A new Russia?

The fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 ushered in a period in which hopes were high for the emergence of a new Russia distinctly different from its predecessor.

Both in Russia and especially in the West, many people looked forward to a future Russia in which a democratic political system, resting on a vibrant market economy, produced a society in which material plenty and political freedom abounded. Many saw this in terms of the creation of a “normal” society, or one like those in the West. However these exaggerated hopes have been disappointed.

Politically, post-Soviet Russia falls well short of being a stable democracy. Especially over the last six years, the weak democratic elements that existed in the system have come under pressure.

Although elections have been held regularly for parliament and president, the dominance of Putin personally and of the party created to support him, United Russia, allied to the weakness of the opposition, has drained these of meaningful competition. At the regional level, governors are no longer elected but appointed.

A leading businessman, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, has been jailed, officially on tax issues but it is popularly believed that this has been because he opposed the president.

Increasing concentration of ownership by the state of national media outlets has meant that, although many niche publications enjoy substantial freedom of discussion and comment, press freedom has been reduced. Even the editors of still independent publications have widely been suspected of exercising a kind of self-censorship over what they publish.

Many have argued that these sorts of measures constitute an attack on democracy by Putin and his colleagues and that this is a new development. They argue that the Yeltsin years in the 1990s were democratic. But this is a misreading of the situation.

The trends under Yeltsin were in the same anti-democratic direction as under Putin. During Yeltsin’s presidency, the parliament was illegally closed by force by the president, elections were manipulated, and undue influence was exercised at the top of the political system by unelected, shady figures whose only qualifications for power were their close personal associations with Yeltsin.

Rather than building the institutions of a strong democracy, Yeltsin left a legacy of weak institutions and a strong and expansive conception of the presidency as able to ride over the other institutions in the system.

In the economy too, achievements did not match expectations. Immediately after the end of the Soviet Union, the new Russian government introduced some elements of economic shock therapy. The result was the effective collapse of much of the economy and a depression which was deeper and more long-lasting than that of the 1920s in the West.

The majority of the population was catapulted into poverty as people’s savings were eaten up by the inflation that wracked the country. There was unemployment and, more importantly, significant underemployment as the process of de-industrialisation gathered pace. Begging became more prominent on the streets as wide sections of the population experienced economic hardship.

In 1998, the Russian economic system experienced a form of melt down as the government was forced to default and devalue the currency. Paradoxically, this had one positive impact internally in that it increased the price of foreign goods and made Russian-manufactured goods competitive. The surge in purchase of Russian-made goods fed into Russian industry and helped to revive it. On the back of this, and especially of rising oil prices for its exports, the Russian economy has boomed in the new millennium.

At least in Moscow and many of the big cities, a new and more prosperous middle class seems to be emerging, and the poverty of the past has disappeared. In sharp contrast to Soviet times, those Russians who have money can now purchase anything they want in Moscow. And the number of people who possess such money seems to be growing in Russian society. It needs to, given that Moscow has been classed as the most expensive city in the world in which to live. However it is not clear how long such a boom can be sustained given that it relies on continuing high oil prices.

The improved economic situation hides other continuing problems. One is the continuing presence of crime and corruption.

Russia earned the unenviable reputation in the 1990s of being a very dangerous society. There were a large number of killings and assassinations during the decade, principally of businessmen and tax collectors, while the level of crime rose substantially.

In the business sphere, one of the areas of greatest growth has been in the protection industry. This has involved the employment of a firm to provide protection from criminals and often to liaise with government officials. Crime is still significant - the recent assassination of the investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya is but one instance of this - but it seems to be at levels much lower than it was in the 1990s.

Corruption is also said to be very widespread. Reports of needing to bribe officials, from traffic police through to those issuing licences and permits, are common. Certainly business routinely builds into its costs a proportion of its turnover to grease the gears of public administration. This clearly adds significantly to business costs, but does at least ensure that things get done.

Another severe problem facing Russian society is health. The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the collapse of an already staggering social security system. With the disappearance of much of the infrastructure necessary to sustain a healthy population, the Russian people have had to confront sharply escalating health challenges.

As well as the scourge of AIDS, formerly absent diseases like tuberculosis have made a comeback. High levels of cardiovascular disease, alcohol and drug abuse, and smoking characterise the society, adversely affecting people’s health and lifestyle.

Suicide has also increased. The decline in life expectancy that occurred in the last years of the Soviet Union has accordingly accelerated following the collapse, with the result that male life expectancy is only 59 and female expectancy a few years higher. All of this, added to the high rate of abortions, has led to a declining population; if it continues at the same rate, the current population of some 148 million will be only 52 million by 2080.

Another pressing problem on the Russian scene is the continuing instability in Chechnya. Having fought two wars in the past twelve years in the would-be breakaway republic - wars that were characterised by sickening brutality and torture on both sides - the Moscow government seems little closer to having a stable pro-Moscow administration in the republic. Unless an administration with widespread popular support can be created, it is unlikely that this sore will easily disappear.

Given this catalogue of problems, how are we to evaluate Russia’s future?

When Putin came to power, he saw his principal task as being to strengthen the state and thereby establish tighter central control over the country. This was clearly needed following the problems of the Yeltsin era, and has in part been achieved. It is this tightening of central control that has had such negative consequences for Russian democracy. However only if there is an effective state will the government have any chance of dealing successfully with these problems.

In this context, while we should remain critical of Russian lapses in democracy, we should recognise the immensity of the problems with which independent Russia has had to deal.