Japan on the road to remilitarization

The Ministry of Defence has even adopted an unconventional public-relations approach, using manga and anime-style covers and short explanatory videos to engage younger Japanese citizens. The message is clear: national defence is no longer a remote elite concern.

China reaction

China’s reaction has been predictably harsh. Beijing lodged formal diplomatic protests and rejected the characterisation of China as the greatest strategic challenge. Chinese officials and state media accuse Tokyo of fabricating threats to justify neo-militarist ambitions and abandon post-war pacifism.

The White Paper’s commentary on Taiwan is denounced as interference in internal affairs. Japan’s rising defence budget, long-range strike capabilities, AI and unmanned systems, and the framing of defence spending as an economic driver are all presented as evidence of a dangerous trajectory toward a “war state.”

Taiwan has taken a more measured but broadly positive view, seeing Japan’s focus on its southwestern island chains and cross-strait stability as a useful layer of deterrence. South Korea has followed a dual track, with strong official protest over Japan’s repeated claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima islets, while simultaneously deepening practical security cooperation on missiles, AI platforms and unmanned systems driven by the shared North Korean threat.

US reaction

The United States has welcomed the shift. Washington views Japan’s increased spending, stand-off capabilities and technological integration as necessary burden-sharing that strengthens regional deterrence and complements American forward presence. Extended deterrence dialogues reaffirm the nuclear umbrella, while technology and industrial cooperation deepen interoperability.

What remains uncertain is the longer-term trajectory. Will a more capable Japan simply supplement U.S. power and intensify the existing two-way competition with China? Or will it gradually assume a larger independent role that eventually allows Washington greater strategic latitude to focus elsewhere? Administrations in both the United States and China will change, so neither outcome can be assumed. What seems more probable is that Japan’s moves will reinforce Chinese perceptions of encirclement, adding another layer of friction to an already tense regional environment.

For ASEAN the challenge is to adjust without being drawn into rigid camps. Historical memory of Japanese militarism remains a sensitive factor. At the same time, the region cannot ignore the shifting balance of forces. Japan’s strategic action may enhance deterrence in some eyes. To others it risks contributing to the very instability it claims to address.

The Asia-Pacific is entering a more crowded, more militarised and less predictable phase. How the region’s smaller and middle powers navigate this new reality will shape the strategic landscape for years to come.

Japan has come a long way from former prime minister Shigeru Yoshida’s declaration that “The world knows we do not possess any weapons... We have renounced war as an instrument of national policy. We have done this because we believe that the world is moving toward peace.”

The Australian government has embraced Japanese remilitarization enthusiastically as an indispensable pillar in the Indo-Pacific region.