake. Not only would it undermine any legitimacy the Americans have left in the region, it would also strengthen the Iranian regime because of the perceived injustice against the country.

Most certainly it would arouse support for the Islamic Republic across the muslim world, and shatter the authority of the few remaining friends America has in the region.

Furthermore, an attack against Iran's installations will speed things up, rather than slow them down, because in the eyes of Iran having the bomb would clearly be the only remaining deterrent.

Things in Iraq would get worse than they are today, and Israel's security would be even more porous than it already is. Worst of all, an attack will kill America's standing with Iran's youth and general population instantly (for example see here). Prospects of regime change will have been pushed back a couple of decades at least. None of that paints a bright future for the region.

As if to even things out, at the other end of the spectrum fatalists have resigned themselves to an Iran in possession of the bomb. Some accept that fate reluctantly, others defend the idea with lustre. Surprisingly, they are not always to be found among the intellectual left wing.

Thomas P.M.Barnett for instance, a professor at the US Naval War College, sees a nuclear Iran as the only way to a secure Middle East. Permitting Iran to have nuclear capabilities creates the platform we need to strike a “grand bargain” with that country, he says. His arguments are convincing to a point, but predicated on the determinist conviction that Iran will get the bomb, one way or another.

And we are not quite there yet. Even if estimates vary widely, most observers agree that Iran is years away from actually having the bomb.

Interestingly too, this race for the rocket ties in with another, demographic race that will turn power over in the hands of people one step removed from the Khomeini revolution but savvy to a more comfortable life. Iran's economic condition will weigh ever more impressively on the regime. And its credentials in that arena are far from shining.

So before we resign ourselves to a nuclear Iran, variables aplenty remain to be valued against each other. And let's not forget: predictions serve mainly to underscore that outcomes will often be different.