Where did all the Democrats voters go?

The 2004 election marked a major shift in voter support from the Democrats, down 5 per cent in the Senate and down 4 per cent in the House. Only part of this vote can be explained by a rise in the Greens support (up 2 per cent in the House and 2.5 per cent on the Senate). This article seeks to identify where the rest of the votes went. This is significant in that if the Democrats are to recover as a political force, or if a new viable political force is to take over the Democrats' role in the political spectrum, a clear understanding of where former Democrat voters have gone and why is crucial.

Looking at the figures, it would appear that the Democrats have lost more support on the “centre-right” of the political spectrum than on the “centre-left” over the past two electoral cycles and that unless the party and its principles are repackaged in a way that provides a genuine home for true liberals, the party is destined to be squeezed on the left by the Greens into oblivion.

Measures of Left and Right support

There is little dispute that over the course of the 1990s the Democrats were repositioned as more of a left-of-centre party. Analysis of the Australian Electoral Study data of voters’ perceptions shows that the Democrats have been regarded by voters as the most centrist party, but less so in recent elections. The AES asks respondents to rank parties from 0-11 on the basis of left versus right. The Greens are consistently rated as Australia's most left-wing party, followed by the ALP, and the Democrats. The Liberals are regarded as the most right wing party, followed by the Nationals and One Nation. Taking the three most centrist ratings (4-6), the Democrats were regarded as a centre party by 57 per cent of voters in 2001, down from 64 per cent in 1998 and 68 per cent in 1996:

Perception of centrist position of parties (AES) 1996-2001 (per cent)*

Interestingly, while 34 per cent of voters allocated the Democrats to the centre of the political spectrum, only 15.5 per cent of Democrat candidates placed themselves in the centre: 77 per cent placed themselves left-of-centre and 7 per cent placed themselves right of centre. 66 per cent of Democrat candidates also described the electorate as right-of-centre, while only 33 per cent of voters described themselves as right-of-centre.

The shift in the voters' perceptions of the Democrats as a centrist party is also reflected in Democrat voters themselves in terms of the percentage allocating their second preferences in the House between the ALP and the Liberal party. The percentage of Democrat voters giving second preferences to the ALP rose from 54 per cent to 64 per cent of voters between 1996 and 2001, but fell back to 59 per cent in 2004 as many left-leaning Democrat voters switched to the Greens.

Minor party preferences to the ALP:

1998 Election

In the 1998 election, the Democrats vote fell 2.2 per cent in the Senate and 1.7 per cent in the House. The Greens vote also fell at that election (down 0.5 per cent in the Senate and 0.3 per cent in the House). Part of the Democrat vote followed Kernot to the ALP (up 1.1 per cent in the Senate and 1.3 per cent in the House) as it reconsolidated its base, and part went to the new One Nation party (around one in six One Nation voters in the House gave their second preferences to the Democrats). It is difficult to calculate how many Democrat voters returned to the Coalition in 1998, as the Coalition lost a huge chunk of support to One Nation and some to the ALP.

2001 election

In the 2001 election, the Democrats vote fell 1.2 per cent in the Senate but rose 0.3 per cent in the House. The Greens vote rose by 2.2 per cent in the Senate and 2.3 per cent in the House. This was largely at the expense of the ALP, whose vote fell 3.0 per cent in the Senate 2.3 per cent in the House. The Coalition picked up around 4 per cent, largely at the expense of One Nation, but also picked up votes off the ALP and the Democrats. While it is not clear where the Democrat vote went in the aggregate figures, it is clearer in the electorate figures. Our House vote tended to go up in ALP seats and down in Coalition held seats, especially in Victoria. Our biggest increases tended to be in safe inner city Labor seats (e.g. Sydney, Grayndler, Brisbane, Perth, Melbourne, Melbourne Ports, Gellibrand), while modest swings were recorded against us in many safe Liberal seats. This trend suggests we lost many small “l” Liberals back to the Liberals, and picked up some (but not most) disillusioned Labor voters. The 12 safest Liberal seats in Sydney, with a quarter of the State's population, accounted for half of the fall in our NSW Senate vote in 2001.

Change in Democrat vote in House of Reps seats 2001:

In the Senate, the Coalition increased its vote sharply, with part of that coming off the Democrats. The Democrats also lost some votes to other micro parties and, to a lesser degree, to the Greens.

To a degree, the party's strong stance on refugee issues probably cost us some voters on the right. Detailed Liberal and Labor party research showed strong swings to the Liberal party across “women, middle and upper class voters” on refugee issues. This was certainly the case in the 2002 South Australian State Election, where many ex-Liberal voters in 1993, who helped push the Democrats to a 17 per cent vote in 1997, returned to the Liberals (or the new right wing Family First party). The Democrats went backwards in many safe Liberal seats where the party had outpolled Labor in 1997.

