The M factor in Malaysian politics

“Because of my statement that I would continue criticising if something that is not good for the religion, race and country is done by the prime minister, all sorts of condemnations and insults are thrown by these hatchet men and the mainstream media towards me.”

Ironically similar criticisms could have been levelled during Dr Mahathir’s term (1981 to 2003) when he faced two unsuccessful challenges from previously close associates within the ruling United Malay National Organisation.

Dr Mahathir always kept a tight rein on the Malaysian media and, at one stage, shut down the popular Star newspaper, owned by UMNO’s Chinese political affiliate, the Malaysian Chinese Association.

The former Malaysian prime minister’s complex psychological make-up appears to have impeded him from recognising the tremendous progress made by three prime ministers that preceded him and the likelihood this trend will persist.

If Dr Mahathir had come on the Malaysian scene any sooner it is unlikely the economy would be as sound as it is today since it might not have been able to withstand the impacts of huge loss-makers, such as the government-funded Pewaja steel complex and the likely failure of the Proton if it were not able to win a foreign manufacturing ally.

In a sense Abdullah is picking up some of the pieces, having made a start at turning around massive losses at Malaysian Airways and by indirectly forcing Proton to face up to the impending competition from within the region and elsewhere.

Another of Dr M’s “think big” projects that is a total shambles is his plan for a multi-billion dollar hydroelectric scheme in Sarawak State, the Bakun project, where millions of hectares of forest have been wiped out for a dam that the government now admits cannot viably provide electricity to Peninsula Malaysia.

The fact that Malaysia is one of the developing world’s greatest economic success stories owes itself to steady economic progress since independence in 1957 with the first economic recession only occurring in the mid-80s during Dr M’s period in office. Another such event occurred in 1997-98 during the Asian economic crisis.

Malaysia’s first and possibly greatest economic success story was provided by its response to the sectarian Biafran War (1967-70) when Malaysia took over from conflict-ridden Nigeria as the world’s biggest palm oil industry producer.

Since its former British colonial days it had been the world’s biggest producer of natural rubber and tin, but palm oil suggested to the national psyche that the country could take on immense challenges and succeed.

At the heart of this success was a rapid rural transformation engineered by the founding Prime Minister Tengku Abdul Rahman and his development-oriented deputy and successor, Tun Abdul Razak.

Tun Razak was fairly austere, highly disciplined and somewhat severe-looking, in sharp contrast to the happy-go-lucky and aristocratic Tengku. Unlike the “think big” goals of Dr Mahathir, Tun Razak worked on simple goals where the long-term impacts were just as dramatic. When the late Tun visited small remote villages, he admonished bureaucrats: “I do not mind if you make mistakes just as long as the job is getting done.”