The tangled web of Middle Eastern alliances

The US can leave Iraq when it wishes but regional powers such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel will have to pick up the pieces.

A US centric explanation would suggest these powers only act because America exists, but shifting the focus to regional initiatives presents aspects less familiar to our US dominated media.

In summary it appears that Iran has launched a diplomatic offensive to paint itself as a force for peace in Iraq. Less known is Saudi Arabia’s campaign to limit Iranian influence in Iraq, and in the Middle East generally, through forming an anti-Iranian alliance.

Israel, meanwhile, is quietly co-operating, to some extent, with the Saudis to counter growing Iranian power. All this represents a new and complicated series of possible strategies, both overt and covert, for regional players.

Iran’s Shiite alliance

As a generalisation Iran is attempting to create a Shiite alliance for mutual defence and to spread the Shiite strand of Islam. Iran can already count on Hezbollah-dominated southern Lebanon as part of the alliance.

Iran's President Ahmadinejad clearly hopes to influence the future direction of Iraq through overt contact with Iraqi Shiite leaders and perhaps through covertly supporting the powerful Shiite militias in Iraq. Iran wishes to alter its image from a “rogue state” (that might be a target for US and Israeli airstrikes against its nuclear infrastructure) to being seen as a benign and conciliatory leader in the region.

In September 2006 Iraq’s leader Prime Minister Maliki (a Shiite but toeing the US line) made a short scheduled visit to Iran and spoke of non-interference in each others affairs.

However, Iraq now appears to be courting some Iranian involvement as reflected in discussions in late November 2006, in Iran, between Iraqi President Talabani (a Kurd) and Iranian President Ahmadinejad. Talabani was quoted on Iranian television as saying: "We are in dire need of Iran's help in establishing security and stability in Iraq."

President Ahmadinejad attempted to make the November 2006 meeting at least a three-way summit by also inviting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Syria did not respond to the invitation, however, and may be aiming to strengthen its position by sitting on the fence.

Syria perhaps rejected honorary membership of Iran’s Shiite alliance on sectarian grounds (Syria is majority Sunni) or it is possible Syria is being given incentives by Saudi Arabia and threats from Israel not to side too closely with Iran’s projects.

Saudi Arabia’s anti-Iranian alliance

Saudi Arabia has many concerns over the Iraq war. It fears an escalation from a militia and al-Qaida fuelled civil war to a conventional war in which Iran’s armed forces (powerful relative to Iraqi and Saudi forces) might intervene and prevail. The Saudis also fear Iran’s ability to incite violence within Saudi Arabia by influencing the kingdom’s Shiite minority.

Ultimately the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia may fear a Shiite alliance could strengthen Iran by allowing it to divert more resources away from conventional military security towards its nuclear program.

The Saudi and the US may be particularly anxious that Iraq and Iran should not co-ordinate oil production levels and pricing as the latter two countries represent a substantial part of the world’s oil production and reserves. The Saudis would also appreciate that even a negotiated three-way division of Iraq (between Shiite, Sunni and Kurdish states) would leave their fellow Sunnis with very little oil. Therefore the Saudis see that maintaining a united, independent Iraq is beneficial for Iraqi Sunni and Saudi security.

Saudi Arabia may be attempting to counter Iran’s diplomatic moves by creating an anti-Iranian (and generally Sunni) alliance. This loose alliance includes Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, such oil rich Arab neighbours as Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates togehter with a quiet intelligence relationship with Israel. Meanwhile Syria may remain relatively neutral.

The Saudis have attempted to reduce sectarian violence in Iraq by bringing together Iraqi Shiite and Sunni leaders in meetings when they visit Mecca, but from the rising level of violence in Iraq this religious humanitarian program does not appear to be working.

At the other end off the moral spectrum the Saudis may see potential to influence Iraqi politics through covert action, perhaps through financing Sunni Iraqi politicians and moderate Shiite politicians. It would be difficult to prove that this potential use for Saudi Arabia’s large cash reserves is actually occurring.

A previous Saudi covert action program was conducted on a large scale in Afghanistan by Saudi intelligence in the 1980s under the close leadership of Prince Turki al Faisal (then head of Saudi foreign intelligence (GID)) in conjunction with the CIA and Pakistani intelligence.

Israel

The Saudis have also broadened their anti-Iranian alliance to include discussions with Egypt and a covert relationship with Israel via Jordanian intelligence. The Israelis may see some political and intelligence value in pooling information concerning their major enemies - Hezbollah and Iran.

The Kurdish guerrillas or Peshmerga continue to serve US and Israeli interests while fighting for an independent Kurdistan. The US and Israel have been supporting the Peshmerga because they are considered the only reliable local allies in Iraq and actually fought alongside US troops against the Iraqi army during the 2003 invasion.

Israel would, of course, prefer US forces remain in Iraq but realises that it must find any friends it can. Israel sees some similarities between its situation and that of the Kurds who, like them, are an isolated ethnic group in the Middle East. Major Kurdish populations live in northern Iraq, Iran and Syria, potentially making them valuable allies of the west.

The Peshmerga currently are considered useful because they regularly pass into Iran, apparently on intelligence missions and to fight Iranian security forces. One aim may be to encourage Iranian forces to retaliate (the Iranians occasionally shell Iraqi Kurd territory) in actions that could be conveniently labelled “Iranian aggression” if the US and Israel wished to attack Iran.

If the US withdraws the main western support for the peshmerga may quietly pass from the US to Israel. The Israeli-Kurdish connection has occasionally been exposed but an alliance with an independent Kurdistan appears to be a key, long term, Israeli strategy.

The processes of Iranian alliance building, the Saudi anti-Iranian alliance and Israeli involvement are complex and in their early stages of clarity. We are conditioned by the media to see actions of Middle Eastern countries as reactions to US moves in Iraq, but some activities, particularly Iran’s, have their own momentum.

It is up to the west, including the US and Australia, to recognise that Iranian initiatives are not necessarily a threat.