Those who would give up essential
liberty, to purchase a little temporary
safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety.
- Benjamin Franklin
Unlike the easy copy that flows from
tabloid media (of any form), the political
attacks on the United States in 2001 did not mark some radical change
in the alignment or nature of politics
and the policy process. Some "new
dawn" did not rise on 12 September
2001 and, for all the horror, pain, and
suffering (inflicted and yet to be perpetrated),
the world was not "changed forever".
For all that death, the most significant
thing to occur was the opening of a window.
The response to this world(view) shattering
event, however, has been dramatic. In
the United States, the USA PATRIOT Act
was rushed through a Congress too shell-shocked
to refer to their pocket-sized version
of the Bill of Rights, heralding a massive
expansion in the surveillance powers of
law enforcement and intelligence services
in that nation, and a peeling away of
the checks and balances shown to be so
critical in the days of King and Hoover,
where organisations like the FBI showed
their ability to support the status quo
and suppress dissent.
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Increased access to surveillance; roving
wiretaps; the surveillance of citizens
by foreign intelligence agencies; access
to ISP logs by law enforcement - all featured
in PATRIOT, with liberals in Congress
increasingly frustrated by the lack of
information from security agencies about
how these powers have been employed, and
conservatives looking to extend the lifespan
of the legislation (from its original
2005 sunset). In Australia, the federal
government toyed with its own version
of PATRIOT (which has resurfaced now the
War in Iraq has exposed the nation to
greater risk of attack), while Victoria
has foreshadowed legislation aimed at
allowing "sneak and peek" covert-entry
warrants. For Australia, this type of
legislation reflects a lack of an indigenous
Bill of Rights, for the United States,
a lack of understanding - as Alanis
Morissette has shown us - of what
the word "ironic" actually means.
And this leads, in a round about way,
to a discussion about technology.
It is interesting that for a man who wants
to know a lot of things about people,
Dr. John Poindexter's biography on the
webpage of Defence Advanced Research Projects
Agency failed to mention his more famous
exploits in the Iran-Contra affair (that is before
the page was removed completely). Regardless
of his previously-demonstrated contempt
for the rule of law and the role of Congress,
however, the head of the Total
Information Awareness project of DARPA
may be just one of the most significant
figures in the future of American democracy.
Total Information Awareness (TIA), for
all its state-of-the-art jargon, isn't
a new concept. TIA aims to develop a comprehensive
(when they say total, they mean total)
data mining and synthesis system, drawing
information from a range of government
databases, and using the inter-operability
of online systems, to comprehensively
search online information as well. Combined
with advanced analysis techniques (read:
profiling), Poindexters's team will use
this information to make the world safe
for democracy - as they see it.
Overall, strategies like TIA have been
mooted ever since computerisation began
to register on the public consciousness
as a means of expediting the handling
and processing of "routine"
information. In 1970, Malcolm Warner and
Michael Stone, a political scientist and
a computer scientist, wrote in the Data
Bank Society - an incredibly presentient
book -that "Our freedom is threatened
by the computer because its information-power
demands that it be given more information,
on the evidence of which conclusions may
be drawn, plans made, directing us (corporately
and singly)".
It is this information-power demand that
makes the prospects of computerisation
and total information awareness so attractive.
As the Vice-Chairman of the US Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence - Senator
Shelby - argued, systems like the TIA
are vitally important to the role of intelligence
agencies because they overcome the problem
of "stovepipes" (hierarchical-only
information flows) and "reservoirs"
(disconnected information repositories).
As the US intelligence community was
quick to point out, it wasn't the incompetence
of senior managers ignoring field officers
reports about suspicious foreigners learning
to fly planes and not land, but a lack
of aggregated reports that failed to trip
important intelligence alarm bells. Aggregated
databases, therefore, are the only way
to make America safe from the type of
people it regularly irritates.
This is an old and hackneyed argument
and runs counter to both the intent and
sprit of pluralistic governments, and
the logic of complex systems.
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First, the TIA approach appeals to conservatives
because of its inherent call to economy,
that is, that with a wide number of competing
agencies, there are inefficiencies due
to duplication and redundancy. Perfect
efficiency, therefore, becomes the objective
of organization reshaping. Put the other
way, however, perfect efficiency (total
elimination of redundancy) means that
should any single element in the system
fail, the result is total failure of the
whole. Think about just how precious efficiency
is to you the next time your 747 bounces
onto the tarmac and multiple redundant
systems come into play to get you to the
terminal, rather than the morgue.