2004 election

Nationally, the Democrats Senate vote fell by 5.2 per cent. The Greens Senate vote rose by 3.3 per cent, leaving a deficit of 1.9 per cent unaccounted. This appears to contradict the conclusion by Democrats activist Danny Carroll that "the diminution of the Democrats primary vote since 2001 has lead to the rise in the Greens primary vote dure to attrition on the Democrats left (with) some marginal attrition on the right". This analysis becomes even more flawed when one considers the broader left parties. The vote for the Progressive Labor Party fell 0.5 per cent nationally, HEMP fell 0.2 per cent, and decision by Unity and Phil Cleary not to contest was another 0.5 per cent. Much of this vote is likely to have returned to the Greens, suggesting that the proportion of the Democrat vote switching to the Greens was likely to have been closer to 2 per cent, less than half the fall in Democrat support. Indeed, had the full Democrat vote switched across to the Greens, the Greens would easily have won extra Senate seats in Qld, NSW, Vic and SA, and the Coalition would not have ended up in control of the Senate.

Did part of the Democrat vote leech to Family First? Demographic modelling by John Black suggests that the Family First vote came largely from Liberal and Labor supporters, with some holding a strong resemblance to former One Nation voters. Black argues that Family Firsts supporters appeared to form two groups - the first were typical religious activists - middle income, professional, evangelical and Liberal. But, the second group where agnostic, blue collar, lower income, single parents, typically ex-ALP or One Nation voters. It is unlikely, based on his analysis, that there was a large leakage from the Democrats to Family First. Like One Nation's support, Family First's vote tended to be weakest where the Democrats were strongest and vice versa. In Queensland (Family First's second best state), 6 of the 8 best results were in regional seats, while the three worst results were in the Democrats' inner city heartland. In South Australia, rural and semi-rural seats made up 3 of the 4 best Family First results, while the inner city seats were the worst.

The following matrix seeks to give some guidance on the moves in Senate votes on a State by State basis. The “micro” parties are divided into two groups - “left-leaning” parties (e.g. HEMP, Unity, Progressive Labor, Aged Pensioners, Socialist) and “right-leaning” parties (CEC, Liberals for Forests, DLP, Ex Servicemen, Fishing). The APA vote is added into the Democrats vote and the Family First/CTA votes are combined as a “Christian block”. The figures in the attached table represent the increase/decrease in the vote for each group since 2001 by state:

Senate election 2004: Shift in party vote:

With One Nation's vote in free fall as well as the Democrats, the ALP's vote falling in three of the five mainland states and the swing to the Coalition and Family First, it is difficult to plot with any certainty where the Democrat vote went. The following table seeks to do so, using the following assumptions:

• One Nation's vote returns to the Coalition and ALP in a 60/40 share;
• the Family First/CTA increase comes from the Coalition and Labor in a 70/30 share;
• the "Other Right" vote returns to the Coalition or is sourced from One Nation; and
• the "Other Left" vote is shared between Labor and the Greens.

The following results emerge:

This table suggests that around 40 per cent of former Democrat voters shifted to the Greens, 11 per cent (in SA and NSW) shifted to the ALP and 49 per cent shifted to the Coalition (or Family First or Liberals for Forests). This suggests that Democrat voters departed in near equal numbers to the “left” and the “right”. If the APA and Johnston are counted as “right-of-centre” as well, the percentage going to the right actually rises from 49 per cent to 52 per cent of lost Democrat votes.

While most of the bolters to the right have gone straight to the Coalition, an indeterminate number have opted for other small parties. Some ex-Democrats appear to have voted for the Liberals for Forests, which scored a respectable vote in several states (Victoria 1.57 per cent, Queensland 1.0 per cent, NSW 0.5 per cent, WA 0.5 per cent, SA 0.3 per cent). Some, especially in South Australia, would have shifted to Family First.

Does the “centre” still exist?

I would argue that the centre still exists in Australian politics, and the success of the Australian Democrats over the past three decades has been directly related to our ability to inspire it. Appealing to the centre does not mean being a bland entity wedged onto the tissue paper that now separates Labor and the Coalition on major issues. Being a centre party means appealing to the values of those liberal-progressive people on the “left” and the “right” disillusioned with the bland enticements served up by Labor and the Coalition in their pursuit of an electoral majority. The 1990, 1996, 1998 and 2001 suggest that there are hundreds of thousands of people in that “progressive centre” category who voted for Democrats and similar parties. Yet, in 2004, they deserted us.

