A very difficult relationship: living with Indonesia

Australia must pursue a more balanced, less self-righteous and more understanding approach to its vital relationship with Indonesia.

With the democratic election of a parliament and President Yudhoyono, Australia’s relationship with Indonesia has become much more complex and less predictable - and even more in need of sophisticated management and greater public understanding than ever before.

Moreover, because of Indonesia’s size and proximity, our relationship is more immediate than our other major relationships such as those with China, Japan, the US, and India.

It would be foolish, therefore, if we were to downplay the importance, the opportunities, and the potential for us in our immediate northern neighbour, as we did in the late 1990s.

The late 1990s and early 2000s was a period of upheaval in Indonesia before President Yudhoyono’s election in 2004. To many Australians, Indonesia appeared to be more unstable, more unpredictable, and generally less important than it had been throughout the 1980s to the mid-1990s - except for the need to co-operate in combating people smuggling and terrorism.

Such an attitude was short-sighted and mistaken.

There are five guidelines, or markers, on how I consider Australians - including the Government and the Opposition - should handle our relationship with Indonesia in the future.

First, we should not expect too much too quickly from President Yudhoyono’s Government.

When the former US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, visited Sydney last year he described Indonesia as “a fantastic success” because it had become a democracy, and because of President Yudhoyono’s close connections with America and his government’s opposition to Islamic extremism.

In reality, President Yudhoyono is a cautious consensus-builder who calculates what he can do politically and what he thinks would be too disruptive to attempt. Indonesia is a fragile democracy, with President Yudhoyono’s party holding only 55 seats in the Indonesian Parliament of 550 members. He derives his strength from the size of his popular mandate rather than his parliamentary support.

Countries like Australia sometimes overlook how long it can take to fashion a stable democracy, and Indonesia deserves more credit than it has been given for the political reforms that have taken root in the past few years.

The second marker is Islam.

The direction Islam takes in Indonesia is of enormous importance to Australia. Our situation is, for example, totally different from that of the US, which is situated in a monotheistic hemisphere that is nominally Christian, from Alaska and northern Canada to Tierra del Fuego.

In East Asia, Christianity is a minority religion in a region of great diversity. By population, Indonesia is the largest Islamic country in the world. Malaysia and Brunei also have Islamic majorities, while Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, India and China all have substantial Muslim minorities.

While Australia needs to maintain firm opposition to Islamic extremism and continue to work with Indonesia in opposing terrorism, we need a more sensitive and sophisticated approach to religious issues in our region.

What we are witnessing in much of the Islamic world, including Indonesia, is a struggle for the hearts and minds of Muslims, between the moderates and the modernisers on the one hand, and the conservatives and fundamentalists, including extremists, on the other, who are prepared to use terror.

It is vital to Australia that the moderates and modernisers prevail.

Despite his strong opposition to terrorism and extremism, President Yudhoyono has been reluctant to respond to politically motivated demands from Australia to ban Jemaah Islamiyah because of the danger of radicalising many of the moderates.

We need also to distinguish between combating terrorist extremism - an objective which Indonesia shares - and the war in Iraq, which the Australian Government supports and the Indonesian Government opposed on the grounds that it would stimulate anti-Americanism throughout Indonesia, and facilitate the recruitment of Islamic terrorists.

Because the US, the UK and Australia - all Western democracies - led the original invasion on Iraq, many Indonesians consider this has eroded their moral standing and challenged the United Nations’ founding principle of collective security.

The third marker is that Australians should not think of Indonesia as a threat.

Indonesia does not threaten Australia. Its armed forces are relatively small and do not have the capacity to attack Australia. If relations are strained, however, Indonesia can cause us considerable difficulties. It is the country most entangled in our domestic politics; more so than the US, China, and Japan.

Australians should regard Indonesia as an opportunity - as the Howard Government regards China - not as a threat.

Unfortunately, such concerns exist on both sides. Nationalism is a strong force in Indonesian politics, with some members of the armed forces and parliament believing Australia is a threat to Indonesia’s territorial integrity. They see our support for the separation of East Timor likely to be followed by support for the independence of West Papua, and even Aceh, despite Government and Opposition denials.

Our military expenditure is more than ten times that of Indonesia, and the clear superiority of our defence equipment and systems understandably troubles some Indonesian strategists. Some senior generals still speak of Australia as a threat from the south.

The fourth marker is the need to acknowledge important policy differences remain, notwithstanding improved personal relations at the head of government level. The stationery printed for the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum 2005 carried under the two crests the words “Close Neighbours; Strong Partners”. The first is a fact. But the partnership is a work in progress.

President Yudhoyono’s election, followed by Australia’s very generous and prompt response to the tsunami tragedy and the subsequent earthquakes in Nias, Sumatra and, most recently, South Java, as well as growing co-operation in combating terrorism, have created the opportunity to improve bilateral relations further.

