Bosnia-Herzegovina: challenging the notion of civil war

The tragedy that occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina to Bosnian Muslims between 1992-1995 at the hands of the Serbian perpetrators was not a “bloody and nasty civil” war, as so many misguided commentators and analysts usually define it. Although the conflict did contain some elements of civil war (the Bosnian Serb rebellion and subsequent Bosnian Croat rebellion against the legitimately elected and legally constituted government of Bosnia-Herzegovina), to try and simplistically define the conflict as a civil war is to reject the truth of what really took place.

The real cause of the tragedy and ultimate responsibility for the genocide and other atrocities that occurred, mainly against ethnic Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) but also other citizens loyal to the Bosnian state, must be properly attributed to the ultra nationalistic regime of the indicted war criminal Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia and his fascist and ultimately genocidal policies of territorial expansion.

Furthermore, direct “on the ground” responsibility for genocide must also be attributed to Milosevic’s clients in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, the former political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs who commanded the Bosnian Serb rebellion against the legitimate government in Sarajevo. The indictments issued by The Hague Tribunal for War Crimes are testimony to this claim.

Bosnia-Herzegovina: the victim of multiple aggression

To present a balanced view of the conflict it must be stated that support for the subsequent Bosnian Croats' rebellion against the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, instigated and supported by the Tudjman regime in Croatia, was at least partly inspired and encouraged by the successful and unchallenged Serbian conquests and policies of ethnic cleansing of Bosnia’s territory.

Croatia’s military involvement has usually, and I believe quite fairly, been regarded by some Western observers as an “opportunistic aggression”. Its consequences were detrimental to the preservation of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina and have added to the complexity of the conflict.

Although the scope and scale of crimes committed by the Tudjman regime in Bosnia were far lesser in comparison to the war crimes and genocide committed by the Serbian aggressor, they are not negligible.

Serbian aggression and genocidal policies against Bosniaks must therefore be viewed as a continuation of the age-old Serbian dream of creating “Greater Serbia” and not as Milosevic’s propaganda machinery claimed, “to preserve Yugoslavia as a multi-ethnic, albeit centralised state”.

Tragically, this propaganda line was initially accepted by the major European powers, primarily by the United Kingdom and France, who blamed the Bosnian side for provoking Milosevic by prematurely declaring independence and by seceding from the Yugoslav federation. The Bush Senior administration at the time also held a similar view. The latter had inadvertently assisted Milosevic by signalling that it would like to see Yugoslavia preserved as a unified country. For Milosevic, who was a shrewd and cunning politician and who knew quite well how to read the diplomatic signals, this practically meant the green light to proceed with his genocidal campaigns against the northern republics, particularly against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

When US Secretary of State James Baker, referring to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, declared, “We don’t have our dog in that fight”, Milosevic interpreted it as sufficient assurance that even the remotest possibility of Western interference to stop his genocidal campaign was highly unlikely. He then proceeded with his military campaign to create an exclusive, homogenous and monolithic ethnic Serbian state along the fascist model. This attempted formation of the ethnically pure Serb “mega-state” is known as the “Greater Serbia”. It is still alive as an ideal, but has been dormant since it was weakened by the humanitarian intervention by NATO military forces in the wake of the Serbian atrocities against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

This Serbian nationalistic goal, which Milosevic clearly failed to fully accomplish, is still cherished by the current Serbian Prime Minister, Dr Vojislav Kostunica, and represents a serious threat to the peace and stability of the Balkans. It is particularly perilous to the survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a sovereign multi-ethnic state, not to mention the threat it poses to the survival of Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims).

Let us bear in mind that during World War II, Bosnian Muslims were also subjected to genocide and the largest percentage of massacres and killings were committed by the Serbian ultra nationalist militias known as “Chetniks”, particularly in Eastern Bosnia.

The genocidal policies pursued by the Milosevic regime in Bosnia represent the most recent attempt by a Serbian leader to achieve a Serbian nationalist objective. How this could be accomplished was meticulously elaborated by the document titled Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and the Arts in Belgrade, known by its acronym (SANU).

The SANU memorandum was the continuation of the same old objective. The ideas contained in this document started to take shape soon after the death of Josip Broz Tito, and were fully conceived several years before the Serbian aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina took place. It had the full backing of the military muscle of JNA (one of the largest military forces in Europe at the time of the aggression). In order to compel the JNA to fully support this Serbian nationalistic goal it had to be purged of all pro-Yugoslav officers by the Milosevic national-socialist regime in Belgrade.

Slobodan Milosevic was SANU’s political executor. For Milosevic, it was to preserve and increase his political power. Perhaps he was the most practical choice of the Serbian nationalist academic elite as the most reliable executor of that traditional Serbian strategic objective at the time: although it is debatable whether Milosevic was a true nationalist or simply a power-hungry politician who rode the waves of the emerging Serbian ultra nationalism for his own personal reasons.

The spiritual inspirers of the SANU Memorandum goals however, were the top brass of the hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church, which traditionally had been the harbinger of Serbian Orthodox nationalism: a dangerous fusion of religion and nationalism.

The “war” in Bosnia was not a civil war. In fact, it was not a war in any traditional sense of the word. American veteran journalist, David Rieff, has properly called it a slaughter. The late Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, used to say, “There will be no war in Bosnia, for to have a war there needs to be two sides willing to fight each other". He was right, for Bosniaks and other patriotic citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina did not want to fight the war. They didn't believe it was possible. Regardless of their sincere beliefs, they suffered a real genocide.