It is also noteworthy that the areas of traditional Democrat strength in affluent safe Liberal seats witnessed some of the largest swings against the Coalition in 2004:

• NSW: Despite a state-wide swing to the Coalition, the six Liberal North Shore seats averaged a 2PP swing of 2.7 per cent against the Libs. Of the Democrats 10 best Senate seats in NSW, 6 were on the North Shore and a seventh was Wentworth.
• VIC: Despite a state wide swing of over 3 per cent to the Coalition, the Liberals went backwards in Kooyong and enjoyed a swing of 0.5 per cent or less in the affluent seats of Higgins and Goldstein.
• QLD: The Coalition recorded a state wide swing of 3.3 per cent n its seats, with the smallest swing recorded in blue-ribbon Ryan (0.86 per cent), the Democrats' best seat.
• WA: Despite a state wide swing of 3.76 per cent, the smallest swing to the Liberals was in blue-ribbon Curtin (0.8 per cent).
• SA Despite a state wide swing to the Coalition, there was an average swing against the Coalition of 1.7 per cent in the affluent inner city seats of Adelaide, Boothby, Sturt and Hindmarsh.

The Democrats need to think long and hard about how to appeal to the values of this group, and about the positions and practices which may have alienated potential supporters.

This need not be rocket science - there is plenty of data around about the values and aspirations of the “socially aware” voter group. But, the party must learn from that data. The Liberal Democrats in the UK have been successful in targeting Tory voters and persuading them to support the LDP with similar progressive policies to the Democrats. The most recent MORI Poll (Dec 2004) had the LDP on 23 per cent nationally, just behind the Conservatives on 31 per cent, and up 6 per cent from the 2001 election.

The Democrats also need to be aware that the shrinking “left” of the political spectrum is becoming very crowded as the Greens become more and more entrenched. Competing with the Greens and the ALP for a shrinking left vote might not be in our best interests. By contrast, the contest for the “small l liberals” might not be so earnest. In 2004, this group showed they will not cross to the Greens in large numbers, as the Greens are perceived as “too left wing” for half of Democrat voters. Family First polled lowest where the Democrats historically have done well, suggesting that Family First is “too conservative” for ex-Democrats. They are left with the uncomfortable choice between the two majors, who, constrained by the need for a majority vote, will seek out the “lowest common denominator” rather than aspiring to liberal-progressive values.

Eminent journalist George Megalogenis makes an interesting attempt to define the values of this “middle group” in his 2004 book Faultlines. He defines the group as Australians aged 20-40 not enjoying representation by the older generation of leaders of the two major parties. Working women and the children on post-war migrants are a key part of the group, and their attitudes are yet to be properly represented by the current generation of Australian leaders:

Generation W is Australia's double-edged demographic. It sets in the middle of the nation's income table, is located in the centre of the nation's capital cities, and is in the prime of life - the twenties and thirties. It is the least political generation that Australia has known, but it has led the largest rallies we have seen for reconciliation and peace. It is a generation that vindicates the working woman and proves that immigration works, but it is not large enough yet to decide who leads the nation. It has already proved its work by forcing a conservative government to deal with the reality of the professional woman and to boost the regular immigration intake above 100,000 a year. It vindication will come with a time lag, in the next decade or so, when one of its own inevitably becomes prime minister and the nation finds an acceptable formula for the republic.

Similarly, Greg Barnes talks of a new category of “reluctant liberals”, a group largely unrepresented in the current political environment focused more on the promotion of human wellbeing and strengthening the concept of public good.

I would suggest the following eight principles as a basis for forming a new progressive liberal movement:

1. Socially progressive - get government out of people's private lives while maintaining a solid social safety net to lift people out of poverty;
2. Environmentally sustainable - good environmental practice is good economic practice;
3. Economically liberal - we should recognise the benefits of economic liberalism while insisting that the winners do more to compensate the losers;
4. Internationalist - we should be demanding that Australia is a good global citizen, promote global economic relations and promoting peace, civil society and environmental sustainability through international co-operation;
5. Pro-freedom - defend civil liberties, human rights and freedom, even in an age of national security, and deliver reconciliation with Indigenous people;
6. Pro-community - encourage more decision making at the lowest possible level and ensure that governments are more responsive to local community needs;
7. Pro-democracy - insist on open and accountable government, media and public institutions and a republic; and
8. Service orientated - search for the most effective, creative and efficient means of delivering government services, minimising the draw on revenue while maximising the public benefit and accountability.

The Democrats need to reach out to other potential partners in building a new progressive movement. The party is too bruised and battered to do it on its own. Other partners could be other small political parties (for example Liberals for Forests, Unity, Progressive Labor), independents, disillusioned sections of the majors, the reconciliation, peace, environment and refugee movements, ethnic and indigenous communities, the regions, local government leaders, progressive church leaders, the business sector and so on. At 2 per cent, the Democrats constitute just one fifth of a viable political movement - we will have to reach out to other groups who could add the other 8 per cent.

Misdiagnosing the current problem and assuming it can be fixed with “more of the same” policies and practices will ensure that the Democrats does not survive the 2007 election in any form, and that the liberal progressive segment of the Australian population continues to be disenfranchised.

As Kevin Costner discovered in the movie the Field of Dreams and as our party's founders discovered back in 1977, "If you build it, they will come".