Australia's foreign policy confusion

Therefore, accepting that coalition war is something we must do if we want to be a US ally (though a bit more selectivity in which wars to join would be highly desirable), we should do it on the smallest scale necessary to make the appropriate political statement. By de-emphasising, though not dropping, coalition war capabilities in our acquisitions, we free up resources to support things like border protection, air and sea surveillance of the approaches to Australia, counter-terrorism and deployments like those to East Timor.

It also provides additional opportunities for a different kind of inter-operability: that required to work co-operatively with the forces of other states which may make contributions to regional assistance missions in which we are involved. Reading the Australian media (or even the Defence Department’s website), you could be excused for thinking that we are on our own in the new East Timor deployment. In fact, though the Australian contingent is the largest, there are also to be contributions from Portugal (the ex-colonial power), Malaysia and New Zealand.

This kind of interoperability involves far less emphasis on high-tech warfighting and much more on day-to-day practical co-ordination to keep the peacekeeping operation on track. It is not as costly, nor as glamorous, but is intensely practical and very important.

(Parenthetically, one should note that despite the ADF’s excellent record in this type of deployment, the current Timor operation will require all our skills, and those of our partners, if it is not to fail. The situation, intervention in a failed state, is far less favourable than it was in 1999, or in Cambodia.)

Politically, too, there are advantages, most notably in strengthening Australia’s regional credibility. Our good peacekeeping record is widely acknowledged, but many in our region still remain suspicious of Australian intentions and motivations. In any given case, is Australia acting in its own behalf? Is it trying to be a good regional citizen? Or doing Washington’s work for it? This uncertainty is very damaging to Australia’s regional image.

One has to wonder about our good judgment and sensitivity to regional concerns when the government has to be dragooned into grudgingly signing the perfectly harmless ASEAN Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and when it echoes George Bush’s “pre-emption” rhetoric. John Howard’s notorious “Deputy Sheriff” line was about as useful in promoting Australia’s regional image as its refusal to sign the Kyoto climate change protocols when a number of South Pacific states face disaster as sea levels continue to rise.

Contrariwise, the Australian response to the Boxing Day tsunami was exemplary, even (I suspect) shaming the US into a more generous response than it initially contemplated.

If this catalogue of conflicting signals confuses readers, it is because Australian strategic and foreign policy is itself confused. As has been the case for decades, we still seem unable to decide whether our region is one in which we should play a useful and constructive role appropriate to our status as a small but advanced western state in a less developed region, or whether it is a source of threats against which we should buy insurance against in Washington and by disproportionately strengthening the high-tech end of our military. This ambiguity provides plenty of opportunity for anyone wishing to attack Australian regional policy.