Safeguarding our nuclear ambitions

Prompted by the inability to address undeclared facilities, and other limitations, the IAEA initiated efforts to strengthen the system in the early 1990s. The IAEA's strengthened safeguards program began in 1993 with “Programme 93+2”. The intention - which proved to be wildly optimistic - was to implement a strengthened safeguards regime in two years.

The Model Additional Protocol was introduced in 1997. With the Additional Protocol in force the IAEA should theoretically be able to develop a more inclusive “cradle to grave” picture of states' nuclear activities. The improvements include:

• requiring substantially more information from states regarding their nuclear activities, other relevant sites, imports and exports, and material holdings;
• increased use of environmental sampling, analysis, and remote monitoring;
• allowing IAEA inspectors extended access to any location that is included on an expanded declaration, and to other necessary locations; and
• additional authority to use the most advanced technologies and intelligence, such as commercial satellite imagery.

As of October 2006, 78 NPT states had negotiated and ratified an AP but over 100 NPT states had not done so.

While strengthened safeguards are welcome, serious problems with the safeguards system remain. One is that the development of the full suite of nuclear fuel cycle facilities - including sensitive, dual-use enrichment and reprocessing facilities - is enshrined in the NPT as an “inalienable right” of all NPT states.

El Baradei noted in a December 2005 statement: "If a country with a full nuclear fuel cycle decides to break away from its non-proliferation commitments, a nuclear weapon could be only months away. In such cases, we are only as secure as the outbreak of the next major crisis. In today’s environment, this margin of security is simply untenable."

Another unresolved problem is highlighted by North Korea. It is difficult or impossible to prevent an NPT state from simply withdrawing from the NPT and pursuing weapons. North Korea joined the NPT but withdrew in 2003 and tested a nuclear weapon in October 2006. Iran could be the next country withdrawing from the NPT/IAEA system.

Australia's bilateral safeguards

In justifying Australia's international trade in uranium, the government and the uranium industry place much emphasis on bilateral safeguards agreements which prospective customer countries must negotiate with the government. These agreements cover Australian Obligated Nuclear Material - uranium and by-products such as depleted uranium produced at enrichment plants, and plutonium formed by neutron irradiation of uranium in reactors. The most important provisions are for prior Australian consent before Australian Obligated Nuclear Material is transferred to a third party, enriched beyond 20 per cent uranium-235, or reprocessed.

The provisions for Australian consent for “high enrichment” (to 20 per cent or more uranium-235) and for reprocessing have never once been invoked since the bilateral agreements were initiated by the Fraser government in 1977. No country has ever requested permission to enrich beyond 20 per cent uranium-235. More importantly, permission to reprocess has never once been refused even when it leads to the stockpiling of Australian-obligated plutonium - as it has in Japan and several European countries. Control of reprocessing has also been weakened by allowing open-ended “programmatic” consent instead of the previous policy of case-by-case approval.

Neither IAEA safeguards nor the provisions of bilateral agreements ensure that Australian uranium will not find its way into weapons. Claims from government bodies such as the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office, and from the uranium industry, that safeguards provide "assurances" that Australian Obligated Nuclear Material will not be diverted should be disregarded.

Of course, it is possible that safeguards could be improved, and it is possible that Australia could play a leading role in improving safeguards. However, as Professor Richard Broinowski details in his 2003 book Fact or Fission? The Truth About Australia’s Nuclear Ambitions, safeguards pertaining to Australian Obligated Nuclear Material have been gradually weakened over the years. The reason was identified by Mike Rann - then a young Labor Party researcher and now the pro-uranium premier of South Australia - in his 1982 booklet, Uranium: Play It Safe.

"Again and again," Rann wrote, "it has been demonstrated here and overseas that when problems over safeguards prove difficult, commercial considerations will come first".

A genuine nuclear debate in Australia would include a reassessment of the uranium export industry given the risks of diversion and proliferation identified in this article.