Asian nations hitch their wagons to the Chinese star

ASEAN countries appreciate the “normalisation” of Beijing’s relations with the region. It is as though, coupled with a greater “sophistication” in its foreign policy and posture, Beijing has deliberately changed its overall strategic engagement with South-East Asia. It has not only abandoned the communist insurgency or war threats of the past, but adopted an active policy of strategic friendship with ASEAN countries. Ideology has been abandoned both domestically and externally, as the vehicle of relations with its neighbours, which has greatly assuaged the fears and concerns of South-East Asian countries.

ASEAN governments and the elite have probably been most impressed by Beijing leaders’ pragmatism in governance, as China seeks to create stability and equilibrium for its own economic and political development. China’s typical slogan of “stability, development, reform” has gone down well with ASEAN leaders, as well as Beijing’s stress on the symbiotic relationship between China’s own internal and external stability.

The unprecedented smooth transition from Jiang-Zhu to Hu-Wen - despite the western Liberals’ charge of China having “no democracy” - was another plus, with the ASEAN elite. The common feeling in South-East Asia is that they can now do business with a more pragmatic generation of Chinese leaders and the “new China”.

As well, Beijing seems intent in pursuing a more active diplomacy around its southern periphery in South-East Asia, including using “dollar diplomacy” and defence co-operation. Beijing’s US$400 million loan to the Philippines (during President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s Beijing visit last September and confirmed during Hu’s recent visit to Manila) for a rail link between Manila and Clark (former US airbase) was an incentive for Manila to conclude a defence co-operation agreement with China, although Manila remains Washington’s strategic ally. Manila has since signed an agreement to co-operate in joint oil and gas exploration in the disputed South China Sea Spratley Islands.

Chinese investments in Indonesian oil, gas and power plants will certainly increase further under the Susilo Bambang Yudhyono administration. Jakarta needs foreign investments urgently and Beijing is promising to deliver. Sino-Indonesian relations have undeniably improved since the 1990 normalisation of relations.

The recent signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries in Jakarta on April 24, 2005 is certainly an historical milestone in Sino-Indonesian relations. Thailand is particularly pleased with China’s offer of an “early harvest” agreement on fruit and vegetables in 2003 and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has even agreed that his brainchild, the Asian Co-operation Dialogue (or ACD), be hosted in Qingdao, China, after holding its first two meetings in Thailand. Bangkok could indeed have become the premier ASEAN capital for Chinese influence.

During last year’s bilateral spat between China and Singapore, there were rumours that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had offered to sell Chinese missiles to Malaysia, so allaying the Malay majority’s suspicions of China. Defence co-operation between Jakarta and Beijing has been touted recently too. Beijing has also managed to convince Vietnam to delay its “tourist excursions” to the disputed Spratley Islands, after discreet intervention by the CPC with its Vietnamese counterpart “via the back door”. Vietnam has also signed a similar joint development agreement with China for the Spratleys.

In all cases, Beijing has shown real panache and sophistication in dealing diplomatically with individual ASEAN countries, while promoting the much-touted ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (to be in effect by 2010). It has even sophisticatedly “divided to rule” within ASEAN, as illustrated by the recent Sino-Singaporean spat in which Beijing openly favoured and courted Singapore’s ASEAN partners, who seemed just as keen to be courted by the Chinese panda.

Beijing has also been using nationalism and the “glories of the Chinese civilisation” to instil a sense of unity in all its own Chinese nationals and within, the Chinese diaspora in South-East Asia. Although Beijing may acknowledge that rampant nationalism could pose a danger to its own internal stability, it has astutely harnessed it to build a “new” Asian pride, which it hopes could help establish a new Asian system of politics, economics, security and culture within the “ASEAN+3” framework. Beijing ardently hopes this could be transformed ultimately into an East Asian Community under its leadership.

China’s goals and vision in South-East Asia are clear, as, diplomatically, it rivals the US and Japan world-wide and regionally. Moreover it may be again considering ASEAN as its own “Monroe” sphere, as it was during the 400 years of the Chinese tributary system under the Ming-Qing Emperors. South-East Asian countries appear to be playing the Chinese game as they seek to benefit from the rising China.