The Copernican Constitution

In the 16th century, Nicolaus Copernicus overturned centuries of doctrine and ushered in the modern age by allowing us to observe the universe as it really is, not as we wanted it to be. A team of independent republicans has begun to employ this legacy to resolve the contest between minimalist republicans and direct election advocates.

The two camps hold to an unconscious understanding that a future republic must involve “the Queen and Governor-General replaced by a president”. While it may make intuitive sense to follow this formula, attempts to re-engineer the Governor-General into a president under Australian conditions must inevitably resolve a range of tangential issues. In the years since the 1998 Constitutional Convention, these issues have split the republican movement and made the purported objective of making Australia independent of the Queen evermore distant.

As Copernicus demonstrated conclusively, intuitive sense sometimes fails us. He challenged the age-old assumptions and took a new interpretation of the heavens beyond the imagination of his fellows. Likewise, republicans will find a solution when they move their technical focus from the Governor-General to the Queen. After all, the Queen is the fulcrum of the whole debate.

At last year’s Inquiry into an Australian Republic, senators received not less than five independent and detailed submissions with a fundamentally new perspective. They all described how the Queen alone could be replaced by a head of state directly elected by the people.

These correspondents have become the new Copernicans. They have developed a constitutional paradigm, similar to the status quo but resolving the apparently irreconcilable expectations of republican advocates and reflecting the strong apolitical sentiment of the electorate.

In concentrating their efforts on the Governor-General, republicans often fail to consider the Australian federation as a whole system. Executive power, federally and in each state, is officially vested in the one monarchy and exercised by the representative governor in each jurisdiction.

The Governor-General may be one rank higher than the rest, however in terms of our federal compact all the Queen’s representatives are peers of each other. The entire system can now be seen through Copernican eyes, where each jurisdiction is independent but formally part of one system and tied to one central authority.

Given the similarities across jurisdictions, an Australian republican model should work regardless of whether we are examining state or federal constitutional arrangements. In contrast, republicans typically ignore the states, thereby revealing their inability to propose comprehensive solutions that work for the whole federation.

Copernicus did not postulate a more complex view of the universe but a simpler and more elegant one. For an Australian republic, this should be as simple as codifying the one actual duty left to the Queen - the appointment of the representative governor on the advice of the prime minister or premier.

To complete the codification, the constitution would vest executive authority in the head of state, but reserve the actual exercise of power in the Governor-General or state governor as required. This would allow the relationship between the Governor-General and prime minister, including the exercise of reserve powers, to continue to be guided by unwritten convention.

Absent of real executive power, the new head of state may be directly elected and yet remain above politics. Separate from the business of government, they cannot implement any policy and thus any electoral campaign cannot be based upon promises or establishing a mandate.

Furthermore, in creating a repatriated position we are starting with a blank slate. We can propose a range of anti-political devices without unwinding the checks and balances of the existing constitution.

For instance, we could allow the head of state one term, so that no incumbent faces an electoral campaign at the end of his or her service. We could use “approval voting” to reduce negative campaigning and eliminate preference deals.

We could allow the head of state to reside in his or her local town or city, rather than build a presidential palace in Canberra, and provide the resources so they could travel across Australia demonstrating community leadership, rather than the political leadership we expect from our parliamentary representatives.

The above is not a list of “nice ideas” but a demonstration of how every aspect of the head of state’s election and tenure can be tailored to establish the office as a fundamentally apolitical institution. It follows that a republican model promoting a president with all or a subset of the existing reserve powers, even if codified, cannot compete with the Copernican paradigm on the key issue of politicisation.

In the final Senate Inquiry Report - Road to a Republic, the five independent submissions were reviewed in a section titled "Models with both a President and Governor-General". The title immediately suggests, as was explained in the report, that “potential for duplication and possible confusion over the roles” may exist.

The practical upshot is that the paradigm appears to result in two ceremonial figureheads instead of just one. The truth is that nothing changes. We would have the same nine ceremonial positions - one head of state, seven representative governors and one NT administrator. There exists a fundamental similarity between the Copernican paradigm and current arrangements.

Based upon an analysis of costs of our state governors, maintaining a non-executive head of state, replete with staff, offices and transportation is estimated to cost two million dollars per year.

This additional expense is dwarfed by the hidden costs of other direct-election models. These exist primarily at the state level, in either establishing six republican systems of government or in holding potentially six elections for state governor. The conclusion of this analysis is that the new Copernicans are developing the least expensive direct-election proposals to date, with savings of at least 60 per cent over equivalent “Elect-the-President” models.

At the inquiry hearings, senators asked specifically about the relationship between the head of state and the Governor-General. In response, I anticipated that the ceremonial role would reflect the constitutional role. The Governor-General would remain in Canberra performing duties associated with the federal and territory government, in addition to existing executive council, parliamentary, diplomatic and military functions. This would leave, in the broadest terms, the rest of the Australian community waiting to be appreciated, enthused, inspired, listened to and congratulated by their elected head of state.

One of the great opportunities here is renewed public engagement. It is astonishing how one-sided a conversation can get when the fascinating subject of constitutional law is raised. On the other hand, what the leader of the nation should do for and within the community is of interest to every citizen. Some may know little about the constitution, but all understand the importance of a cohesive and meritocratic society.

The new paradigm presented in this article is no mere compromise between direct election and minimalism, although it satisfies the expectations of both republican camps. It is a more accurate observation of the Australian system of government that identifies the exact element of that system which ties us to the monarchy - the Queen. It proposes the solution of replacing that element with an elected yet apolitical Australia head of state, symbolic of the sovereignty of the people. It leaves governors in their existing constitutional role, subject to the same conventions and constraints that are the great strengths of Australian democracy.

The Copernican system went on to be further refined and it is likewise for a Copernican republic. Effort is needed on the regulations governing presidential elections and campaign financing. Then, as mentioned previously, there will be the broader community dialogue on our expectations for a ceremonial head of state. It is our ability to listen concerning this issue that will decide the result of the next federal referendum on an Australian republic.

To continue exploring the paradigm, the Legal and Constitutional Senate Committee website has a record of implementations by Emeritus Professor John Power, Dr Peter Carden, Mr David O’Brien and Mr Robert Vogler. An introduction to the author’s Honorary President Republican Model is available here.