Democracy by the sword

Thus under occupation democracy in Iraq appears as an alien, Western importation. In post-1945 the Western Allies were able to impose democratic institutions on Germany and Japan, but those countries were totally crushed by war, with their political structures dismantled. Nobody had a problem with the legitimacy of these harsh methods and a prolonged occupation. Such extreme measures could not - and should not - be taken in Iraq. Even those, like myself, who feel that deposing Saddam's regime was justified, would not advocate a Macarthur-like pro-consular regime for Iraq.

Moreover what the Americans have totally overlooked has been the specific nature of the Iraqi body politic. Modern Iraq was stitched together by British imperialists after World War I from three very different provinces of the Ottoman Empire: Mosul (with a Kurdish majority), Baghdad (with a Sunni Arab majority) and Basra (with a Shi'ite Arab majority). For their own reasons, the British rulers put power in the hands of the Sunni Arab minority of about 20 per cent: consequently, Iraqi history has been the history of Arab Sunni coercive hegemonism (of which Saddam's regime was only the most extreme variation). It experienced constant rebellions by the Kurds, the Shi'ites, even the small Christian Assyrian community. Iraq could be held together only by the iron fist.

With the fall of Saddam, this oppressive structure fell apart. The Sunni Arab minority, whose old logistical and command structures have regrouped underground, is waging a brutal war not only against US-led occupation, but also against the Shi'ites and Kurds. It targets Shi'ite holy sites in Kerbala and Najjaf as well as Shi'ite leaders and headquarters of Shi'ite and Kurdish parties. It does not appear that the Sunni Arabs, for decades the lords of the land, are going to give up their traditional hegemony by bowing to the electoral process. On the other hand, neither the Kurds nor the Shi'ites appear to be willing to accept the return of the old Arab Sunni domination. In situation like these, perhaps partition - as in Yugoslavia, but hopefully with less bloodshed - may be the only way out.

Nor will analogies with Afghanistan help. Karzai was able to legitimate his rule through alliances with the regional warlords. This is the old, pre-Taliban country, not a new democratic Afghanistan.

The American attempt to impose democracy on Iraq is based on ignorance and arrogance and will fail. The relatively successful elections on January 30 should not hide the fact that the Sunnis by and large boycotted the elections and view them and their outcome as illegitimate: under such conditions the establishment of a functioning democracy in Iraq is far from assured. Paradoxically it may be Iran, a self-styled Islamic Republic, which may develop many ingredients of democracy. It enjoys a certain tradition of civil society, going back to Persian history, and it is invoking a democratic legitimacy within an Islamic discourse. Iran is obviously not a democracy, but it has (within Islamic limits) contested elections, both presidential and parliamentary, more political rights for women than in any Arab country, and a press and student population struggling to be heard. There is much potential here, based on internal legitimacy.

Perhaps one should quote Karl Marx here, despite the obviously different context. In an 1872 speech to the Socialist International he maintained that the route towards socialism will be different in different countries, saying, "We know that one has to take into consideration the institutions, mores and traditions of different countries". He amplified this in 1877 when asked if capitalism and hence proletarian socialism will necessarily develop in Russia, he admitted that he did not know, it may, or may not, then added:

Events strikingly analogous but taking place in different historical surroundings lead to totally different results. [One has to study] each of these forms of evolution separately … One will never arrive [at an answer] by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical.

If only someone at the Pentagon had only read Marx rather than Fukuyama …