The US on the horns of a dilemma

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was the mayor of Tehran. When he became president of Iran in 2005, one of the smartest observers of Iran in the United States wrote, “This was a coup d’état led by the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. It was foreseeable as soon as it became known that between 66 and 70 of the new members of the majlis (parliament) elected in February 2004 were members of the Revolutionary Guards militia - enough to give these forces, and the ruling elite, control of the institution.”

The analyst (who remains anonymous for his own safety) wrote, “In the presidential election, the coup extended to the executive branch”.

Ahmadinejad is a second-generation revolutionary. He witnessed first hand the corrupt practices of the first-generation revolutionaries - most of whom are now 70 and older - and how the latter have become rich and powerful.

The revolution has both religious and economic elements. The first generation revolutionaries wanted to spread the wealth in a more appropriate way. Before them, the Shah and his henchmen made all the money. Now they wanted to become rich.

Part of the key to achieving this end was to establish a rigidly loyal religious following. This fuels the Islamic extremism.

A recent announcement by Ahmadinejad that he was dismissing soft, non extreme or “corrupt” professors is part of the scheme to enforce fiercely loyal Islamic extremism and order.

Throughout his campaign for president Ahmadinejad referred to various “mafias” controlling many sectors of Iran’s economy and his determination to break apart these controlling blocs. Ahmadinejad especially wanted to break apart the oil industry (controlled by Rafsanjani) and the auto industry (overseen by another clique).

But Ahmadinejad’s economic ambitions have not all proved successful (naturally, the owners of economic power have not relinquished it gracefully).

Michael Slackman wrote in the New York Times in May 2006 that, “President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is trying to consolidate power in the office of the presidency in a way never before seen in the 27-year history of the Islamic Republic”.

One of the ways Ahmadinejad can rise in stature is to defy the West - especially the United States.

Consequently, it is sometimes not clear how much progress he is really making on his nuclear projects. He might just be inciting a fight with the West. He knows he may not win a prolonged military action. But he is heartened by how long it has taken the United States to assert order and calm in Iraq.

Naturally, Ahmadinejad is the architect of disorder and unrest in Iraq. Iran wants Iraq, a nation with which it waged an eight-year war (1980-88), in the Iranian sphere. Who wouldn’t want a neighbour to the west with similar extremist Islamic leanings?

Since Washington has had no diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979, Washington is unable to talk directly to Ahmadinejad and his government. To do so now would only raise Ahmadinejad’s prestige and give him a free “win” in the diplomatic shell game.

Ahmadinejad knows this. He knows he can keep pressing his advantage to the limit; the limit being an air strike or other hostile act by the United States.

So Ahmadinejad defies the UN, makes bombastic statements (“the Zionist state should be wiped from the map”) and pursues his nuclear ambitions. He also funded and armed Hezbollah and other terror groups and stands behind and fosters the insurgents in Iraq.

So America’s continued presence in Iraq is very much a test of wills, between George W. Bush (and the American people, who could run out of patience) and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran. The future of the Iraqi people, one would normally assume, lies totally in their own hands. But in this case, the future of the Iraqi people is in many hands indeed.

The choices of the West are limited. An air strike or similar military action may seem to be an overreaction, especially among radical Islamic extremists. This may just incite more terrorism against the United States from some quarters.

Economic sanctions might seem, to the Islamic extremists, like an Iranian victory. The sanctions might be seen as western near-impotence.

So the United States is on the proverbial horns of a dilemma.