Although important policy differences remain, this does not mean avoiding policies that might cause concern to our regional neighbours, especially ones clearly based on Australia’s interests. But, clearly, relationships are closer if we find ourselves pursuing similar approaches to major international and regional issues.

We need to realise many Indonesians see us as more closely aligned with the US - or with the Bush Administration - than ever before. This, and some prime ministerial and ministerial comments, have nourished the perception of the “deputy sheriff role”.

There are still concerns in Indonesia that Australia is now a less independent voice than before, and that we do not use our position to try to influence American decisions that may impact adversely on our region.

Indonesia is also concerned by Australian plans to acquire and deploy missiles, which will put Indonesia within range. The Prime Minister’s support for a right to launch pre-emptive strikes in South-East Asia - although since qualified - and the original decision to create a 1,000 nautical mile surveillance zone, which would encroach on Indonesian territorial sovereignty, have also caused anxiety in Indonesia.

More importantly, we need to recognise that Indonesians, including the President, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, were all opposed to the invasion of Iraq. This cannot be reversed, and the situation it has created must be addressed.

Nevertheless, Indonesians remain concerned that the occupation has led to increased, not reduced, terrorism in the Middle East, and offered enhanced recruiting opportunities to Islamic extremists.

Unfavourable perceptions of our method of conducting our diplomacy still linger. Our style is often seen as assertive, moralising and intrusive - what Foreign Minister Wirajuda has called “megaphone diplomacy”, often invoked for domestic political reasons.

There has also been a distaste for what is perceived to be jingoism - an excessive emphasis on military heroics and triumphalism - in relation, for example, to our intervention in East Timor in 1999.

The fifth guideline is that, although the Indonesian economy remains fragile and foreign investment is still sluggish, we should expect - in the longer term and with stable government - Indonesia, with its population expected to reach 300 million by 2050, to offer Australia considerable commercial and selective investment opportunities.

The relationship between Australia and Indonesia is a complex and fragile one between two very different societies, and requires a continuing and special effort to sustain. The Government should avoid creating unnecessary misunderstandings and concerns, as it has sometimes done in the past, usually for domestic political reasons.

The meeting between John Howard and President Yudhoyono on Batam Island on June 28 restored a measure of cordiality at the head-of-government level. We should, however, rely less on personal relationships between heads of governments and certain ministers, which can mask important cultural and policy differences.

John Howard himself said in a moment of frankness and without “spin” on June 16 that “it is a very difficult relationship”. We need, therefore, to build a wider convergence of policies at the government level and, at the public level, a deeper and more general mutual understanding. Neither will be easy.

It is imperative to change perceptions of Australia in Indonesia, and perceptions of Indonesia in the wider Australian community.

The Government could take four steps: first, it should ensure adequate funding for programs to increase language studies and people-to-people contacts in both directions - between elected members of the Australian and Indonesian parliaments, and between academics, youth leaders, writers, journalists, moderate religious figures, and other groups. This will help increase each country’s knowledge of the other, and break down ignorance and prejudice.

Second, we should consult more closely on important policy decisions, which can impact on either country.

Third, Australia and Indonesia should work towards expanding defence cooperation through wider exchange programs, and by reinstating, with Indonesian support, the 1995 Agreement on Mutual Security or some similar arrangement.

Fourth, in addition to working to strengthen our bilateral relations, we should continue to consult and cooperate with Indonesia whenever possible in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the Post Ministerial Forum of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), future East Asian summits, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings, the WTO and the Cairns Group.

Even when we have different policies it is helpful to ensure that both sides understand the reasons for the differences.

Indonesia faces complex problems that most Australians cannot be expected to comprehend fully. Conversely, Australia enjoys a lifestyle that most Indonesians can only imagine.

Neither side should shrink from seeking to build bridges between our very different societies: rather it is a national objective that should be seen as an exciting and worthwhile challenge. If we succeed, both Australia and Indonesia will benefit.

Official diplomacy must operate in the world as it is, not as it should be. There will always be tensions between principle and morality on the one hand and expediency and the constraints imposed by existing realities on the other. Often in foreign policy, decisions have to reflect an appropriate balance between conflicting interests.

To succeed in our essential thrust into East Asia, Australia must develop a much deeper public understanding of our largest and closest Asian neighbour. In this context, we must work to promote a major change in public attitudes towards Indonesia that will reject both a negative and biased approach towards it, and an over-eager enthusiasm.

This is a challenge and a national interest which all intelligent Australians, especially religious figures and academic and media commentators, should work to assist rather than retard, as some have done in recent years.

This is not “appeasement” but practical common sense - and recognition of the realities stemming from our place on the globe.

In the interest of future generations of Australians, the Government of the day and the Opposition, supported by the wider community, must pursue a constructive, balanced, more educated, more objective, more understanding, and less self-righteous approach to Indonesia, without undertones of racism or religious intolerance.

Indonesia is a very large and influential nation beside which we shall live for the rest of time.