A new holocaust in Europe: slaughterhouse supervised by the United Nations

Serbian aggression against the sovereign and internationally recognised state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the genocide of ethnic Muslim civilians from 1992-1995 is undoubtedly the single most heinous crime against humanity in Europe since the Nazi holocaust of the Jewish people during World War II.

While crimes committed by the Nazis were much greater in scope and number, they were largely hidden from the world’s public. The Serbian genocide in Bosnia against its Muslims was systematically committed while the international community watched. It could have easily been prevented had there been a stronger political will on the part of the great powers of the Western world to act more decisively. The genocide in Bosnia was the most televised and documented massacre of a civilian population of a single nation in human history.

Imposition of unjust arms embargo

How is it possible that the UN did not allow Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it had just recognised as an independent state, to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity and its peoples from aggression? The basic right to self-defence enshrined in the United Nations Charter is legitimately afforded to every state, no matter what its size or geographical location, but was blatantly denied to Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was done by the misguided policy of imposing an arms embargo on all the former republics of SFRJ. This embargo, in the final analysis, was unjust, illegitimate and immoral.

By imposing the arms embargo on Bosnia the UN gave outright assistance to the Serbs, leading to genocide, ethnic cleansing, expulsions, destruction of the religious and cultural institutions of Bosniak people, rapes and the other atrocities, without fear of being challenged. The arms embargo ensured the hands of Bosniaks were tied so they could not resist their own slaughter. The UN abandoned one of its own members to be dismembered and destroyed at the will of Serbian perpetrators.

Delayed armed Western intervention to halt the genocide

The rise of ethno-nationalism in the post-cold war era and the question of self determination, as well as problems of minority rights and territorial disputes among other things, are usually stated as some of the major causes of ethnic conflict in Bosnia.

The myth of the so-called “ancient hatreds” that purportedly existed for centuries between the different ethnic groups of former Yugoslavia in general, and Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular, usually occupies centre stage when scholars try to ascertain some of the major causes of conflict in the Balkans. This, of course, is only a myth and totally contradicts the inter-ethnic collaboration and tolerance between the various groups that inhabited the geographical space of the former Yugoslavia for many centuries.

Unfortunately, and for Bosniaks indeed very tragically, even the president of the world’s most powerful country, Bill Clinton, purportedly came to believe in this myth. It was reported that Clinton read the book The Balkan Ghosts written by the American journalist Robert Kaplan, which gave the ancient “ethnic hatred” version of the contemporary Bosnian history. “They’ve been fighting each other for 500 years”, Clinton reportedly said. “We need to stay out of there.”

But this was not the real reason for his reluctance to use force to stop genocide in Bosnia, but a “superstructure” that provided him with a good excuse not to get involved. Although some accomplished and reputable Western scholars successfully challenged Kaplan’s myth they were unable to convince the Clinton administration to fulfill his pre-election promises. It is just one example of how some of the most powerful Western decision-makers have often conveniently manipulated this and other myths to justify their failure to halt genocide in Bosnia.

The term genocide was first coined by Raphael Lemkin during World War II and its most widely accepted definition is that contained in the United Nations Convention on Genocide. However, genocide in Srebrenica was a clear indication that the mere adoption of the United Nations Convention on Genocide by the international community was not capable of preventing genocide from reoccurring in Europe.

Several genocides in different parts of the world have occurred since its adoption. What makes the genocide in Srebrenica so unique is that it is a paradigm of the overall suffering endured by Bosniaks at the hands of Serbian perpetrators. Srebrenica is also unique as it took place in Europe, which had promised “never again”, and yet it occurred under the very supervision of the United Nations peacekeeping forces. This is what makes it an unforgivable crime.

Although obliged to prevent genocide in Bosnia, the international community first denied that what was actually taking place in Bosnia was actually genocide. It was only after the brave American journalist Roy Guttmann finally managed to reveal to the world the sheer magnitude of the genocide and ethnic cleansing of Muslims in northern Bosnia that the Western policy-makers started issuing statements to the effect that this kind of Serb behaviour would not be tolerated. So much for the firm promise “never again”.

Bill Clinton promised during his election campaign that if he were elected US president, "ethnic cleansing would stop". After he was elected, he spent 18 months standing by as genocide in Bosnia continued to unfold. The American Left was unwilling to contemplate any use of American military power to save Bosnia. They would have regarded it as imperialism. Ordinary Americans did not want to send their children to risk their lives in Bosnia.

The UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, when he visited Sarajevo on December 31, 1992, declared what was going on in Bosnia was “a rich man’s war". In fact, as The New York Times David Rieff has pointed out in his brilliant account about Western failure in Bosnia, he meant that Bosnia was a white man’s war. “I understand your frustration”, he said, “but you have a situation that is better than ten other places in the world … I can give you a list”. Then he left the city.

For more than four years the world watched the genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, destruction and other atrocities without seriously considering the calls by the victims, or the media to do something.

The armed humanitarian intervention on the side of justice and truth eventually did happen in Bosnia in 1995. But by then it was too late. Bosnia-Herzegovina, that precious symbol of centuries-old multi-ethnic coexistence in the heart of Europe was effectively carved up. The final peace settlement brokered by Richard Holbrook only legitimated the gains made by the Serbian perpetrators.

Although some adjustments were made by NATO's surgical strikes on the Serb positions to enable the Bosnian Muslims to regain more territory, as envisaged by the latest peace settlement, the Americans said this was the best deal they could obtain by negotiating with Milosevic. According to David Rieff, the reason the Americans said they could not offer more support to the Bosnian Government was because it would imperil the Yeltsin Government in Moscow. Apparently, this was what the US Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, told President Clinton. It indicates larger strategic issues were at play preventing the US from acting more robustly in order to halt the genocide of Bosniaks.