Burmese daze

Another reason is that the Tatmadaw has made concerted efforts to institutionalise military rule. It is now a state within a state, with privileges such as separate hospitals, schools and businesses. Added to these avenues for dispensing patronage, the SPDC has, in recent years, poured money into its front organisation, the Union Solidarity Development Association, under the guidance of the Prime Minister, General Soe Win.

It is no secret that the Tatmadaw would like the USDA to evolve into a political party, capable of mobilising support and competing with the NLD. Their role model is Indonesia’s Golkar Party, which was formed by the military during President Soeharto’s New Order Regime.

Similarly, the Tatmadaw aspires to the “dwifungsi” or dual political and defence roles of the Indonesian armed forces. Under such a system, the military would be guaranteed seats in parliament and control over key ministerial portfolios, such as defence. This kind of political system, which the military calls “disciplined democracy”, would be minimally acceptable to ASEAN and possibly to other Asian nations such as Japan and China. Military rule is likely to have one more incarnation.

In recent months the military government has escalated its persecution of the National League for Democracy. State controlled television and newspapers, like the New Light of Myanmar, have published feature articles on mass resignations from the NLD and members renouncing the party’s policies. It is now far from certain that the democratic opposition, weakened by so many years of intimidation, can disentangle and solve Myanmar’s many woes.

Foremost among these is separatism. The need for a federal system allowing a degree of self-governance for the Karen, Kachin, Mon and the rest of the nation’s minorities is obvious to most foreign observers. Yet federalism remains anathema to the military. “Non-disintegration of the Union” is the regime’s mantra for the preservation of a Burmese-dominated, multi-ethnic state - through sheer brute force, if necessary. Even a civilian-led government would have to attend to the ethnic separatist issue, but under constant threat of a coup.

There is little or no prospect that General Than Shwe or any other officers in the ruling junta will release Aung San Suu Kyi on humanitarian grounds. Nor is there any hope that the SPDC will simply capitulate in the face of economic sanctions. Myanmar’s predominantly agrarian economy is not as susceptible to international pressure as, say South Africa’s under the Apartheid regime.

The international community is unable to gain leverage over the regime by exerting pressure on a globally oriented-business class and their export industries. Most corporations in Myanmar owe their existence to patronage dispensed by the military. The junta is further insulated by the considerable support it enjoys from Beijing and a number of ASEAN neighbours, such as Thailand and Singapore.

As difficult or unpleasant as it may be for us to accept, there is no incentive for the military to release Aung San Suu Kyi before they have implemented their plans for a “disciplined democracy”. There is little prospect that international pressure will succeed in bringing forward that day. Indeed speculation by the western media, linking her possible release to international appeals and diplomatic initiatives, will in all likelihood have the opposite effect.