Multilateral assistance and aid addiction

The recent civil unrest and violence in Timor Leste, which prompted the fledging government in Dili to request multilateral assistance, highlights the persistence of weak states. Weak states have been part of the post-1945 world order. The end of the Cold War has accentuated localised problems of nation states causing them to become international as problems of one state spill over into the next.

The challenges of addressing weak states stems from three areas: the dilemma of a “no quick fix” solution; the cost of prolonged intervention; and overcoming the apprentice mentality.

No quick fix

It is a myth that granting a country independence and installing a democratic government will solve the problems of its people. While there is inherent goodness preached in the gospel of democratisation, the reality is that stability goes hand-in-hand with democratic governance.

Opinions are polarised as to whether democracy or stability comes first. One school of thought asserts that stability is a tangible and real notion of sound governance, while democracy is a general principle that needs to be adapted to local conditions.

Suffice to say, a stable country is not necessarily democratic and a democratic country is not always stable. There is no scientific correlation between the two ideas and evidence suggesting there is, cited from Western democracy, ignores the fact the West took many centuries of trials and upheavals before evolving to the current state of being exemplary democracies.

Both external and internal stakeholders advocating for democracy and stability often clash over how it should be done. Beleaguered governments want external assistance to restore stability first so as to enable a process of democratic governance to evolve eventually. Agencies and countries rendering assistance enter on the assumption that peace and stability can be restored as soon as the fighting stops and the feuding parties start talking.

The score sheet for successful intervention remains patchy and claims of success remain qualified. This does not mean that intervention to help weak states is an expensive undertaking but rather that it takes persistence and commitment on both the donor states and the recipient government for it to work.

Intervention and restoration of stability in weak states does not simply mean deploying “more boots on the ground” or injecting more aid. This is because when the fighting stops, the reconciliation and rebuilding must begin for the long term. Strengthening weak states is about institution building and fostering ethnic and religious cohesion.

The dismal shape of “state building” in Iraq and Afghanistan are compelling examples of all the wrong things to do to delay the arrival of stability and democracy.

The challenge for other well-meaning and well-endowed political actors is to get it right with current and persistent cases of weak states. This is a tall order but a necessary one, as endemically weak states pose a problem not just to themselves but create a contagion effect in the region.

Costly intervention

Foreign intervention is expensive - politically, economically and socially. Governments making the case to intervene may find the initial move to enter a weak state easier than advancing the need “to stay the course” for the sake of democracy and humanitarian causes.

Political office-holders are directly accountable to their electorate. Issues of peace and reconciliation in faraway lands do not resonate with voters as deeply as domestic concerns of jobs, security and health care. Even if the case for intervention can be justified on national security grounds, as in the case of Timor Leste, good political management and constant public reassurance are needed so that short political memory and competing priorities do not take precedence.

The key to making intervention “affordable” is to get the rationale for intervention right from the start. The case of Australia’s involvement in Timor Leste could well be a good case study for limited and judicious intervention. The elements of Canberra’s prudent management of the crisis so far can be seen in the following aspects:

• Canberra sent an optimal number of troops and supplies to stabilise the situation;
• the Australian Defence Force is equipped for the task as it had previously been charged with the UN mandate in 2001;
• local forces and Timorese stakeholders have requested Canberra’s assistance, rather than been forced to accept the presence of Australian troops;
• there is a tacit admission by Dili that the current crisis is a problem of its own making; and
• most crucially, the fault lines in Timor Leste are far less complicated than compared to Iraq, Afghanistan or the Balkans.

However, there is always the possibility of crisis escalation, or worse still a stalemate, if the current crisis is not properly managed. In the case of Timor Leste, the jury is still out on how successful Canberra’s effort will be, but suffice to say, it will not be smooth sailing or problem free.

In addition, the irony of helping a weak state is often the malaise of selective amnesia, where people may choose to highlight persistent problems as yet unsolved, rather than “count their blessings” as to how much has been done to reduce more bloodshed and violence.

Overcoming “aid addiction”

Even with the best of intentions and efforts, weak states might end up becoming more aid-dependent than before. The aims of intervention and peace building are ostensibly to transform weak states into functioning ones - instead of rendering them semi-colonial or as political entities hooked on “government through foreign welfare and external handouts”.

Africa is a telling example of how much aid has done to some countries. Aid is not neutral: the political motivation of donor countries comes into play. Africa is synonymous with aid dependency and aid addiction. Although the war that killed 70,000 people between 1998 and 2000 has stopped, conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea has not ended. If the UN Security Council reduced its 3,000-man peacekeeping force on the border fighting would most likely resume.

Africa seems to be in need of external parties to ensure peace and stability for its peoples and nations.

There is a definitive commencement of support and multilateral intervention for weak states, but the end stage of total withdrawal is perhaps more elusive.

In many situations, the parties who intervened, either by request or by pre-emption, find themselves perpetually obliged to keep intervening. A vicious cycle ensues and hardens where the legacy of corrupt governance, a gun culture and aid injection to unaccountable political leaders assumes a dynamic of its own.

The challenge for agencies in Timor Leste is not to create another Africa but to enable it to stand on its own “feet” sooner rather than later. Experience has shown that donors are experiencing aid fatigue and are weary of funding state-building efforts if results are not forthcoming. However, the choice between not helping at all and helping half-heartedly is a tough call to make. State building is, after all, a long-term process wrought with many contradictory forces. The results are measured not in terms of days or months but in generations and decades.

Helping weak states to help themselves is a noble cause - provided they are able to cease asking for help in the foreseeable future. In an era characterised by a persistent problem of weak states, it is often not more blessed to help than to be helped. For those who help the helpless can be saddled with the repeat obligation to help further.

So long as weak states cannot and will not assume control of its own political and economic destiny, these countries will continue to be prominent feature in the 21st century security outlook.