China is a partner, not a foe

In the case of Taiwan, the substantial difference is that it is enmeshed among the interests of three great powers: China, the US and Japan. As such, comparisons by some scholars drawing parallels between the manner in which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) governs post-1949 China, and how dynastic (pre-1911) China established a system of suzerain and vassal relations in South-East Asia suffer from an historic disjoint and applicability. This is because post-1949 China is operating in a system of sovereign states where there are established rules and norms for inter-state dealings, unlike the former era of empires and kingdoms where the weaker subject "states" submitted to the stronger overlord entities.

The CCP is primarily obsessed with maintaining domestic stability, ensuring political control and sustaining economic growth. These are the three indivisible and inseparable political agendas of Beijing.

The Chinese preoccupation for domestic stability also extends to having a stake in the stability of the international system it so depends on for growth. This is underlined by Beijing’s emphasis on “peaceful development”.

While some hawkish cynics may dismiss it as the latest CCP rhetoric, the truth of the matter is that Chinese strategic thinking is consistently focused on the notion of luan (chaos) and the need for centralised domestic control. Hence, policies that are likely to usher in a state of chaos are anathema to the Chinese elite.

Chinese concerns are different

Beijing’s concern with stability is best seen in its recent “Go West” policy, aimed at addressing the crisis in the countryside. For two decades now, China has seen annual growth rate of 9 per cent on average, but this has benefited the urban east at the expense of the rural west.

The result is 120 million migrant workers and 150 million under-employed agricultural workers, accompanied by rising social tension and instability. The Chinese National People's Congress convened in Beijing on March 5 and officially adopted its eleventh “Five Year Plan” to tackle the dangerous syndrome of the “poor rural peasants and their rich urban cousins”.

The strategy aims to reverse the traditional flow of wealth from the rural to the urban sector. A few areas are targeted:

1. the lowering of peasant taxes;
2. consolidation of rural semi-democracy;
3. better job matching and
4. the improvement of education.

The 11th Five Year Plan (FYP) will reduce taxes for the peasantry and increase farm incomes. The lowering of taxes for peasants will remove one of the key structural impediments that is frustrating their standard of living.

As China lives and breathes the free market economy, peasant incomes have not kept pace with their agricultural yield. In many cases, peasants have seen a regression in their financial return: not a few are struggling to produce more in the hope of reaping higher returns, only to be caught in a vicious cycle of higher prices, unchanged tax rates and stagnating harvests.

The FYP will also address the quality of education. Beijing will endeavour to improve the quantity and quality of education by doing away with tuition fees for primary and junior high school students in western provinces and making it compulsory for urban teachers to teach for a period in rural areas as one of the criteria for promotion.

At the same time, the central government will consolidate the semi-democracy of the villages. The thinking behind this move is that by allowing inhabitants to choose freely from the acceptable candidates, it will stem the tide of excesses by local authorities and of municipal corruption - a common, but an increasingly bitter, issue for rural constituencies.