Second, there's an inherent assumption
that organizations involved in intelligence
and law enforcement have only one objective
and master - in the current political
climate the elimination of "terrorists"
and "terrorism" at the behest
of the US President. This assumption is
problematic - unless you assume that the
US is run like Syria. When considering
a federal system like the US (but also Australia,
Canada, and now Europe), different law
enforcement bodies (ranging from local,
through state and federal) theoretically
report to different masters with their
own political agendas. Madison argued
for division of power between multiple
branches of government and different levels
of the federation, not because he was
interested in inefficiency, but because
he feared the totalising power of a single
sovereign. Democracy's costly, but Madison,
Locke, and Montesquieu recognised the
value proposition of complexity and countervailing
centres of power in terms of personal
liberty.
Third, regardless of the rule of law
inherent in countries like the US, profiling
and selective harassment of Arab-Americans
and the use of mechanisms like military
tribunals, demonstrate how democratic
countries can be tyrannical in times of
(real or perceived) crisis - the old problem
of democracy, where the many are tyrants
to the few. While technologies like the
TIA are targeted at minority groups now,
we have to remember what Milton Friedman
said about nothing being as permanent
as a temporary solution.
If security is the carrot that will encourage
Americans to exchange their liberty for
data profiling, then the corporate sector
may illustrate how low a price privacy
really is. In a recent analysis of Microsoft
XP's Update
feature (an automatic routine that
allows users to download the latest "patch"
for their computer operating system) Mike
Hartmann of Tech Channel in Germany demonstrated
how the software vendor gains access to
hardware information from users, and has
the capability to determine software used
on individuals' machines. Again, information
is power, but in this case particularly
valuable marketplace power.
"So what?" some might ask,
a little bit of "opt in" data
for the software giant, "What does
it cost you?". While Microsoft argues
that updates are "optional",
it must be remembered that these patches
are often fixes to the imperfect products
offered by the company in the first place,
either simple error corrections or adjustments
to the security and integrity of the computer.
One must question how voluntary these
corrections really are.
At the more prosaic level, Internet hoaxes
like Freewheelz.com
(a website promising a free car in exchange
for extensive personal information, including
a regular stool sample) illustrated how
willing citizens are to hand over information
in exchange for large or even very token
rewards (many people responded to the
hoax). Overall, this reflects either the
casual attitude to information of those
who fear not the state nor corporate America;
or ignorance about the possibilities of
the data bank society (the latter being
more likely). When Scott McNealy, head
of Sun Microsystems, told reporters that
"You have zero privacy anyway … Get
over it", he was not simply arguing
that his vision of an integrated information
society was not just right, but appropriate
- a normative good for the post-modern
age in which we live. This view, however,
in combination with the aggressive stance
taken by the PATRIOTs into online information,
data mining of multiple databases, and
the US
music industry's desire to take direct
action (cracking attacks) against computer
users who share MP3 music files online,
questions the status of personal privacy
as a natural human right.
Developments in data mining in the
intelligence community and commercial
sector are not - as some would argue -
the inevitable march of technological
progress making us so much more efficient
and effective. This revised view of technological
determinism is an easy way to explain
the tendency for governments and large
corporate actors to erode the privacy
of citizens. In reality, what we see is
a least-effort lock-in adoption of an
insidious character. Insidious, not because
it's a type of "rush to the bottom
of the barrel" phenomena proclaimed
by many privacy groups - but because of
a fundamental lack of political imagination.
Technology driven (or dependent) western
societies are not "locked-in"
to the Poindexter-McNealy view of the
future because the technology makes privacy
and the respect for personal liberty obsolete,
but because those who lead have limited
political and cultural imaginations and
are committed to a narrow economic-rationalist
paradigm.
As the Europeans have demonstrated, public
interest regulation of corporations can
be effective, and the expansion of these
regulations globally is required when
corporations like Microsoft can extract
information from Sydney for data mining
in Redmond. When it comes to the aggregation
of data by government intelligence services,
can you really trust a US administration
lead by a man who argues that "There
ought to be limits to freedom" when
irritated by public criticism?